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Preface
This thesis studies the foundations of time in physics. Its origin lies in the urge to
understand the quantummeasurement problem. While the emergence of classical-
ity can be well described within algebraic quantum mechanics of infinite systems,
this can be achieved only in infinite time. This led me to a study of quantum dy-
namics of infinite systems, which turned out to be far less unique than in the case
of finitely many degrees of freedom. In deciding on the correct time evolution the
question appears how time – or rather duration – is being measured. Traditional
quantum mechanics lacks a time observable, and for closed systems in an energy
eigenstate duration is indeed meaningless. A similar phenomenon shows up in
general relativity, where absolute duration (as well as spatial distance) becomes
meaningless due to diffeomorphism invariance. However, by relating different
parts of a closed system through simultaneity (in quantum mechanics as well as
in general relativity), an internal notion of time becomes meaningful.
This similarity between quantum mechanics and general relativity was recognized
in the context of quantum gravity by Carlo Rovelli, who proposed a relational
concept of quantum time in 1990. He showed in a two-oscillator model that, by
using an energy constraint instead of time evolution, the algebra of constants of
motion can be quantized and used to relate so-called1 partial observables. The
main problem with the relational concept of time turns out to be the lack of a fixed
evolution in the quantum domain, where arbitrary superpositions are allowed for
the total system, leading to a possible superposition of different instants of the
internal time. At this point a question naturally arises, which to the best of
our knowledge has not been asked so far: If the system becomes infinite, can
we reconstruct a classical notion of time from algebraic quantum mechanics; and
what do inequivalent representations of the algebra of observables mean for time?
– When trying to find rules, which guarantee agreement of a general notion of
time with the empirical time of classical observers, one is lead to a number of
further questions, whose very meaning is not easily clarified: What is time? Why
is time a totally ordered set, even a one-dimensional differentiable manifold? Why
does time pass by? What determines the direction of time? What is a clock?
– During the last decade foundational physics has seen much progress on the
subject of time; the central issues are however still unsolved – there is still pretty
much to do.
This thesis analyzes the foundation of the relational concept of time in view
of various meanings and problems of ’time’, and it asks whether a ’relational
quantization’ of the free quantum field is possible; see the overview on page vi.
1The notion of partial observable was introduced only recently [Rov01b], thereby putting
the conceptual foundations of relationalism on a solid basis.
i
It could not accomplish its initial goal, a solution of the age-old quantum mea-
surement problem. Nevertheless we feel confident that a solution of this problem
will be possible with a new, physical understanding of time. This will require to
free oneself from preconceptions, to doubt the foundations instead of believing in
them, an act of pleasant emancipation, which allows to discover the real world
behind the shadows we see and too often take for real.
Wu¨rzburg, spring 2004
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Overview
Chapter 1
After a brief historical introduction to the phenomenon of time we present math-
ematical structures often used in talking about time and we discuss the concepts
of time as used in Newtonian mechanics, special and general relativity and quan-
tum mechanics. Thereafter we focus on the relational concept of time and reduce
time to its essence: a simultaneity relation.
Chapter 2
An introduction to three of the main problems of time is given: 1. The arrow of
time in classical and quantum physics from the absolute and relational point of
view. 2. The measurement of time with quantum clocks. 3. The meaning of time
in quantum gravity (without a fixed background metric).
Chapter 3
We discuss Rovelli’s model of two oscillators, which shows the very meaning of
the relational concept of time at the quantum level: Via coherence one oscillator
acts as a clock for the other one. In the first section we generalize this model on
the classical level to the free massless scalar field in one dimension. The second
section is concerned with quantization.
Chapter 4
The last chapter briefly discusses the classicality of time and gives an outlook on
a general dynamics compatible with quantum measurement collapse.
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On arrangement and notation
Each chapter is divided into sections, sections are divided into subsections and,
possibly, subsubsections; numbers include the chapter, e.g. /1.2.3.4/ refers to
subsubsection 4 of subsection 3 of section 2 of chapter 1, and /1/ refers to the
first chapter. Equations are consecutively numbered within each section and
contain the number of the chapter and section, e.g. (1.2.3) denotes equation 3 in
section 2 of chapter 1.
References are cited in square brackets, e.g. [Rov90]. In cases where the literature
is too much to be cited completely, we have tried to include in the references at
least recent reviews or original articles.
By “matter” we mean all forms of energy, not only fermionic matter. If not
otherwise stated, by finite (infinite) quantum systems we mean quantum systems
with a finite (infinite) number of degrees of freedom. We use“quantum mechanics”
and “quantum theory” synonymously. With “state” of a quantum system in the
traditional Hilbert space formalism we usually mean a state vector (and not a
ray), or a density matrix. In /2.1/ “state” does mean a configuration, not a point
in phase space. We use the terms “two-oscillator system” and “two oscillators”
instead of and synonymously with “double pendulum”.
In the context of general relativity, as is customary, we use Einstein’s summation
convention and the range of greek indices is 0, 1, 2, 3, while roman indices take
the values 1, 2, 3 corresponding to 3-space.
Throughout the text we use the following symbols and abbreviations:
T instant
T set of instants
T time operator
t time parameter, or time coordinate
x0 time coordinate in relativity
1S identity mapping on S
V Poisson algebra
C Poisson subalgebra of constants of motion
span(A) vector space spanned by A
gen(A) algebra generated by A
Ran(A) range of A
S(R,R) real-valued Schwartz functions with domain R
SYM(H) symmetric operators on the Hilbert space H
V ,V2,V∞ Poisson algebras
C,C2,C∞ algebras of constants of motion
C∞,g set of generators of C∞
a+n , an creation and annihilation operators
a±ij, b
±
ij constants of motion of the free field involving triples of field modes
θ(x) Heaviside step function (θ(x) = 1, if x ≥ 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise)
iXY inner product of the tensors X and Y
genLie(A) Lie algebra generated by the set A
w.r.t. with respect to
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CHAPTER 1
Concepts of time
In this chapter we study the nature of time in fundamental physical theories.
We put emphasis on its relational character.
The prejudice – which has by no means died
out in the meantime – consists in the faith that
facts in themselves can and should yield scien-
tific knowledge without a free conceptual con-
struction. Such a misconception is possible only
because one does not easily become aware of the
free choice of such concepts, which, through ver-
ification and long usage, appear to be immedi-
ately connected with the empirical material.
Albert Einstein1
Time has for centuries been the subject of scientific investigations and specula-
tions. Only recently has a considerable number of physicists become interested
in the fundamental nature of time, when trying to unify the two great theories
of the last century, quantum mechanics and general relativity. Since Newtonian
mechanics time was steadily “flowing” and was defined up to an overall choice of
a unit of time and an origin. According to Newton, “Absolute, true and mathe-
matical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to
anything external [...]” [New69]. While special relativity rendered time observer
dependent, with the advent of general relativity it became clear that not only time
but even spacetime is only defined up to a diffeomorphic change of coordinates
(general covariance).
Motivated by a speculation of Carlo Rovelli that time has to be understood first of
all in quantum field theory, this work focuses on the relational nature of quantum
time. Quantum dynamics predicts the change of expectations for measurement
1cited in [Sch82, p. 48]
2results during the course of time and therefore involves the measurement of any
quantity as well as time. This relies on the tacit assumption that the quantum
system can act as a carrier of information on time between the (classical) prepa-
ration and measurement devices, or, to put it differently, the quantum system
always shares the same time with the measurement apparatus, even without any
intentional measurement of time being performed. This means, that time is as-
sumed to be a classical observable (i.e. an observable which commutes with all
other observables), and moreover always takes the same values for interacting sys-
tems. This is not at all clear for quantum systems, where superpositions of states
at different times are ruled out by a postulate, not on a physical basis. - What
guarantees that a measurement is performed only at a single instant of time? A
finite measurement apparatus, being a quantum system, needs an external device
to measure time, and so on. Similar to the measurement of any quantum observ-
able we need a von Neumann’s chain regarding the generation of instantaneity.
We hold the opinion that the possibility of instantaneity in quantum theory has
to be explained.
We investigate the intriguing idea that for quantum systems with finitely many
degrees of freedom there is no classical time at all (fundamental timelessness);
we shall reconstruct a classical notion of time on the other hand for a quantum
field with its infinitely many degrees of freedom.
If time is no fundamental observable, why should one try to eliminate it from the
formalism? (After all, time has proved to be an extremely fruitful concept.) We
recall Einstein’s thought experiment where it is not observable locally whether the
frame is accelerated or a gravitational field is present. This famous equivalence
principle stating the unobservability of a quantity2 was the corner stone of general
relativity. Analogously timelessness might give rise to a new fundamental theory,
and in fact is believed to play a central role in quantum gravity.
The current chapter introduces the main concepts of time, with special emphasis
on the relational concept.
Time serves as a means to structure observations of our own and others in a
consistent way and allows us to coordinatize our actions. The notion of a state
signifies observations at a specific instant of time. Observations at different in-
stants of time are connected through dynamical laws, causing the predictive power
of science.
A simple observation of a dynamical law is that of simultaneous recurrence of
events, and in fact was used already five thousand years ago in ancient Egypt,
where the position of stars on the night sky provided a seemingly universal,
eternal clock time. The problematization of the nature of time began two and
a half thousand years ago3 in presocratic philosophy. Heraclitus compares time
2The unobservability of a distinguished inertial frame in special relativity is of the same
kind, and in fact – according to his autobiographical notes [ebPAS79] – Einstein was motivated
by an analogy with ’impotence’ principles of phenomenological thermodynamics to construct
perpetual motion machines.
3At about the same time in Hinduistic culture one of the Upanisads mentions time. We
quote a translation from the Sanskrit original of Maitri Upanisad (VI. 14):
3with a river whose water is always changing, while Parmenides holds that not
change is real, but only permanence.
Zenon, follower of Parmenides, formulated four paradoxes, the best known of
which is the second one, where Achilles cannot win a footrace against a turtle;
these paradoxes later entered into the concept of time as a real line. According to
Democrit atoms and empty space are permanent, while the structures built out of
atoms can change with time. The Pythagoreans, on the contrary, hold that not
substance is eternal, but ideas and mathematical laws. For Plato timelessness
is ideal while change is not. Aristotle dissents: matter has the potentiality of
having a certain form, and motion or change happens when potentiality becomes
actuality. Three centuries later Lucretius, follower of Epicurus, writes: “tempus
item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis consequitur sensus, ...” [Car, 459]; we quote
a translation given by Rovelli [Rov91c, fn. 18]:
“Time does not exist by itself. Time gets meaning from the objects:
from the fact that events are in the past, or that they are here now,
or they will follow in the future. It is not possible that anybody may
measure time by itself; it may only be measured by looking at the
motion of the objects or at their peaceful quiet.”
Another five centuries later Augustinus moves backward and contends, contrary
to Aristotle, that time is a prerequisite for motion and comes from spirit.
This short journey through the early human history of time (for details see [Mai02,
F9¨9,oMa]) shows that there were many concepts of time already before the rise of
modern sciences. Contemporary thought has dealt with time a lot again, and we
refer the reader the the excessive literature, of which the book [Mac91] collects
the most important items from different sciences up to 1991.
Here we are concerned with time in fundamental physical theories. In dealing
with such a fundamental notion like time we first of all have to notice that our
thinking is very deeply biased towards temporal concepts [Rue82]. Every sen-
tence of our languages encodes time in tense. Everyday experiences incessantly
affirm a temporal logic, a clear distinction between “before” and “after”. Being
performed with various kinds of clocks4, time measurements are the most popular
Because of the subtlety, this is the measure: time is of the thing to be
measured. Without a measure, there is no getting hold of the thing to be
measured. Moreover, because of its separateness, the thing to be measured
becomes the measure for the purpose of making itself known. Someone has
said: the one who worships time as Brahman moves on through all the
divisions of time that there are, and time moves very far away from him.
Someone has said:
Because of time, beings move on;
Because of time, they grow up;
In time they reach their end;
Time, though unshaped, possesses shapes.
4For s short history of timekeeping cf. e.g. [oST95]. Clocks will be discussed in /2.2.2/ and
/2.2.4/.
4 Modelling time
measurements of a physical quantity and make it very difficult for us to imagine
a world in which time is not a fundamental concept.
The opinion towards the existence of time at a fundamental level has recently
become quite controversial among physicists. Popular physics books published in
the last decade proclaimed “Timeless reality” [Ste00], the “End of time” [Bar99a]
or “The View from Nowhen” [Pri96]. Julian B. Barbour describes his experience
at an international workshop on time asymmetry in 1991 [Bar94]:
During the workshop, I conducted a very informal straw-poll, putting
the following question to each of the 42 participants:
Do you believe that time is a truly basic concept that must ap-
pear in the foundations of any theory of the world, or is it an effective
concept that can be derived from more primitive notions in the same
way that a notion of temperature can be recovered in statistical me-
chanics?
The results were as follows: 20 said there was no time at a fun-
damental level, 12 declared themselves to be undecided or wished
to abstain, and 10 believed time did exist at the most basic level.
However, among the 12 in the undecided/abstain column, 5 were
sympathetic or inclined to the belief that time should not appear at
the most basic level of theory.
During the last decades time has become a major topic of research in the (quan-
tum) gravity context, see /2.3/ below, as well as in quantum theory, see /2.2.1/.
This section begins with a brief review of mathematical concepts of time /1.1/.
We next locate these concepts in fundamental physical theories, see /1.2/, where
time is shown to lose structure with increasing generality of the theories. From
this discussion we are led to relationalism /1.3/ as fundamental concept of time
that will be explored in the subsequent chapters.
1.1 Modelling time
Different theories use different models of time. In preparation for the next sub-
section we decompose the standard notion of time, the real numbers R, into a
hierarchy of substructures, cf. [Rov95,Kro85]:
(A) Let T be a set with the cardinality of the continuum, |T | = |R|.
(B) Let T be equipped with a topology T.
(C) Let T be a differentiable manifold with local charts ϕT at T ∈ T such
that the topology induced by open sets of R via ϕ−1T coincides with
T.
(D) Let T moreover be isomorphic to the topology of R; this implies that
a (global) chart ϕ : T → R (bijective and C∞) exists.
5(E) Let an Euclidean metric d on T be defined (fixing one global chart
ϕ),
d(T1,T2) := |ϕ(T1)− ϕ(T2)| (T1,T2 ∈ T ).
(F) Let a linear order relation ≤ on T be defined by
T1 ≤ T2 :⇔ ϕ(T1) ≤ ϕ(T2) (T1,T2 ∈ T ).
(G) Let T be equipped with the field structure inherited via ϕ−1 from R,
i.e. define addition in T by
T1 +T2 := ϕ
−1(ϕ(T1) + ϕ(T2)) (T1,T2 ∈ T ),
let the neutral element be ϕ−1(0), and similarly for multiplication:
T1 ·T2 := ϕ−1(ϕ(T1) · ϕ(T2)) (T1,T2 ∈ T ),
with the neutral element ϕ−1(1).
Conditions (A) to (G) imply that T is isomorphic to the real numbers R with
Euclidean metric. We call T ∈ T an instant (of time) or moment of time, T the
set of instants, d the duration (of time) or temporal distance or time lapse and
≤ the time order. By just time we mean T together with a specification of some
of the structures (A) to (G), or possibly others.
ad G: The multiplicative group structure among instants has no physical mean-
ing; neither does addition of instants. What is used in the description of dynam-
ical flows is the sum of durations: Let φt be a flow with “time t” on a set M ,
i.e. a mapping φ : R×M →M, (t, x) 7→ φt(x) with the flow properties φ0 = 1M
and φs ◦ φt = φt+s (s, t ∈ R). The meaning of s, t and t + s is the following:
Given any instant T0 ∈ T the expression φt means that the flow φ has to be
evaluated at that instant Tt ∈ T which is uniquely defined by d∗ (T0,Tt) = t,
where we have introduced a signed duration by d∗ (T,T′) := ±d (T,T′), with
“+” applying in case T ≤ T′ and “−” otherwise. I.e., given any fixed instant
T0, metric and time order provide a bijection between instants and real num-
bers. The expression t+s signifies that instant Tt+s which is uniquely defined by
d∗ (T0,Tt+s) = d∗ (T0,Tt) + d∗ (T0,Ts). The flow φ can thus be characterized
in terms of instants, duration and time order, while the field structure on T has
no physical meaning. Note that the mapping T0 7→ Tt (T0 ∈ T , t ∈ R) is a
time translation; time translations build a group reflecting the additive group of
reals5. (Similarly, the time that enters into Galilei boosts has the meaning of a
duration.)
Note also that independence of the choice of T0 is implicitly contained in the flow
properties. T0 can be understood as “now” and allows an observer to separate
all other instants into two sets, called “past” ({T ∈ T : T ≤ T0, T 6= T0}) and
“future” ({T ∈ T : T0 ≤ T, T 6= T0}). Two unsolved problems are connected
with this: 1) Is it possible to distinguish the “past” and the “future” on a physical
basis? - This is known as the problem of the arrow of time, see /2.1/ below. 2)
Can the meaning of T0 as “now” or “present” be established on a physical basis?
- Because of time translation invariance (sometimes also called homogeneity of
5The set of reals involved here is not T , but the range of the metric.
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time) it is hard to single out exactly one instant (called “now”) in an objective
way6. This might be possible however in a theory describing the subjectiveness of
an observer on a physical basis, cf. the discussion in [Kro85, Epilogue]. A combi-
nation of both problems amounts to the problem of explaining the flow of time7:
There is a change of the“now”(T0 7→ T′0) which causes future instants to become
“nows” and past instants later on, “during the flow of time”. Related questions
are why the past is determined, cannot be influenced and can be remembered,
while the future is not determined, can be influenced and not remembered. These
are as yet open questions.
If we omit (G), we are left with an affine line.
ad F: Given any two instants T1,T2 ∈ T we have either T1 = T2 (“T1 and
T2 are simultaneous”), or T1 < T2 (:⇔ T1 ≤ T2 ∧ T1 6= T2, “T1 lies in the
conventional past of T2” or, equivalently, “T2 lies in the conventional future of
T1”), or T2 < T1 (:⇔ T2 ≤ T1 ∧ T1 6= T2). The question of whether (F)
represents some physically observable relation is known as the debate on the
arrow of time, see /2.1/. In relativity weaker versions of (F) may appear, see
below.
ad E: The topology in (D) is induced by d. As will be seen later, the choice
of a specific metric has limited physical meaning. E.g. in relativity duration is
dependent on the observer’s path in space-time (proper time), see /1.2.4/.
ad D: This allows one to speak of time intervals, i.e. sets of instants, which ϕ
maps to intervals of R. And it fixes the one-dimensional character of time and
as well its linearity; other possibilities would include a cyclic time (T isomorphic
to the topology of S1), a many fingered time (“curves with bifurcations”), a time
with endpoints (T isomorphic to a closed interval), or even more dimensional
times. (See also [Wic03], where a topology generated by half-open intervals is
used in order to render time itself asymmetric.)
Time structure (D) together with (F) is known as topological time [Mit89,Mit95].
ad C: This condition rules out e.g. a discrete time, which is being considered in
quantum gravity /2.3/.
ad B: Some sense of neighborhood seems to be necessary for any notion of con-
tinuous time.
ad A: The cardinality of T could even be lower, cf. our treatment of simultaneity
within the relational concept of time in /1.3.3/.
Generalizations of the standard notion of time can be obtained by successively
dropping the more specialized items (G,F,E,...), but there is no need for this to be
done in the given order. One could e.g. define a metric, linear order and preferred
point directly on T without having a topological or differential structure. (The
6While the instant of the big bang in cosmological models, i.e. in certain solutions of
Einstein’s equations, is certainly a preferred point, it is not with regard to Einstein’s equations.
7This is not to be confused with the concept of a dynamical flow.
7chosen hierarchy will prove useful in the next section, since it is similar to the
hierarchy of physical theories.)
For further discussion of mathematical time structures cf. also [Pim95].
1.2 The role of time in physical theories
Historically, time initially played the role of an absolute entity in Newtonian me-
chanics /1.2.1/ (in contrast to Leibniz’ relational concept /1.3.1/). In /1.2.2/
we describe the homogeneous and presymplectic formalisms, which allow to for-
mulate mechanics in a reparametrization invariant way. In Einstein’s special
theory of relativity time was relativized according to the motion of the observer
/1.2.3/, and finally it was understood as being meaningful only in relation to
material fields in general relativity /1.2.4/. We will briefly sketch these steps and
subsequently ask for the role of time in nonrelativistic /1.2.5/ and relativistic
quantum mechanics /1.2.6/. (See also /2.3/ for quantum gravity, where prob-
lems with time are most pressing.) For each theory we describe a scheme for
time measurement (duration and synchronization), as well as the meaning of si-
multaneity and causality. (Thermodynamical time will be discussed in the next
section in connection with the problem of the direction of time /2.1/.)
We remark that similarly to our itemisation, which largely corresponds to that
of Rovelli [Rov95], Bialynicki-Birula [BB94] distinguishes four notions of time:
Cosmological time, thermodynamical time, time of the laboratory clock, and the
time that enters the definition of the state of the system.
The discussion will show that with increasing generality of the theories’ domains
of application the corresponding notions of time lose structure.
1.2.1 Newtonian mechanics
In Newtonian mechanics one usually starts from time structure (G) /1.1/ and
calls it absolute (Newtonian) or universal time8. When describing the motion
T → R, T 7→ xi(T) of particle i (i = 1, 2, · · · ) in 3-space the instants T ∈ T can
be identified with the values of a specific coordinate t on T , the motion obtaining
the form xi(t), where t is called time parameter.
9 With this choice of t Newton’s
Second Law takes its usual simple form
mi
d2xi(t)
dt2
= K(x1(t),x2(t), . . .) , (1.2.1)
K being the total force acting on a point particle of mass mi at position xi. We
can take K to not explicitly depend on t; otherwise we could incorporate the
sources causing the explicit time dependence into the system and treat them as
dynamical degrees of freedom.
8This refers to observer independence and to independence of position (spatial globality).
9Note that t is both coordinate and parameter.
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The time parameter t is not unique: Upon linear reparametrization
t 7→ t˜ = αt+ β (α, β ∈ R, α 6= 0)
(1.2.1) remains unchanged. The invariance of (1.2.1) under the symmetry oper-
ation β 7→ β′ is called time translation invariance. The arbitrariness of the sign
of α for solutions of (1.2.1) is called time reversal invariance (cf. /2.1.1/).
Thus Newtonian mechanics effectively requires only time structure (E).
The choice of |α| corresponds to a choice of unit of time, which is required to be
the same for all systems in order to make duration (time parameter difference,
i.e. Euclidean metric on R) comparable between noninteracting systems. How is
duration measured? We describe two methods:
(a) Assume that there is an inertial frame of reference in which a body is not
at rest and moving freely, i.e., at different instants it does occupy different
places. We define duration in such a way that its velocity is constant, namely
the duration between two (instantaneous) configurations of this “clock” sys-
tem is defined – up to a scalar multiple, the unit of time – as the distance
between the positions of the body in 3-space. In order to determine the
duration between two configurations of any other system, we determine the
duration between the corresponding simultaneous configurations of the clock
system. (Here we assume hat both systems do not interact.) The determina-
tion of corresponding simultaneous positions is no problem, since Newtonian
mechanics allows for action at a distance.
Since there is no universal velocity in Newtonian mechanics, we can and
must choose an arbitrary unit of time. Since we can in principle attach our
clock (or a copy of it) to any system, the definition of duration and unit
of time derived from this single clock can be extended to that system and
therefore to all of space.
(b) If we do not rely on the presence of this single clock (or any copy of it),
we can determine the unit of time from the (static in nature) units of mass,
distance and force via (1.2.1): The duration between two configurations of a
given system can be measured by attaching to it (with no interaction) a clock
system with just one particle of mass m exposed to a nonvanishing constant
force, moving (for simplicity) in direction x; one measures the distance ∆x
covered by the particle during the two simultaneous instants in an inertial
frame in which its initial velocity vanishes10 (dx
dt
= 0, being invariant under
t 7→ αt, hence not requiring α to be known). From (1.2.1) duration follows
as
∆t =
√
2m∆x
K
.
10This can be achieved e.g. by measuring the distance between the particle and another,
but free particle with the same initial velocity.
9The synchronization of clocks works the same way, and in principle every position
in R3 can be equipped with the same time11. The causal structure is given by the
time order of two events, irrespective of their spatial positions.
What about general, not necessarily linear reparametrizations? If we use another
time parameter τ = f(t) instead of t, where f : R→ R and F = f−1 are at least
C2, then (1.2.1) reads
mi
1
F ′(τ)3
(
F ′(τ)
d2xi
dτ 2
− F ′′(τ)dxi
dτ
)
= K , (1.2.2)
where we have assumed that K is not explicitly time-dependent and F ′ 6= 0.
Since (1.2.2) looks more complicated than (1.2.1), Poincare´ was led to a general
postulate of simplicity of equations in physics. As pointed out in [Mit89, ch. 2]
however, simplicity has no unique meaning, but instead one can require maximal
explanatory power; this favors (1.2.1) against (1.2.2), because it does not contain
an unexplained velocity-dependent term corresponding to an apparent force.
1.2.2 Homogeneous and presymplectic formalism
Instead of choosing a certain parametrization one can rephrase classical non-
relativistic mechanics (in its Hamiltonian formulation) in a reparametrization
invariant way, which is called homogeneous formalism, see [Mit95, §7.3 and §8.1]
and [Mit89, appendix III]:
Let a Lagrangian system with n degrees of freedom, coordinates qk, velocities
q˙k =
dqk(t)
dt
and Lagrangian L(qk, q˙k, t) (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) be given, where t denotes
Newton’s absolute time. The action is S [qk(t)] =
∫ t2
t1
dt L(qk, q˙k, t). Assume that
there are no constraints so that the relation between velocities and momenta,
pk =
dL
dq˙k
, can be inverted; then the Hamiltonian H =
∑n
k=1 pkq˙k − L does not
depend on velocities. The Hamiltonian equations read q˙k =
∂H
∂pk
, p˙k = − ∂H∂qk . We
call this the “original system” and all quantities “original” quantities.
We shall now construct from this system a new one, called parametrized system:
Let an arbitrary diffeomorphic mapping t 7→ τ be given. We define the n + 1
coordinates of the parametrized system,
q¯0(τ) := t(τ) , q¯k(τ) := qk(t(τ)) ,
and the new velocities
q¯′ν(τ) :=
dq¯ν(t(τ))
dτ
(ν = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n) .
The new action is
S¯ [q¯ν(τ)] :=
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ L¯(q¯ν , q¯
′
ν) ,
11The description of a classical mechanical system by a point in configuration space already
makes use of simultaneity in 3-space, by jointly fixing values of coordinates of particles located
at different positions.
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where
L¯(q¯ν , q¯
′
ν) :=
dq¯0(τ)
dτ
L(qk(t(τ)), q˙k(t)|t=q¯0(τ) , t)
=
dq¯0(τ)
dτ
L(q¯k(τ), q¯
′
k(τ) (q¯
′
0(τ))
−1
, q¯0(τ))
is the new Lagrangian having no explicit τ -dependence. Obviously, with τi :=
τ(ti) (i = 1, 2) we have S¯ [q¯ν(τ)] = S [qk(t)] and extremizing S¯ w.r.t. q¯ν yields an
extremum qk(t) := q¯k(q¯
−1
0 (t)) of S. The Euler-Lagrange equations
∂L¯
∂q¯k
− d
dτ
(
∂L¯
∂q¯′k
)
= 0 (k = 1, 2, . . . . , n)
are equivalent to those of the original system.
Now for the Hamiltonian formulation: Let
pk :=
∂L¯
∂q¯′k
=
∂L
∂q˙k
= pk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) ,
p¯0 :=
∂L¯
∂q¯′0
and
H¯ (q¯ν , p¯ν , q¯
′
ν) :=
n∑
ν=0
p¯ν q¯
′
k − L¯ (q¯ν , q¯′ν)
= p¯0q¯
′
0 +
n∑
k=1
pkq˙k
dt
dτ
− L dt
dτ
(1.2.3)
= p0
dt
dτ
+H
dt
dτ
= (p0 +H)
dt
dτ
,
where we have used the abbreviation p0 := p¯0. H¯ does not depend explicitly on
τ , but not all velocities can be eliminated, as we will see shortly.
We first prove that L¯ is homogeneous of degree one in the velocities q¯′ν , i.e.
L¯ =
n∑
ν=0
q¯′ν
∂L¯
∂q¯′ν
. (1.2.4)
For k = 1, 2, . . . , n we have
q¯′k
∂L¯
∂q¯′k
= q¯′kq¯
′
0
∂L(q¯l, z, q¯0)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=q¯′k(q¯′0)
−1
(q¯′0)
−1
= q¯′k
∂L(q¯l, z, q¯0)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=q¯′k(q¯′0)
−1
11
and the remaining ν = 0 term evaluates to
q¯′0
∂L¯
∂q¯′0
= q¯′0L+ (q¯
′
0)
2
n∑
k=1
∂L(q¯l, z, q¯0)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=q¯′k(q¯′0)
−1
(−1)q¯′k (q¯′0)−2
= L¯−
n∑
k=1
q¯′k
∂L(q¯l, z, q¯0)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=q¯′k(q¯′0)
−1
.
Adding both expressions we arrive at (1.2.4), and from this we conclude
∂L¯
∂q¯′µ
=
∂
∂q¯′µ
(
n∑
ν=0
q¯′ν
∂L¯
∂q¯′ν
)
=
∂L¯
∂q¯′µ
+
n∑
ν=0
q¯′ν
∂2L¯
∂q¯µ∂q¯ν
(µ = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n) ,
hence the matrix
(
∂2L¯
∂q¯µ∂q¯ν
)
µ,ν=0,1,2,...,n
has eigenvalue 0 and is not invertible (i.e., L¯
is singular). Therefore not all velocities q¯′ν are expressible in terms of coordinates
and momenta. While this is possible by assumption for the velocities q˙k (k =
1, 2, . . . , n) and thus for q¯′k (k = 1, 2, . . . , n), we cannot eliminate q¯
′
0.
We have now H¯ = H¯ (q¯ν , p¯ν , q¯
′
0) and since we have just reformulated the original
system, the variables cannot all be independent. A constraint is obviously already
given by (1.2.4), which is equivalent to
H¯ (q¯ν , p¯ν , q¯
′
0) = 0 ,
or equivalently
p0 +H(qk, pk, t) = 0 , (1.2.5)
which fixes the momentum canonically conjugate to q¯0 = t.
Since (1.2.4) means
L¯ =
n∑
ν=0
p¯ν q¯
′
ν ,
we can write the action in Hamiltonian form as follows:
S¯ [q¯ν , p¯ν ] =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
n∑
ν=0
p¯ν q¯
′
ν
This expression is obviously invariant under diffeomorphic transformations of
the parameter τ . Not all variables of S¯ can be varied independently; we take
into account for the constraint (1.2.5) by incorporating it with a Langrangian
multiplier λ(τ):
S¯ [q¯ν , p¯ν , λ] =
∫ τ2
τ1
dτ
(
n∑
ν=0
p¯ν q¯
′
ν − λ (p¯0 +H)
)
Variation of this action leads to
q¯′ν = λ
∂p¯0
∂p¯ν
+ λ
∂H
∂p¯ν
,
−p¯′ν = λ
∂p¯0
∂q¯ν
+ λ
∂H
∂q¯ν
.
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For ν = 0 we obtain
dt
dτ
=
dq¯0
dτ
= λ (1.2.6)
and
−dp0
dt
=
∂H
∂t
,
while for the indices k = 1, 2, . . . , n we reobtain the Hamiltonian equations of the
original system,
q˙k =
∂H
∂pk
,
−p˙k = ∂H
∂qk
.
Using (1.2.3) the last four equations can also be rewritten:
q¯′ν =
∂H¯
∂p¯ν
, (1.2.7)
−p¯′ν =
∂H¯
∂q¯ν
(1.2.8)
A Poisson bracket for the parametrized system can also be defined,{
f¯ , g¯
}
:=
n∑
ν=0
(
∂f¯
∂q¯ν
∂g¯
∂p¯ν
− ∂f¯
∂p¯ν
∂g¯
∂q¯ν
)
,
where f¯ , g¯ are functions of q¯ν and p¯ν .
Example. Figure 1.2.1 shows the geometrical meaning of parametrization for
the canonical variables considering as example the free particle in one dimension.
Let us now collect, interpret and discuss the results.
(i) We started from a Hamiltonian system with Hamiltonian H and time pa-
rameter t and constructed a new Hamiltonian system with one more de-
gree of freedom corresponding to time, with Hamiltonian H¯ = q¯′0 (p¯0 +H)
and a new, arbitrary and physically meaningless parameter τ . The new
(“parametrized”) system is equivalent to the original one, iff we impose the
constraint p¯0 +H = 0.
(ii) An advantage of practical importance for numerical calculations lies in the
fact that the Hamiltonian of the parametrized system is not explicitly time-
dependent. (This would be especially useful, if the original system had
time-dependent constraints.)
(iii) While in the original system time is both a measure of duration and the
evolution parameter (“time parameter”), these roles are separated in the
parametrized system: The time variable q¯0 = t is on par with the other
canonical variables; evolution is controlled by a parameter τ , whose values
correspond to instants, but whose metric is physically meaningless.
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x
x
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Figure 1.2.1. Evolution of a parametrized free particle in one
dimension with coordinate q1 = x. The original time evolution t 7→
x(t) = vt is replaced with the evolution τ 7→ (t(τ), x(τ) = vt(τ)).
The graph may be smoothly deformed along the τ -axis without
changing physics.
(iv) In classical mechanics the canonical variable q¯0 = t is observable indirectly:
If we had attached12 to the original system an (or the unique) ideal clock
consisting of a free particle with motion qn+1 =: vt, then comparison of q¯0(τ)
12Attaching in classical mechanics to a given system another one without interaction does
not essentially change the nature of the given system, in contrast with quantum mechanics.
14 The role of time in physical theories
and 1
v
q¯n+1(τ) (with the same τ -value, meaning simultaneity) would show that
q¯0 has the meaning of absolute time, possibly up to a linear transformation.
(v) If we try to understand the canonical variable q¯0 as a spatial coordinate,
then we are led back to absolute time: Assume that parametrizing can be
understood as attachment of a physical system. The original Hamiltonian
was H, the new one is p¯0 + H; thus the attached system has Hamiltonian
H0 = p¯0 and is attached without interaction. The Hamiltonian equations
for the attached system read
q¯′0 =
∂H0
∂p¯0
= 1, p¯′0 =
∂H0
∂q¯0
= 0 ,
describing essentially a free particle. The first equation implies τ = q¯0 + β
′
(β′ ∈ R), so that the evolution is time evolution. Moreover, a free particle
is by definition related to absolute time t through q¯0 = αt + β, with some
constants α, β ∈ R. It follows that τ is linearly dependent on t, i.e. the
evolution parameter coincides with absolute time and cannot be chosen ar-
bitrarily.
In other words, we have either a canonical absolute time variable, which
is not directly observable (in terms of position measurements), or we are
forced to use absolute time as parameter, which is not directly observable
either. (The lack of direct observability becomes important in quantum the-
ory /1.2.5/.) In conclusion, the existence of absolute time is postulated in
classical mechanics.
In the theory of gauge systems initiated by Dirac [Dir64] the homogeneous for-
malism is known as “parametrizing” or “rendering a system generally covari-
ant” [HT92, ch. 4]. The latter is according to general relativity, which is in-
variant under (diffeomorphic) reparametrizations and therefore called generally
covariant, see /1.2.4/ below.
Since
{
f¯ , H¯
}
= df¯
dτ
is equivalent to
{
f¯ , p¯0 +H
}
= 1
q¯′0
df¯
dτ
, and with f (qk, pk, t) =
f¯ (q¯ν , p¯ν) we have
df¯
dτ
= q¯′0
df
dt
(assuming ∂f¯
∂p¯0
= 0), it follows
{
f¯ , p¯0 +H
}
= df
dt
.
Hence the gauge transformation generated by the primary first class constraint
p¯0 + H is time evolution. For short one often says “dynamics is (the unfold-
ing of) gauge”. – Counting dimensions, we have a 2n + 2-dimensional phase
space of the parametrized system; there is one constraint restricting orbits to a
2n+1-dimensional hypersurface; after identifying gauge orbits with points in the
physical phase space, we are left with a 2n-dimensional manifold, in full agreement
with the dimension of the phase space of the original system.
In coordinate-free language the homogeneous formalism can be formulated as
follows (see e.g. [Rov90, Rov02a]): The Hamiltonian equations for the original
system read
iXσ = dH , (1.2.9)
where σ =
∑n
k=1 dqk∧dpk is a symplectic (i.e. nondegenerate, closed) [AM78, ch.
3] two-form on phase space Γ. (1.2.9) determines the vector field X = ∂
∂t
, whose
integral curves s(t) (s ∈ Γ) are motions with time parameter t.
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The phase space of the parametrized system is Γ¯ = Γ × R2 and we define a
symplectic form on it as follows:
σ¯ = σ + dq¯0 ∧ dp¯0 (1.2.10)
Let X¯ be a vector field on Γ¯ which fulfils
iX¯ σ¯ = dH¯ , (1.2.11)
where as above H¯ = q¯′0 (p¯0 +H) and q¯
′
0 =
dq¯0
dτ
with some τ .
With the identification X¯ = ∂
∂τ
this is equivalent to the equations of motion (1.2.7,
1.2.8) of the parametrized system. As we have already shown, on the hypersurface
Σ :=
{
p ∈ Γ¯ : p¯0 +H = 0
} ⊂ Γ¯ and with q¯0 = t these are equivalent to those
of the original system. To see this in coordinate-free language, we decompose X¯
into components tangent to Γ and R2:
X¯ =
∂
∂τ
=
n∑
ν=0
(
∂q¯ν
∂τ
∂
∂q¯ν
+
∂p¯ν
∂τ
∂
∂p¯ν
)
=
∂t
∂τ
n∑
k=1
(
∂q¯k
∂t
∂
∂q¯k
+
∂p¯k
∂t
∂
∂p¯k
)
+
∂q¯0
∂τ
∂
∂q¯0
+
∂p¯0
∂τ
∂
∂p¯0
=
∂t
∂τ
∂
∂t
∣∣∣∣
Γ
+ q¯′0
∂
∂q¯0
+ p¯′0
∂
∂p¯0
Requiring now q¯0 = t and restricting X¯ to Σ (thereby getting rid of
∂
∂p¯0
) we
obtain, using (1.2.10),
i X¯|
Σ
σ¯
∣∣∣
Σ
= iq¯′0Xσ + iq¯′0 ∂∂q¯0
(dq¯0 ∧ dp¯0)
∣∣∣
Σ
= q¯′0 (iXσ + dp0|Σ)
= q¯′0 (iXσ − dH)
on the one hand, and
dH¯
∣∣
Σ
= q¯′0 d (p¯0 +H)|Σ = 0
on the other hand; assuming q¯′0 6= 0 and using the last two formulas, the restriction
of (1.2.11) to Σ is immediately seen to be equivalent to (1.2.9). In geometrical
terms this means that the integral curves of X¯
∣∣
Σ
are the graphs of the integral
curves of X¯.
The homogeneous formalism is a special case of the presymplectic formalism,
which requires first a definition:
Definition. A two-form ω on a differentiable manifoldM is called nondegenerate,
if for all m ∈M
(∀y ∈ Tm(M) ω (x, y) = 0)⇒ x = 0 (x ∈ Tm(M)) ,
where Tm(M) is the tangent space to M in m.
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A symplectic form is a nondegenerate closed two-form. A presymplectic form is
more general in that the requirement of nondegeneracy is dropped. The two-form
σ¯|Σ is presymplectic, since i X¯|
Σ
σ¯
∣∣∣
Σ
= 0 while X¯
∣∣
Σ
6= 0. (It is true in general, that
a closed two-form on an odd-dimensional manifold cannot be nondegenerate.)
In general, for a presymplectic mechanical system with degenerate two-form ω
and Hamiltonian H˜ the equation iXω = dH˜
13 does not uniquely determine a
vector field X, and hence the solutions of the equations of motion, since there
may be a nonzero vector field Y with iY ω = 0 and thus iX+αY ω = dH˜, where
α is an arbitrary scalar. – In our case of the homogeneous formalism we have
ω = σ¯|Σ, dH˜ = dH¯
∣∣
Σ
= 0, X = 0, Y = X¯
∣∣
Σ
and the scalar α corresponds to a
reparametrization of the solution curves to X¯
∣∣
Σ
.
While every symplectic system can be cast into a presymplectic one through
parametrization, the converse is not true: There are presymplectic systems which
do not arise from symplectic ones through parametrization. E.g. the topology
might not allow to split off a coordinate q0 ∈ R, or the restriction of the presym-
plectic form to the remaining coordinates might not be symplectic, or the param-
eter t being uniquely determined by the symplectic evolution on the hypersurface
might not coincide with q0.
For later use we note: Any (not nondegenerate) presymplectic system with con-
stant Hamiltonian is reparametrization invariant.
The generalization of symplectic mechanics, where only a presymplectic form is
available, is called presymplectic mechanics or presymplectic formalism. There
is also a theory of canonical transformations of presymplectic systems, see e.g.
[CGIR85], and elements of a presymplectic formulation of Lagrangian mechanics
can be found in [CR95].
1.2.3 Special relativity
Since there is a maximal signalling velocity (speed of light, c) in special relativity,
there is no means to instantaneously compare the readings of clocks at different
positions. Consequently the notion of simultaneity becomes problematic. Mit-
telstaedt’s book [Mit89] describes the conceptual foundations in an illuminating
way; we will sketch the main points in the light of our discussion of time struc-
tures /1.1/ above. (For an axiomatic foundation of special relativity based on
free particles and light signals as primitive concepts confer [Sch73]; Mittelstaedt’s
approach however has the advantage of working out the physically testable as-
sumptions more clearly with the status of axioms, especially the equality of the
maximal signalling velocity and the speed of light.)
In principle each point in space can be equipped with a tiny clock, for instance
with Einstein’s ideal light clock : A light signal is reflected back and forth between
two parallel mirrors and the number of reflections as counted on one mirror is
proportional to duration at this mirror’s position. In the limit that the distance
between the mirrors approaches zero, a time is being defined at a single position.
13For conditions on the solvability of this equation cf. [GNH78].
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(In classical mechanics this limit is unproblematic.) To be more precise, we have
a set of instants Tp for any p ∈ R3, together with time structures (A) to (F)
/1.1/. Especially we have a duration dp and a time order ≤p for all p ∈ R3,
and by analogy with the discussion in /1.1/ we introduce a signed duration d∗p
providing a bijection between instants and the real numbers which are measured
by the ideal clock. (With p we denote the points of 3-space, irrespective of what
coordinates are assigned to these points by observers.)
Next we want to make instants at different positions comparable, in order to
be able to describe motions: Let a particle be located at p ∈ R3 at instant
T ∈ Tp with local clock reading t(p) = d∗p(T,T0) ∈ R, where T0 ∈ Tp is some
fixed instant. Assume we find the particle at position p′ ∈ R3, where the local
clock reads t(p′) = d∗p′(T
′,T′0) ∈ R with fixed T′0 ∈ Tp′ . In order to predict the
observable number t(p′) (arrival time at p′) from t(p) and laws of motion, we
must fix a relation between an instant at p and an instant at p′ (e.g. T0 and T′0),
called simultaneity relation.
Before continuing with synchronization we must first discuss how to distinguish
the points p of the spatial manifold R3 on a physical basis. For this purpose we
need a reference frame. By this we mean (compare [Mit89]) a set of reference
points ideally filling all of space, where reference point means a distinguishable14,
noninteracting material basis located approximately in a point15 and carrying an
infinitesimal Einstein’s light clock. The reason to require this is that two points
without any distinguishable physical property would have to be considered iden-
tical. Empirically we know that any reference frame is topologically isomorphic
to R3 and all points of R3 are distinguishable.
Given a reference frame we can define coordinates xk (k = 1, 2, 3) on R3. In
general, these coordinates might even depend on local time, i.e. xk = xk(p, t(p)),
but we restrict our considerations to the case of a coordinate system at rest in the
reference frame (also called a comoving coordinate system), xk = xk(p). Empiri-
cally we find that the coordinate functions provide an isomorphism between the
topology of R3 and the topology of the reference frame.
A reference frame in which every free body moves along a straight line (or doesn’t
change its position) in a coordinate system at rest in this frame, is called an
inertial system or inertial frame; if gravitational interaction is negligible, then
neutral bodies may serve as free bodies. We call a coordinate system at rest in
an inertial frame an inertial coordinate system.
Let two free bodies be at rest at points p1, p2 ∈ R3. If we send light signals from
p1 at constant intervals ∆t1(p1) to p2, then the signals arrive at p2 at constant
intervals ∆t2(p2) = ∆t1(p1), since the local clocks were constructed in the same
way. Moreover, light signals preserve the time order; hence they provide an
identification of instants such that we can empirically verify d∗p1 = d
∗
p2
. This
relation holds true, if we send the signals backward, thereby identifying different
instants. There are even more methods to identify instants: Einstein’s method
14Note that distinguishability of reference points is required throughout time.
15Infinitesimal adjacency, or in other words topology, is assumed to be a primitive notion
of the theory, testable directly in experiments.
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consists of sending a light signal from p1 at T1 ∈ Tp1 to p2, where it arrives at
T2 ∈ Tp2 and is immediately reflected back to p1, where it arrives at T′1 ∈ Tp1 ; he
proposed to identify the instant T ∈ Tp1 fulfilling t1(T) = 12 (t1(T1) + t1(T′1)) as
simultaneous with T2; for obvious reasons this synchronization method is often
called radar synchronization. We cannot however identify any T > T′1 or any
T < T1 with T2, because this would violate causality (light arriving before being
sent)16. Altogether, we can define any T with
t1(T) = t1(T1) + ε (t1(T
′
1)− t1(T1)) ,
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, as simultaneous with T2. The so-called ε-parameter shows the
conventionality of simultaneity [Jan02]. Since Tp1 and Tp2 carry the same metric,
this synchronization procedure (with fixed ε) works for any and for all instants.
There is a long and continuing debate [Ryn01b, Ryn01a,Min02a] on whether ε
does have a naturally fixed value. A value ε 6= 1
2
would mean that the forward and
backward velocity of light (between p1 and p2) are different. With the postulate
of an isotropic velocity of light Einstein’s definition (ε = 1
2
) is retained. This
postulate can however not be verified experimentally. In order to not single
out one entity (light) as special (other phenomena might not be isotropic), a
more general postulate requires that any synchronization procedure must not
single out one preferred spatial direction; from this, again, ε = 1
2
follows. A less
popular opinion holds that on the contrary space need not be isotropic, and what
is measurable is only the two-way velocity of light, never the one-way velocity.
In this approach all ε ∈ [0; 1] are possible. Recently it was even argued that
different forward and backward velocities of light are measurable: By considering
circular signal propagation, being observed in a rotating frame, in [GS97] it was
claimed – making use of general relativity – that not only can the one-way velocity
of light be observed, but also the forward and backward velocities of light can
differ for frames with a nonvanishing relative velocity; in [JS03] however the
misconceptions therein (mainly the incorrect usage of general relativistic higher
order corrections to the special relativistic approximation in the case of circular
geometry) and in the recent literature have been clarified, and the Sagnac effect
was shown to be in accordance with the principles of special relativity; also the
problem of synchronization of clocks on a rotating platform was explored. The
assumption of equal forward and backward velocities of light is hence not at odds
with experiment.
Let us now return to motion. We pick out a free body which is not at rest in an
inertial coordinate system and therefore moves along a straight line. We param-
etrize this line so that position depends linearly on the parameter, xk(t) = vkt,
and we call the parameter t time parameter ; it is defined up to linear transfor-
mations. Empirically we find that t is proportional to the time t(xk) measured
by the local clocks at xk, which we now assume to be synchronized by any of the
above procedures.
16The consistency with causality is a main restriction for the definition of synchronization
procedures.
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So far our description was based on a fixed inertial frame and a coordinate system
at rest in this frame. We have identified the local times in this frame with a syn-
chronization procedure, resulting in a spatially global time coordinate17. We thus
have a spacetime coordinate system, and free bodies move along straight lines in
this 4-dimensional coordinate system. – The relativity principle now states that
all inertial frames provide equivalent descriptions of a physical system. Let two
inertial frames and corresponding spacetime coordinate systems (x, t) and (x′, t′),
where the same synchronization procedure has been used, be given. Since free
bodies in (x, t) are also free in (x′, t′), straight lines must be mapped into straight
lines upon coordinate transformation. In axiomatic relativity it is then shown
that together with homogeneity of space and time the linearity of the transfor-
mation can be derived. One next requires that the transformations have a group
structure and that they preserve the causal structure. The resulting transforma-
tion equation contains a free parameter v∞ (w.r.t.g. v∞ ≥ 0) with the meaning
of a maximal velocity. Choosing v∞ = ∞ reproduces Galilei transformations,
while v∞ = c < ∞ results in the well known Lorentz transformations. The last
equation is necessary for ε = 1
2
[Mit89, ch. VI], but ε = 1
2
is conventional. The
true reason for v∞ = c (conversely implying ε = 12) lies in the fundamental axiom
of Lorentz invariance, which means: Given any Lorentz system18 and any equiv-
alent system (such that all of physics looks the same from within each system),
both are connected by a Lorentz transformation:
Given one Lorentz system L0 with coordinates (t0,x0) ∈ R4, every other Lorentz
system Lv has a relative velocity v ∈ R3 (|v| < c), and its coordinates (tv,xv) ∈
R4 are connected to those of the original system through a Lorentz transforma-
tion19 (up to translations):
tv =
t0 − vx0c2√
1− v2
c2
,
xv =
x0 − vt0√
1− v2
c2
We thus have no unique time in special relativity, but a 3-parameter family of
times of type (F) /1.1/ and bijective (even linear) mappings between them, which
however depend on position. (“Time and space are linked together indissolubly.”)
The metrics of these times are different. (For v 6= 0, tv is dilated w.r.t. t0.) Each
time corresponds to an inertial system, and can be measured at an arbitrary point
x ∈ R3 (via synchronization). A fixed point in an inertial frame is also called
an inertial observer, and if we conceive of an inertial observer as a body at rest
17Of course, within a finite time only points separated by a finite distance can be synchro-
nized; for an inertial observer the synchronizable region in spacetime is an intersection of a
forward and a backward light cone, also called diamond or double cone in algebraic quantum
field theory [Haa96].
18A Lorentz system is an inertial coordinate system, which has been extended to a coordi-
nate system on spacetime (using a synchronization procedure), and which has the metric tensor
ηµν = diag(1;−1;−1;−1) (µ, ν = 0, 1, 2, 3).
19The notation is consistent in case v = 0.
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in this frame carrying a tiny clock, then its time is by definition the time at its
position in this frame.
For an accelerated observer A proper time is defined as the time that is measured
by a clock carried along with A. In special relativity the metric along worldlines
can locally be approximated with the duration of an inertial observer I ′ moving
with the same instantaneous velocity v as seen from an inertial observer I, i.e.
dτA = dtI′ .
Integration along the worldline gives the metric of A’s proper time,
∆τA =
∫ tI,2
tI,1
√
1− v
2(tI)
c2
dtI .
The causal structure, which does not depend on a particular inertial observer’s
description, depends on both time and space, too: For timelike events it is given
by the time order; for two arbitrary spacelike events A, B one can choose inertial
frames in which they are arbitrarily time-ordered (A future to B, B future to A
or A simultaneous to B), i.e. simultaneity is frame dependent.
Let us finally mention that the presymplectic formalism provides the only pos-
sibility for a Lorentz covariant formulation of mechanics, since a distinguished
duration (corresponding to a choice of Lorentz frame) is not required in this
formalism.
1.2.4 General relativity
As opposed to special relativity /1.2.3/, there is no independent (material) ref-
erence frame in general relativity: Since gravity affects all kinds of matter, also
reference points interact with the bodies to be referenced. If we assume that a
reference point has negligible mass, then it does not affect the motion of other
bodies, but its motion is affected by other bodies through the gravitational field
they cause at the position of the reference point. Under these circumstances
the analogue of inertial motion is free fall: A body is called freely falling, if it
is not exposed to forces other than gravity. An approximately massless freely
falling body is called a reference point. A reference frame in general relativity
consists of an approximately continuous, but incoherent distribution of matter,
which is freely falling. As in special relativity we assume each reference point
to be furnished with a tiny and approximately massless Einstein’s light clock, so
that the presence of the clock does not alter the gravitational field, and the local
gravitational field at the position of the clock can be considered homogeneous.
For now the reading of this clock does not have the meaning of some duration
(which could be compared to other clocks), it just serves to distinguish instants
λ along the path of this reference point.
Coordinates
Following Rovelli’s proposal [Rov01a] (see also [Rov03, sec. 2.4.6]) we introduce
physical coordinates for reference points: Assume that there is an event in the
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distant past, where one reference point has ’decayed’ into 4 equal reference points
(µ = 0, 1, 2, 3), which are all furnished with senders emitting radio signals (in
different frequency bands) with a message containing the reading xµ of their
respective Einstein’s light clock into all directions of 3-space. Any other reference
point can receive these 4 radio signals at any instant λ (provided it is not too
far in the past) and thus obtains 4 coordinates xµ = xµ(λ). In general it is not
necessary that these 4 real numbers allow to distinguish different reference points
and different instants along the path of a reference point, but empirically one
finds that this can be ensured in a simple way: One considers a decay where the
initial directions of the 4 senders are maximally symmetric: In the rest frame
of the ’decaying reference point’ they shall move from the center (decay event)
to the corners of a tetrahedron. – Here one has to measure angles, but this is
possible in special relativity, which valid locally due to
Einstein’s equivalence principle [Car97]:
(i) In sufficiently small regions of spacetime, the laws of physics are reduced to
those of special relativity.
(ii) It is impossible to detect the existence of a gravitational field.20
We thus have coordinates for all reference points and all instants which are not
too far in the past, and as long as we neglect spacetime singularities.
Coordinate time
The ’time coordinate’ x0 has no special meaning for the reference point; the
choice of the coordinates serves only to label and distinguish the points of space-
time and is a mere matter of convenience. Coordinate time x0 does not have
the meaning of an observable duration for the reference point, it can always be
reparametrized.
Proper time
Empirically one finds that for any reference point, with Einstein’s light clock
reading λ, the dependencies xµ(λ) obey a second order differential equation:
d2xµ
dλ2
+ Γµαβ
dxα
dλ
dxβ
dλ
= C(λ)
dxµ
dλ
(1.2.12)
In Newtonian mechanics equation (1.2.2) obtains the simple form (1.2.1) through
the choice of a distinguished parametrization (with the meaning of Newtonian
time): The term with one first derivative drops out. Except for the term Γµαβ
dxα
dλ
dxβ
dλ
equation (1.2.12) is equivalent to Newton’s Second Law reparametrized, and for
vanishing external forces. As in Newtonian mechanics we can get rid of the term
with one first derivative [Mit89, ch. VIII]: Define τ by d
2τ
dλ2
= C(λ)dτ
dλ
(which
determines τ up to linear transformations); then (1.2.12) is easily seen to be
20One cannot decide on whether the acceleration of a body is due to the choice of reference
frame, or due to actual forces (cf. Einstein’s famous elevator thought experiment). One also
cannot detect a gravitational field using several bodies, since the proportionality of inertial and
gravitational mass is the same for all bodies (weak equivalence principle).
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equivalent to
d2xµ
dτ 2
+ Γµαβ
dxα
dτ
dxβ
dτ
= 0 . (1.2.13)
The value of C(λ) can be measured along the path of each reference point, and
thus τ is uniquely defined (up to linear transformations). This distinguished pa-
rameter τ is called affine parameter (of the curve xµ(τ)) or proper time (of the
respective reference point, or along its worldline). In fact locally it agrees with
the special relativistic notion of proper time: The connection Γµαβ(x) is empiri-
cally found to arise from a metric gµν(x) (spacetime is thus a (3+1)-dimensional
pseudo-Riemannian manifold); in this case the affine parameter τ is known to be a
measure for the length of the curve, c2(dτ)2 = gµνdx
µdxν (see e.g. [Wal84, p. 42f]).
On the other hand according to Einstein’s relativity principle one can find new
coordinates x′µ in which Γ′µαβ(x0) = 0 and g
′
µν(x0) = ηµν := diag(1;−1;−1;−1)
locally around x0, so that the affine line element dτ can be calculated in a (special
relativistic) reference frame I0 in which the reference point is at rest [Mit89, ch.
VIII]:
c2(dτ)2 = gµνdx
µdxν = ηµνdx
′µdx′ν = c2(dt′I0)
2
Here dt′I0 is the proper time of special relativity. Furthermore, because of Γ
′µ
αβ(x0)
= 0 in the frame I0 the reference point moves on a straight line and uniformly,
d2x′µ
dτ2
= 0, so that I0 is a local inertial frame.
Using local inertial frames, also the proper time of bodies falling non-freely along
a timelike worldline is physically meaningful. More precisely, it is the duration
of proper time; the origin is arbitrary, and the unit of proper time and unit of
length are chosen such that the speed of light equals c in a local inertial frame.
The duration between two arbitrary timelike events in general depends on the
worldline connecting them. While this is already known from the twins paradox
in special relativity, here in addition the dynamics of the gravitational field gµν
has to be known.
In conclusion, there is a metric on each worldline called proper time, which de-
pends on the gravitational field gµν and its canonically conjugate momentum
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piµν . The evolution of gµν cannot be expressed in dependence on proper time along
a single world line; a suitable description of the dynamics of the gravitational field
requires more than proper time.
Synchronization
While in special relativity free bodies at rest in an inertial coordinate system could
be used to mark positions, in general relativity freely falling reference points do
in general change their distance over (coordinate) time. But there is an analogue
of an inertial coordinate system, see [Mit89, ch. VIII], whose presentation we
follow closely: One defines comoving coordinates as those coordinates, whose
spatial values are constant for all freely falling particles and whose time coordinate
coincides with the proper time of the respective freely falling particle.
21For a Hamiltonian formulation of classical general relativity cf. for instance [Wal84, ap-
pendix E].
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Given any coordinate system xλ and the metric tensor gµν in these coordinates
one can find comoving coordinates x′λ in the following way: Let uµ(xλ) be the
velocity field of the approximately continuous system of reference points in the
given coordinates. One requires the velocity in the comoving coordinates to be
u′µ =
∂x′µ
∂xν
uν = δµ0 . (1.2.14)
This implies u′ν = g′ν0 and u′νu′ν = g′00. By appropriate normalization of u
′µ
one obtains g′00 = 1, which means that the proper time τ of each reference point
coincides with coordinate time x′0.
Using (1.2.14) and g′00 = 1 the geodesic equation (1.2.13) in the new coordinates
is equivalent to
0 =
du′µ
dτ
+ Γ′µαβu
′αu′β
= Γ′µ00u
′0u′0
=
1
2
g′µα (g′α0,0 + g′0α,0 − g′00,α)u′0u′0
= g′µαg′α0,0u′0u′0 ,
hence g′α0,0 must vanish. This means in particular that g′i0 (i = 1, 2, 3) is time-
independent, so that the line element takes the form
(dx′0)2 + 2g′i0(x′k)dx′idx′0 + g′ij(x′λ)dx′idx′j .
One may ask whether there is even a coordinate system in which space and time
are completely separated, i.e., where also g′i0 = 0. This would be a comoving
and time-orthogonal (or synchronous) coordinate system. These coordinates are
also called Gaussian normal coordinates ( [Mit89, fn. on p. 162], [Wal84, p. 42f])
and have the following properties: Spacetime is foliated into hypersurfaces x′0 =
const.; geodesics are everywhere orthogonal to the hypersurfaces and have spatial
coordinates x′i = const.; the affine parameter of geodesics (proper time) coincides
with x′0; the hypersurfaces x′0 = const. consist of simultaneous events for all
observers moving along geodesics.22
Gaussian normal coordinates do not exist for general spacetimes; as shown in
[Mit89, ch. VIII] the normalized velocity field u′µ has to be curl-free, which can
however be experimentally verified for general relativity. The possibility g′i0 = 0
corresponds to Einstein synchronization when using light signals. (While in spe-
cial relativity the choice ε = 1
2
of the synchronization parameter is completely
conventional, general relativity as a theory with stronger self-consistency require-
ments [Mit89, ch. VIII] puts further conditions on the possibility of radar syn-
chronization with ε = 1
2
.) With appropriate g′i0 6= 0 any two spacelike events
22We should perhaps point out the use of a time coordinate common to all freely falling
observers: Assume that observer O1 wants to send a message so that observer O2 will receive
it at some particular time. If O1 knows the worldlines of himself and O2, and if he has enough
knowledge about the gravitational field along the possible light paths (geodesics) between him
and O2, then he can calculate the time at which to send the message. (In special relativity
knowledge about the velocities of O1 and O2 would suffice.)
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can be made simultaneous as in special relativity. (Recent work [Min02b] shows
that the arbitrariness of synchronization can be understood as a choice of gauge
in the formalism of gauge theories.)
In conclusion, the general relativistic analogue of the special relativistic iner-
tial frame is a reference frame (an approximately continuous system of reference
points, i.e. incoherent, freely falling and nearly massless particles, with clocks at-
tached to them), which has a curl-free velocity field. This latter condition ensures
that two reference points leaving both from event A, taking different paths and
finally arriving both at event B measure the same time difference between A and
B; the twins paradox does not appear.
In cases where one has no reference frame of freely falling particles, but only accel-
erated particles the introduction of appropriate coordinates is more complicated
(see e.g. [PV00,AL03]).
We had assumed that clocks measuring proper time are attached to the reference
points. Such clocks are called standard clocks and from the outset we could only
assume that they were constructed in the same way (e.g. as tiny Einstein’s light
clocks). If one assumes that general relativity (or just a Weylian spacetime model)
is valid, then one can verify whether a real clock is a standard clock by using
elementary procedures based essentially only on freely falling (or even accelerated)
bodies and light signals, see [Per94]. On the other hand, the assumption of the
existence of clocks in the above reasoning rests on the local validity of special
relativity. If one does not assume this characteristic of general relativity from
the outset, then one can use the axiomatic approach of Ehlers, Pirani and Schild
(EPS) [EPS72] (see also a summary thereof in [LP03, appendix C] as well as
[AL94,L0¨1]) for the foundation of spacetime structures, which is based solely on
empirical facts about light rays and freely falling particles and does not assume
the existence of clocks.
General spacetimes
Proper time and synchronization as sketched above face problems when spacetime
singularities are involved, and in general they are meaningful only for bounded
regions, not globally, since for general spacetimes one cannot choose Gaussian
normal coordinates everywhere. If this were the case, one would have a cosmic
time, which is used e.g. in Robertson-Walker models of the universe, where the
metric is ds2 = c2dt2 − a(t) (dx21 + dx22 + dx23). In general there is a hierarchy of
causal structures weaker than cosmic time, see. e.g. [HE73, ch. 6], or [Wal84, ch.
8].
At the bottom of this hierarchy lies temporal orientability and chronology. Both
notions are concerned with temporal ordering: The first ensures the existence of
past and future locally, and the second excludes the possibility of closed timelike
curves [Ear97]. In fact there are homogeneous, but non-isotropic spacetimes
(Go¨del universes, [HE73, sec. 5.7]), which are temporally orientable, but allow
for closed timelike curves and thus for “time travel” [AM00]; these solutions to
Einstein’s equations are however considered unphysical.
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1.2.5 Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics uses a time parameter t to describe the evo-
lution of the state of a system. This parameter is not an observable of the system
itself (see /2.2.1/), but of a classical environment. The evolution of the system
is described in such a way that to each value of t corresponds a state of the sys-
tem, which determines the expectations for instantaneous measurements taking
place at an instant, which is determined by the fact that a classical clock shows
the value t. By this a classical environment and the existence of a Newtonian
absolute time is presumed.
For solutions of the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation with a certain en-
ergy E the time evolved state vector is the product of an initial state vector
and a complex phase e−
i
~Et, which is unobservable; the state is therefore called
stationary.
The appearance of t-dependent potentials in the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation can be understood as an effective influence of a (semi-)classical en-
vironment at instant t (as determined by a classical clock). In [BR00] it was
shown, that certain t-dependent potentials arise from an interaction of the quan-
tum system with a quantum environment in the limit that the environment can
be treated semi-classically; the value of t is here determined by the quantum state
of the environment and (at least in principle) observable. This suggests that the
description of any t-evolution can be achieved with a quantum environment in
an appropriate classical limit, so that a strictly classical notion of time is not
required.
Besides the Schro¨dinger picture the Heisenberg picture is used for the description
of time evolution. In the traditional Hilbert space formalism both pictures are
equivalent. In field theory the situation is however not so clear. Dirac claimed23
that the Heisenberg picture is the right picture. There is still much controversy
which of the two pictures is the right one, Schro¨dinger’s or Heisenberg’s (except for
traditional nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, where both are equivalent). E.g.,
an article published in a respected journal [FFMS02] recently studied a harmonic
oscillator coupled to the electromagnetic field and concluded that Schro¨dinger’s
picture is wrong, contrary to Heisenberg’s, which is right. This argument in
favor of Dirac’s claim has however shown to be flawed [Nik03]. While Dirac’s
claim finds support in theories with constraints, in algebraic quantum theory the
Schro¨dinger picture is known to be more general than the (modified) Heisenberg
picture [Kad65].
Another alternative is relevant for the time evolution of quantum systems: A sys-
tem can be modelled as subject to influences of the environment (open system, ex-
osystem), or isolated from external influences (closed system, endosystem). Both
23According to [Rov91c, sec. III.A.] he claimed this in a talk in 1981 (see also [Dir65]; before
he had been an adherent of the Schro¨dinger picture, and even earlier of the Heisenberg picture,
cf. different editions of his famous textbook on quantum mechanics), in which he used a single
transparency which contained just the following text: i~dAdt = [A,H]: Heisenberg mechanics is
the good mechanics.
26 The role of time in physical theories
descriptions are quite different, the former having an indeterministic dynamics,
the latter a deterministic one.
In this respect we mention that the time evolution of an endosystem is prob-
lematic, since it requires some environment to interpret the parameter t in the
Schro¨dinger equation as time. The environment forbids arbitrary reparametriza-
tions t 7→ t′ = λ(t) with a diffeomorphism λ, just as the hypothesis of absolute
time in classical mechanics. – Without environment there is no measure of dura-
tion for the system /1.3.2.3/.
1.2.6 Relativistic quantum mechanics
A relativistic quantum theory is widely believed to be meaningful only as a quan-
tum field theory. (See e.g. [Wei95, p. 169] and the discussions about Malament’s
theorem [HC01] the Hegerfeldt’s paradox [Heg98].)
As in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics the time parameter in quantum field
theory corresponds to an external classical time, however in this case the rel-
ativistic time of classical special relativity. The arbitrariness of the choice of
classical Lorentz frame naturally imposes covariance conditions on the quantum
fields.
Due to the quantum nature relativistic field states are not localized at a point,
and therefore not at an instant of time [BB94]. Since states (eigenstates of a
system of operators) are used to label the state of a system, this state is not
instantaneous, too. Thus only smeared in time (and in space) field operators
are mathematically meaningful.24 In a different line of thought is was noticed
that the (strong) causality of special relativity may be too strong in the quantum
domain: It is only the expectation values which have to be Lorentz covariant; for
individual processes this is not necessary, which gives rise to the notion of weak
causality [Heg98] (see also [May98]).
Quantum field theory on curved spacetimes [Wal94] with a fixed background
metric uses the general relativistic notion of time.
1.2.7 Summary
Let us briefly summarize in which respect the structure of time in Newtonian
mechanics has been reduced25 in increasingly fundamental theories.
In special relativity the temporal ordering of spacelike events, duration and simul-
taneity become dependent on the choice of inertial frame. Duration transforms
linearly between these frames. The choice of synchronization procedure is to some
extent arbitrary.
24Bialynicki-Birula uses a relational argument: “When the state of a system at a given
instant becomes ill-defined, time itself becomes diffused. After all, what is the meaning of an
instant if there is no element of reality associated with it?”
25Healey [Hea02] compares Newtonian mechanics with “a high water mark for the reality
of time in physics from which it has been receding ever since”.
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In general relativity the notion of inertial frame is generalized to a reference frame
with curl-free velocity field. If a cosmic time does exist, the events along different
worldlines of freely falling observers can be synchronized. The arbitrariness of
synchronization remains.
In quantum theory classical notions of time are used, but duration is not observ-
able for isolated systems.
1.3 Relational time
In the previous section the notions of time have been shown to progressively be-
come deconstructed when advancing towards more fundamental theories. What,
then, are the bare essentials of every notion of time? - The answer of relationalism
is: The nature of time is essentially that it relates observations of physical quan-
tities. Time measurements do not correspond to preferred observables. A time
observable could be e.g. the spatial position of the hand of a clock. On the other
hand not every observable qualifies as a time observable. The relational concept
of time reduces the richness of time structures discussed in /1.1/ to merely an
equivalence relation having the meaning of simultaneity. It therefore also goes
under the term fundamental timelessness.
This section begins with a short review of the historical development of relational
ideas /1.3.1/, then explains in detail the idea of time as a relation in fundamental
theories /1.3.2/ and finally analyzes the underlying notion of simultaneity /1.3.3/.
1.3.1 Relationalism
Most physical theories start with presumed (absolute) structures for space and
time, then place objects into spacetime (localization), and describe (or predict)
verifiable observations as a result of the interaction of the objects.
An opposing attitude holds that this procedure conceals the nature of space
and time. Instead of assuming space and time from the outset, they should be
seen as formed from the relationships between objects; objects themselves are
formed from relationships between our observations, and only our observations
are absolute. This latter attitude is called relationalism or relationism26.
Both attitudes have a long history [Bar89], as has the struggle between them27,
which continues until today. As an early proponent of relationalism we have
already quoted Lucretius (see above). Participants in this debate include among
others Newton, Huygens, Leibniz, Berkeley, Maxwell, Kant, Mach, Poincare´ and
Einstein [Ear89].
26In philosophy the relational idea with regard to time is known as the “relational theory
of time” [SO95, ch. 3].
27Much of the debate is concerned with rotation (and Newton’s bucket experiment), which
is of no importance for our purpose.
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Newton’s famous scholium on absolute space and time begins with these sen-
tences:
Hitherto I have laid down the definitions of such words as are less
known, and explained the sense in which I would have them to be
understood in the following discourse. I do not define time, space,
place, and motion, as being well known to all.
This was heavily criticised by Leibniz in his correspondence with Clarke, who
defended Newton’s view [Sma64, pp. 89-98]:
... As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold
space to be something merely relative, as time is; ...
... the answer is, that his inference would be right, if time was
any thing distinct from things existing in time. ...
... Nothing of time does ever exist, but instants; and an instant is
not even itself a part of time. Whoever considers these observations,
will easily apprehend that time can only be an ideal thing. ...
Mach published a history of mechanics in 1883 [Mac83]. Therein he argued
strongly against Newton’s idea of absolute space and absolute time. Newton
had argued that inertial motion was relative to absolute space; Mach held that
inertial motion was relative to the average of all the masses in the universe. His
understanding of time was relational, too:
It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by
time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction, at which we arrive
by means of the changes of things.
While Mach had formulated his critique of Newton’ absolute space and time
rather vaguely, Poincare´ clarified the defects in mathematical terms in 1902 and
1905, but he did not create a relational theory of classical mechanics. Einstein on
the other hand read Mach’s book, and was inspired by a relational philosophy:
... time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions
in which we live.
But he seemingly did not know about Poincare´’s analysis [Bar99b]. He coined the
term Mach’s principle, but missing Poincare´’s analysis he interpreted Mach in a
“curious way” [Bar99b], thereby causing much confusion. Indeed there are now
different versions of Mach’s principle; see [Rov03, sec. 2.4.1] for a brief summary
and a discussion of their validity in general relativity (some are false). After
Einstein’s eminent creations of special and general relativity the original Mach-
Poincare´ line of thought escaped most researchers’ attention. There had been
publications by Hofmann (1904), Reissner (1915) and Schro¨dinger (1925), who
went into that direction, but it took until the seventies of the last century for the
idea of Machian mechanics to be rediscovered by Barbour and Bertotti [BB77]
(see /1.3.2.1/).
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While Machian mechanics attacks absolutism with relationalism of motion, Ein-
stein’s general relativity has another kind of relationalism28: It involves only
spatiotemporal relations among bodies and events [Ear89]. The famous hole ar-
gument /1.3.2.2/ is widely perceived as evidence for the absence of spacetime as
a substratum underlying concrete events.
Another kind of relationalism is embodied in the conventionality of simultaneity
in special relativity /1.2.3/.
In nonrelativistic physics time can be separated from space and the relational
concept of time can be characterized e.g. like that [Coe69]: Time is no mystery,
no a priori : Time only exists to the extent that it is a property of matter, and
it relates the change of any two quantities, whereby the unit of time (duration)
cancels out during the evolution of both quantities. Only relative duration is
physically meaningful; time can thus be seen in any system as a relation among
its observables. (We will make this more precise in /1.3.3/.)
This raises the question for devices to measure relative duration, i.e. for clocks.
The position of the sun on the sky and of the stars on the night sky were early
clock observables, although they had limited precision. To construct “better”
clocks is more than a mere technical problem; let us cite Rovelli [Rov91c]:
Galileo used his pulse to measure the oscillation period of a pendulum
and to discover that it was isochronous. A few years later doctors
were using pendulums to measure the periods of people’s pulses and
to check whether they were isochronous.
Which one is the better clock, the pendulum or the pulse? – A straightforward
answer from classical mechanics is that clocks having a less disturbed oscillation
mechanism are the better ones. To put it differently, the more isolated the clock
system is from other systems, the better is its time. As general relativity tells,
gravity can never be switched off, and therefore the metric of time, which essen-
tially is a component of the metric tensor, can always be measured by an isolated
clock. We will discuss nonrelativistic (classical and quantum) clocks in /2.2/.
1.3.2 Relational theories
In this subsection we indicate how classical mechanics, general relativity and
quantum mechanics can be formulated in a relational way.
1.3.2.1 Classical mechanics
As noted above /1.2.1/, Newtonian mechanics has an absolute, unique time com-
mon to all systems: We can in principle adjoin the same ideal clock system to all
systems, while the interaction with each system remains negligibly small. Abso-
lute time (duration) is then defined to be – up to a linear transformation – the
clock time (duration) measured by the ideal clock.
28Earman holds that “there are almost as many versions of relationalism as there are rela-
tionalists.” [Ear89, p. 12]
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However a line of research originating from Mach’s critique of Newton (see [Bar03,
Bar99a,But01,BB82,Bar74] for contemporary work) exploits a loophole in this
reasoning: One cannot attach a physical clock to the whole universe.29 (In Bar-
bour’s words: “The great timekeeper outside the universe does not exist.”) Con-
sequently the absence of absolute time is claimed for Newtonian mechanics of
the universe, and furthermore the absence of absolute position and rotation, as
well as absolute unit of length. All absolute frames are considered equivalent and
shape space is defined as the set of all configurations of the universe which dif-
fer only by changes in absolute frames. I.e., points in shape space correspond to
three-dimensional relative configurations of point particles. Within this approach
dynamics is then reconstructed from geodesic principles in this shape space, where
only solution curves attain physical meaning, not certain parametrizations30. Ab-
solute time can be understood as distinguished simplifier by which the expression
for the distance between different configurations is made most simple. This rela-
tional theory was shown to be equivalent to Newtonian mechanics with vanishing
total angular momentum. Hence, this approach tries to base mechanics on a
more simple and more restrictive set of axioms, which conforms to Machian prin-
ciples. To this day there is no experimental evidence consistent with Newtonian
mechanics that would falsify Machian classical mechanics.
In this thesis we employ another possibility to make sense of a relational classical
mechanics: We drop the assumption of extensibility also for parts of the universe,
i.e. we consider a closed system and exclude the possibility of attaching additional
degrees of freedom, in particular a clock. In such a setting the notion of absolute
time becomes meaningless: Assume that any mechanical system S is given and
that there is nothing beyond S. Then we have no possibility to measure the dura-
tion between any two different instants during the evolution of (the whole of) S,
since we cannot attach a noninteracting free classical particle, or any other clock,
to S. The evolution of S is then necessarily reparametrization invariant, so that
only solution manifolds (without a parametrization) are physically meaningful.
– Clearly, giving up extensibility in classical mechanics requires a justification,
since empirically it is plainly wrong; it is however a fruitful guiding idea for the
quantum regime /1.3.2.3/.
29The consideration of all degrees of freedom is essential in this approach. Barbour also
argues against the possibility of an internal time; the present author disagrees with this claim
[Bar94]:
“I think it is wrong to attempt to identify certain degrees of freedom as
a clock and use them to describe the behaviour of the remainder. Any
satisfactory operational definition of time must involve all the degrees of
freedom of the universe on an equal footing, so any division into clock and
residual measured system is misleadingly artificial.”
30Hence the full symmetry group of Machian mechanics is the Leibniz group [BB77], consist-
ing of rotations, time dependent displacements and time reparametrizations, plus spatial scale
transformations. See also Earman [Ear89], who discusses a hierarchy of spacetimes (Machian,
Leibnizian, Maxwellian, neo-Newtonian, full Newtonian, Aristotelian) with decreasing symme-
try groups. Except for the Machian spacetime, all have a fixed time metric.
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A reconsideration of the foundations of mechanics, which does not require the
notion of external time, has been undertaken by Rovelli [Rov01b,Rov02a,Rov02b].
He argues that there are two kinds of observables: complete observables and
partial observables. Partial observables are quantities, which can be measured,
while complete observables can be predicted by the theory. E.g. in the case of a
single harmonic oscillator in one dimension the function
f(q, t;A, φ) = q − A sin(ωt+ φ) ,
where q is the position and t the time, is a complete observable, since its value is
predicted by the theory:
f = 0
Here A and φ are parameters of a motion. The quantities q and t are partial
observables, since their values can be measured, but not predicted by the theory.
There is no fundamental reason to consider q as being dependent on t, or vice
versa; it is only the relation between q and t, given by f , which is meaningful. This
idea that only a relation between partial observables makes a complete observable
can be generalized and was applied to special relativity, general relativity and
quantum theory.
1.3.2.2 General relativity
In analogy to classical mechanics a Machian theory of general relativity has been
worked out, see [Bar03] for a recent overview and references. One assumes space-
time to be globally hyperbolic with compact spatial sections, so that it can be
foliated into a family of spacelike hypersurfaces (of simultaneous events according
to some synchronization) with an induced Riemannian 3-metric on each hyper-
surface, and the family is parametrized by a ’time’ parameter. (In Hamiltonian
gravity the initial conditions for time evolution are given by a 3-metric on a
hypersurface and a canonically conjugate momentum.) The equivalence classes
(3-geometries) of all 3-metrics on a hypersurface under diffeomorphisms on this
hypersurface constitute an (instantaneous) physical configuration, i.e. a point in
shape space. Starting from a 3-geometry (without time), time evolution results
from the Baierlein-Sharp-Wheeler action principle (which is derived from the
Einstein-Hilbert action principle). A change of foliation of spacetime then corre-
sponds to a reparametrization of time. Considering conformal transformations of
3-metrics, problems arise in rendering general relativity fully scale-invariant.
Besides modifications towards relationalism, any theory of gravity is already re-
lational in the following sense: Local physics (in particular, proper time for a
local observer) depends on the presence of energy-momentum in surrounding re-
gions, since “gravity cannot be switched off”. In general relativity there is no
fixed background relative to which a body moves, but the presence of the body
has an impact on the gravitational field. Only in the (classically admissible) ide-
alization of infinitesimally small test masses can a time be defined for these test
masses, which is independent of them; it would coincide with the reading of an
infinitesimal clock at the position of the test mass, and defines proper time. In
general, and in particular for real, massive and extended clocks, the evolution of
the gravitational field and of the clock have to be considered together.
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But there is another reason to call general relativity a relational – as opposed to
substantivalist – theory. This is different from the absolute-relational controversy
about the existence of absolute position, time, velocity, acceleration or rotation.
The point at issue is whether spacetime itself does exist independently of events
taking place on it (substantivalism), or spacetime is made up from relations
among events (relationalism).
During the development of general relativity Einstein was facing this problem.
Until 1912 he was searching for a general covariant theory of gravity, but then
inventing the hole argument he convinced himself that the theory could not be
general covariant. In 1915 he finally returned to a general covariant formulation
and general relativity was born.
Let us briefly describe the hole argument (see e.g. [Nor99, Ear89, GR99, EN87,
Nor93]) and its interpretations. One starts with a general relativistic description
〈M, g, T 〉 of reality, whereM is the spacetime manifold, and the metric tensor g
and the energy-momentum tensor T are related through Einstein’s equation. And
one assumes that there is a region H (“hole”) in which T does vanish. Then one
can choose arbitrary diffeomorphisms d on M, which do differ from the identity
only inside H. For any such d the descriptions 〈M, g, T 〉 and 〈M, d∗g, d∗T 〉 =
〈M, d∗g, T 〉 are mathematically equivalent, since Einstein’s equations are due
to general covariance invariant under (active) diffeomorphisms. What does this
mean? The answer is that if the mathematical description is correct, then one
can change the metric g 7→ d∗g without affecting physics. Hence, on the one
hand g is gauge-dependent, and on the other hand the points inside H cannot be
individuated by the values of g, and since T = 0 not at all.
The relational interpretation therefore claims that spacetime does not exist a
priori, only the gravitational field, from which spacetime may emerge. Substan-
tivalism contrariwise takes spacetime to exist and have metrical properties, while
the gravitational field does not exist. As noted in [Rov03], the distinction be-
tween both interpretations is reduced to semantics. – A physically meaningful
statement about a field φ at an event x involves a relation of a value of φ with
four parameters determining the event x, the latter being either four values of the
gravitational field g (in the relational interpretation), or the metric g of space-
time (in the substantivalist interpretation). (A question in both interpretations
then is how to individuate spacetime points and what is observable in general
relativity [Lus03,LP03,Lus02,PV02,Rov91d,Rov91b,Ber61].)
1.3.2.3 Quantum mechanics
When one adjoins a classical clock C to a quantummechanical system S in order to
measure a duration between observations (instantaneous measurements) of S, one
assumes that C and S do not interact. The correlation between observation results
and readings of the clock takes place at the classical level, with approximately
vanishing interaction. In a genuinely quantum description one cannot neglect
mutual influences between (measurements of) S and C, and we have to treat
them together as a whole quantum system W. If the state of W separates into
a tensor product of states of S and C, then measurements of S and C remain
uncorrelated. If W is in an entangled state w.r.t. the decomposition into S and
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C, then a measurement of C does project out not only a state on C, but also the
corresponding relative state of S; subsequent (or simultaneous) measurements of
S are therefore in general correlated with “time” measurements on C, hence the
state of S is “time dependent”. We say that C provides an internal time (within
W) for S. In spite of this interpretation there is no fundamental property which
qualifies C as a clock and the observable measured on it as time observable. In
the next subsection /1.3.3/ we will characterize the conditions such an observable
has to fulfil in order to be a reasonable measure for time.
As above (in classical mechanics) we now assume that there is nothing beyond W,
i.e. we describe W as an endosystem31. As a first consequence we have no external
time, and evolution becomes reparametrization invariant. Instantaneous states
w.r.t. a fictitious external time lose their meaning; only orbits remain as physically
meaningful descriptions of the state of W. Within an orbit there is a relation
between partial observables (like e.g. that of S and C). – On the other hand,
denying extensibility implies that there are no observers and no measurement
devices outside W. What then, do observables mean for the endosystem W? The
term certainly loses its connection with actual measurements. Primas [Pri94c,
AP02] proposes to call the endophysical observables potential properties. He
shows that in a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics one has to choose a
context in a subjective way. This choice corresponds to the attribution of values
to potential properties.
We therefore have two aspects of relationalism in quantum theory [Wei01]:
(i) A relation between simultaneous relative states of subsystems, i.e. a simul-
taneity relation with respect to value-definiteness of subsystem observables.
(ii) The absence of a relation between the system and anything external to it;
this renders any absolute meaning of time unphysical.
For quantum mechanics this relational approach has been worked out for the
first time by Rovelli. In his path-breaking article “Quantum mechanics without
time: A model” [Rov90] (see also [H9´1,Rov91a,Rov91c,Rov88]) he investigates
the conditions under which time emerges from a finite system consisting of two
uncoupled quantum oscillators with equal frequencies in one dimension. As this
model will be studied in detail below /3/, we sketch it here only briefly32:
• First one considers the model at the classical level with an energy constraint
for the closed total system. Consequently the system has two independent
constants of motion: the relative phase of the oscillators and the energy (or
amplitude) of one of them. (The absolute phase is physically vacuous and
the energy of the other oscillator follows from the constraint. Classically
one could of course adjoin a (ideal) clock and observe the motion of both
oscillators in time.) - What remains from a timeless point of view is the
31We use the term in the sense of Primas, see [Pri94c] for its comparison with the notion
of Ro¨ssler and Finkelstein.
32Whereas this research was primarily conducted in the context of quantum gravity, we are
here concerned with its implications for non-gravitational quantum physics. Thereby we pick
up a hypothesis of Rovelli, that the problem of time might have to be solved in the quantum
realm.
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correlation between the elongations q1 and q2 (partial observables) of both
oscillators when measured simultaneously. One can then consider t := q1 as
time observable which allows (albeit ambiguous) predictions of q2. There is
no duration required for the total system, just a simultaneity relation for both
subsystems.
• In the second step the system is quantised in a non-canonical way: The alge-
bra of constants of motion is mapped to an algebra of Hilbert space operators
such that the energy constraint is fulfilled for all physical states /3.2.2/. If
one requires the total system to be in certain (semiclassical) states, then the
expectations of the quantised elongations, qˆ1 and qˆ2, are correlated and allow
to define an approximate time t := 〈qˆ1〉. Rovelli shows that (using the semi-
classical state) the evolution of qˆ2 in the time parameter t is approximately
unitary. In the classical limit for qˆ1 this agrees with the well known unitary
evolution in classical environments with respect to a classical time parameter,
showing that the internal quantum time has the correct classical limit.
• The underlying simultaneity relation is not derived in any way, but taken
as an empirical valid fundamental structure of possible observations of q1
and q2, which are in addition supposed to happen at a single instant. The
approach works without an absolute duration, it relies just on instantaneity
and simultaneity.
The main problem with this approach is to justify the choice of (a class of) states
for the total system which induce a correlation between subsystem observables, so
that for macroscopic systems there is a time observable, which can be identified
with the empirical classical time /4/.
1.3.3 Relational time from simultaneity
In /1.1/ several time structures were discussed. Here we define a general time
structure for the relational approach based on the primitive notions of observation
and simultaneity. We thereby reduce time to its core.
By “observation” we mean the event of a measurement and we denote the set of
observations by O. We do not assume that such an event is instantaneous in an
absolute sense, since we have no notion of an absolute time with respect to which
we could define instantaneity. We will however construct a notion of an instant
w.r.t. all observations below. Since each measurement has an outcome, we also
have a map r : O → R, O 7→ r(O), which gives the result of an observation in
a set R, often the reals R. In nonrelativistic classical mechanics an observation
could be that of the x-coordinate of a particle, and the result of the observation
would be a real number. R could e.g. also contain values in R3, or the set {0, 1}
for binary measurements. In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics we mean by
observation not an actual measurement, which would disturb the system, but a
potential one, its “result”being the expectation value of the measured observable.
In order to compare observations taking place somewhere in space we assume
that we are given a simultaneity relation. In /1.2/ we have discussed for different
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theories how simultaneity can be empirically established. Simultaneity is a reflex-
ive, symmetric and transitive binary relation in O, i.e. an equivalence relation,
which we denote by ∼S.
We begin our discussion in nonrelativistic physics where time and space can be
separated and a single simultaneity relation is sufficient.
Let O be a set of observations, r : O → R a result function and ∼S a simultaneity
relation. We furthermore assume that O is equipped with an observable structure,
i.e. with a set A of subsets of O, whose elements A ∈ A we call observables. This
notion of observable coincides with the usual one, where two observations belong
to the same observable, if the measurement procedures are essentially the same33.
Often for A ∈ A the set r(A) is a metric space.34
From the observable structure and the values of observations we clearly have for
any A ∈ A and any O1, O2 ∈ A an equivalence relation
O1 ∼A O2 :⇔ r(O1) = r(O2) .
This does not mean that the observations O1 and O2 contain the same information
about the measured system: they need not be simultaneous. If O1 ∼A O2 and
O1 ∼M O2, then O1 and O2 are physically equivalent. (One could restrict all
considerations to classes of physically equivalent observations, but we are doing
without.)
Definition 1.3.1. We call a quadruple (O,A, r,∼S) consisting of a set of ob-
servations O, an observable structure A, a result function r and a simultaneity
relation ∼S a description of a physical system.
We now ask, whether the values of observations belonging to an observable A ∈ A
allow to distinguish different equivalence classes of a given equivalence relation
∼ in O0 ⊂ O, to be more general. (In a moment we will restrict to simultaneity,
∼=∼S.) We denote the set of equivalence classes as X := O0∼ and want to find
an observable A ∈ A such that
(i) for all x ∈ X there exists an observation O ∈ O0 with O ∈ A and O ∈ x
(observations of A parametrize X ),
(ii) ∀O1, O2 ∈ A (O1 ∼ O2 ⇒ r(O1) = r(O2)) (the result of observations of A
depends only on the equivalence class),
(iii) for all pairs of observations O1, O2 ∈ O0 with O1  O2 there exist corre-
sponding equivalent observations of A with different results, i.e. ∃O′1, O′2 ∈
A∩O0 : O′1 ∼ O1∧O′2 ∼ O2∧ r(O′1) 6= r(O′2) (observed values of A separate
the equivalence classes in X ).
Example. Consider Newtonian mechanics for massive particles in three dimen-
sions. Let O0 consist of observations of the x-coordinate of the center of mass
33Of course, an observable may be measurable using different measurement procedures.
34The set of observables A has further structure, e.g. in nonrelativistic classical (quantum)
mechanics the observables form a Poisson algebra (Jordan-Lie algebra). In particular, A often
has a topological structure; this is however of no importance here.
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in a coordinate system and, say, the angular momentum of a single particle. We
want to characterize the equilocality relation for all observations by means of
an observable. We choose the position observable A := X, which consists of all
observations of the particle position with real values as results.
This is trivial, since we have a position variable at our hand. Suppose now that
we do not. If we know that the electrostatic potential Φ increases monotonously
along the x-axis, then we could as well use observations of Φ to decide whether
equilocality holds. That is true, because i) for each position we can observe Φ,
ii) there is only one value of Φ for each position, and iii) for different positions
we observe different values of Φ.
Since there is no obvious natural time observable, we now consider the above
question for the simultaneity relation ∼S, i.e. we want to characterise equivalence
classes under simultaneity by the values of a physical observable. We can do
this in the same way as above (e.g. characterising observations by simultaneous
measurements of the position observable in the case of a free particle with a
nonvanishing velocity), but we want to remove unphysical structure from our
simultaneity relation: It may happen that two equivalence classes have the same
values for each observable. Assuming that there is no more physical structure
than contained in the set of observations, we can then identify these equivalence
classes.
Example. Assume that we have an oscillator in one dimension and only observa-
tions of position and momentum. Then we cannot distinguish between different
cycles of the motion. We identify one time observable as the combined position-
momentum observable; we could as well choose the momentum observable to-
gether with the sign of the position observable, but the momentum observable
alone would not qualify as a time observable. – If we had only observations
of position, then the position observable would of course suffice to distinguish
instants. (In the case of the oscillator we know however, that there is more
observable structure which we have to “resolve” by a time observable.)
We come now to the definition of a relational time observable:
Definition 1.3.2. Let (O,A, r,∼S) be a description of a physical system. Given
O0 ⊂ O, we define T := O0∼S and call the elements t ∈ T instants (of O0). T is
called the set of instants (of O0) (cf. /1.1/).
Moreover, an observable T ∈ A is called a (relational) time observable for the set
of observations O0, if
(i) for all t ∈ T there exists an observation O ∈ t ∩ T ∩ O0
(observations of T parametrise T )
(ii) ∀O1, O2 ∈ T (O1 ∼S O2 ⇒ r(O1) = r(O2))
(the result of observations of T depends only on the instant)
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(iii) if O1, O2 ∈ O0 with O1 S O2 and
∃A ∈ A, O′′1 ∈ A, O′′2 ∈ A :
O1 ∼S O′′1 ∧ O2 ∼S O′′2 ∧ r(O′′1) 6= r(O′′2) , (1.3.1)
then there exist corresponding simultaneous observations of T with different
results, i.e.
∃O′1, O′2 ∈ T ∩ O0 : O′1 ∼S O1 ∧O′2 ∼S O2 ∧ r(O′1) 6= r(O′2)
(observed values of T separate the equivalence classes in T ).
If we drop the relational requirement (1.3.1), then we call T an intrinsic time
observable.
Because of condition (1.3.1) a relational time observable T is more general: It has
to have different result values only if there is any observable, whose result values,
observed simultaneously with those of T , differ. Time is thus a tool to structure
actual observations, while a possibly too fine, unobservable classification through
simultaneity is being coarse-grained.
Remark 1.3.3.
1. If T1 and T2 are both time observables for the observations O0, then we have
a bijection of observations T1 ∩ O0 → T2 ∩ O0 which at the same time is a
bijection between their result values.
2. Given an observable A ∈ A, we can associate to any observation O ∈ A due
to (i) an observation O′ ∈ T belonging to the same instant (∼S- equivalence
class). And due to (ii) r(O′) does not depend on the choice of O′ ∈ T , so
that we have a mapping from observations of A to time values t = r(O′).
This ensures that each observation happens at some “time” t.
3. One usually requires uniqueness of all observations of an observable at an
instant, i.e. a generalization of (ii),
∀A ∈ A∀O1, O2 ∈ A (O1 ∼S O2 ⇒ r(O1) = r(O2)) . (1.3.2)
This guarantees that the Heisenberg observables A(t) := {O ∈ A : O ∈ t}
(t ∈ T ) for all A ∈ A have definite values, notwithstanding the possibility
of different observations of the same observable at the same instant. Then
there exists a injective mapping of the values of A (a value of A being defined
as the value of an arbitrary observation in A) to the simultaneous values of
T .
4. Many physical theories provide simultaneity and equilocality relations in the
set of all observations. In nonrelativistic physics it is however not important
where a physical quantity is measured, if it is the same quantity that is
measured. E.g. the motion of a pendulum could be broadcasted to a distant
observer, who can equally well observe the position of the pendulum.
5. It is straightforward to generalise the definition of a time observable to en-
compass several of the above defined time observables pasted together, so
that they can measure time successively (comprising all instants). (This
requires “consecutive pairs” of time observables to have common instants.)
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Up to now we have not discussed the structure of the set of values of observations.
Even if there were only a discrete set of values or only finitely many observations,
then our definition of a time observable would make sense. Often the set of values
of the observations of an observable A ∈ A, which we denote by R(A), has more
structure, leading to more structure of the notion of time (cf. /1.1/):
If T is a nonrelativistic time observable and R(A) and R(T ) are topological
spaces, and if (1.3.2) holds, then the injection tT : R(A)→ R(T ), r(A(t)) 7→ r(t)
(t ∈ T ) may be open, whence t−1T : r(t) 7→ R(A(t)) is continuous. If these
maps are continuous for all A, the system has a continuous evolution w.r.t. the
time observable T . If R(A) and R(T ) are moreover differentiable manifolds,
and if t−1T is a differentiable map, then we can take time derivatives and define
e.g. velocities and use differential equations to describe evolution. While the
relational time would also make sense for manifolds of higher dimensions, R(T )
is usually a one-dimensional manifold.
If R(T ) is a metric space with metric dT , this defines a duration in the set T of
instants:
d (t1, t2) := dT (r(t1), r(t2)) (t1, t2 ∈ T )
If there are several time observables, their durations can be different: If T (i)
(i = 1, 2) are time observables and R(T (i)) are differentiable manifolds and met-
ric spaces such that the metric induces the topology, then the bijection between
the instants of both time observables, t(1) 7→ t(2), induces a diffeomorphism
R(T (1)) → R(t(2)), i.e. the change between the two time observables amounts
to a reparametrization of the time parameter, r(1)(t) 7→ r(2)(t).
Given an ordering relation < on R(T ) one can also define a time order on T :
t < t′ :⇔ r(t) < r(t′) (t, t′ ∈ T )
This does however not provide us with a substantial direction of time, since one
can easily find another time observable T ′ with the same values and with the
opposite ordering (see /2.1/).
We have now analyzed the reconstruction of the standard notion of time /1.1/ as
seen from nowhen and from a relational point of view. Physical theories not only
tell us how to verify simultaneity and how to measure observables; they also say
which observations are possible and which of their values are consistent. This is
the subject of a dynamical theory. Deterministic dynamical theories can predict
or retrodict the values of all observations, given that the values are known at
one instant, by dynamical laws. The consistent combinations of the values of all
observations for a given physical system are called solutions or orbits. Orbits are
independent of the choice of time observable. (They usually have the structure
of 1-dimensional differentiable manifolds.)
Let us conclude this subsection with some remarks on time observables in rela-
tivity and quantum mechanics.
In special relativity the description of observations as seen from different Lorentz
frames is equivalent. Each Lorentz frame defines a simultaneity relation and
39
we can apply the above reasoning. A change of Lorentz frame also affects the
equilocality relation, which like simultaneity is an equivalence relation among ob-
servations. Lorentz invariance of a theory can then be seen as the unobservability
of certain changes of the simultaneity relation which are accompanied by certain
changes of the equilocality relation.
Quantum mechanics puts strong restrictions on possible time observables, since
only commuting observables are simultaneously observable. This is e.g. the case
if all observations, except for those of the time observable, belong to a subsystem
which is disjoint from the subsystem on which the time observable does operate
(see /1.3.2.3/). If one wants to have a time observable for all observations, then
the time observable must commute with all other observables, i.e. it must be a
classical observable. We will return to this idea in chapter /4/.

CHAPTER 2
Problems with time
This chapter gives a brief account of three main problems connected with
time: The arrow of time, time measurement, and quantum gravity.
... beyond all day-to-day problems in physics,
in the profound issues of principle that confront
us today, no difficulties are more central than
those associated with the concept of ’time’ ...
John Archibald Wheeler [Whe94, p. 7]
In our culture time is experienced as flowing, it has a distinguished present, and
it allows for memory of the past as well as expectations for the future. Why is
that? This raises, among others, the question for a physical basis of the direction
of time, which will be treated and discussed also from the relational point of view
in /2.1/.
A second problem is concerned with the measurement of time in quantum physics.
There is no time operator although clocks do exist /2.2/. This problem is espe-
cially important within the relational approach to time.
A main contemporary motive for considering time problems is rooted in quantum
gravity /2.3/. For a generally covariant quantum theory of gravity makes an
understanding of the true nature of time indispensable. We sketch the main
problems.
Another problem connected with time will be considered later /4.2/: The unitary
dynamics of endosystems, which is a main obstacle to a consistent description of
the measurement process in quantum mechanics.
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2.1 The arrow of time
Everyday experience endorses the passage of time, e.g. a glass can break, but we
never see one building up from pieces “spontaneously”. Can this be explained
on the basis of our microscopic physical theories? At first sight the decay of an
atom seems to prove that time has a direction: While relaxation occurs sponta-
neously, excitation does not. But in fact this rests on the assumption that the
boundary conditions of the equations of motion lie in a certain (“time forward”)
class: We consider the undecayed state as “initial” and require all other states
during its dynamics to lie in the “future”. Tautologically, then, atoms decay in
the future. Substituting the words “initial” and “future” with “final” and “past”
would result in a physically equivalent description of the decay process, however
with an apparently different unphysical meaning.
In order to avoid wrong intuitions it is wise to use a time symmetric language.
In [Alb00] the notion dynamical conditions was introduced: Dynamical conditions
comprise all information necessary to apply dynamical laws in a predictive way
(be it towards the future, i.e. prediction, or towards the past, i.e. retrodiction),
e.g. instantaneous positions and momenta in Newtonian mechanics, or instanta-
neous electric and magnetic fields and charge and current densities in classical
electrodynamics, or the state vector in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
The dynamical laws of most fundamental theories do not distinguish between
prediction and retrodiction and therefore cannot justify everyday experiences,
like e.g. breaking glasses. The debate on the arrow (or direction) of time aims
at bringing dynamical laws into agreement with everyday experiences. This de-
bate (which has a long history and continues until today [Vaa02]) has suffered
from many imprecise statements (e.g. using hidden assumptions, or confusing
different concepts), we therefore recast some definitions in a rather mathemati-
cal language, following largely [Alb00] and [CLL03b]. After explaining (partial)
time-reversal invariance /2.1.1/ we make the important distinction between irre-
versibility /2.1.2/ and the arrow of time /2.1.3,2.1.4/.
2.1.1 Time-reversal invariance
Intuitively, time-reversal invariance of a physical process amounts to the possibil-
ity of watching a movie of this process backward and finding it to be in accordance
with all dynamical laws.
E.g. in Newtonian mechanics the instantaneous pictures contain information
about the positions of all particles. As pointed out by Albert [Alb00, ch. 1],
velocities are not part of an instantaneous configuration, which is per definition
a state1. Velocities always involve two different instants, which can be arbitrarily
close. Since velocities are the time derivatives of positions, they change their
signs, when the movie is watched backward. They do not enter into Newton’s
1Albert [Alb00] and Zeh [Zeh99] use the term state synonymous with configuration, in
contradistinction with a point in phase space.
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Figure 2.1.1. A charged particle moving along a circular path
(solid line) with an initial velocity (solid arrow) in a plane per-
pendicular to a homogeneous magnetic field, and the path of the
time reversed motion (dashed line) with an opposite initial veloc-
ity (dashed arrow): Under time-reversal the path does not remain
invariant.
Second Law (assuming an autonomous system, i.e., an endosystem with absolute
time),
d2xi(t)
dt2
= Fi(x1(t), . . . , xN(t)) ,
which only contains second time derivatives. It is equivalent to the following
equation:
d2xi(−t)
dt2
= Fi(x1(−t), . . . , xN(−t))
Thus x(t) fulfills Newton’s Second Law, iff x(−t) fulfills Newton’s Second Law2;
this means that for any sequence xi, . . . ,xf of instantaneous configurations also
the reversed sequence xf , . . . ,xi can happen. We therefore call Newtonian me-
chanics strictly time-reversal invariant.
Many theories turn out to be not strictly time-reversal invariant: Consider e.g. the
Newtonian mechanics of point particles subject to external electric and magnetic
fields. The instantaneous states consist of the positions of all particles and the
magnitudes and directions of the electric and magnetic fields everywhere in space.
Upon time-reversal the magnetic field doesn’t change its sign, which in general
leads to a different dynamics (cmp. fig. 2.1.1). This theory is not time-reversal
invariant.
Another example is Maxwell’s electrodynamics. Here the fields are not pre-
given, external and instantaneously measurable quantities, but they have physical
sources: The electric field is generated by an instantaneously measurable charge
distribution and therefore is itself instantaneously measurable. The magnetic field
on the other hand is given by the motion of charges and the rate of change of
the electric field, and thus is not instantaneously measurable. I.e., the magnetic
field is a dynamical condition and not fixed by a choice of an instantaneous state.
We are therefore free to choose its transformation behaviour upon time-reversal,
so that the equations of motion remain invariant under time-reversal. This is
2The choice of the origin of time with respect to which t 7→ −t is performed is arbitrary,
since we assume time-translation invariance.
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indeed possible: We just have to change the sign of the magnetic field. This re-
stores Maxwell’s equations after a time-reversal and at the same time leaves the
instantaneous state invariant. By transforming an instantaneously unobservable
quantity we therefore have restored time-reversal invariance.
Albert rightly calls a time-reversal invariance that holds for instantaneous states
(and not necessarily for all dynamical conditions) partial time-reversal invariance,
contrary to many textbooks, which just call it “time-reversal invariance”.
The point is that already partial time-reversal invariance conflicts with everyday
experiences [Alb00]. E.g., given two configurations, one with a glass on the table,
and another one with a broken glass on the floor, we can tell which was later: the
broken glass; i.e., here we observe only the positions of particles. Furthermore, it
is widely believed that quantum measurements basically always involve position
measurements. If the classicality of macroscopic phenomena arises from localiza-
tion processes, then the partial time-reversal invariance of quantum mechanics
contradicts everyday experience, too.
The combination of time reversal (I : t 7→ −t) and another transformation J ,
which restores partial time-reversal invariance, is known as time-reversal operator
K and acts on solutions f(t), f(t) being a state (i.e. a point in configuration space)
for each t, in such a way that its image fK(t) is also a solution.
For nearly all fundamental theories there are transformations of quantities other
than positions, which can restore partial time-reversal invariance after a reversal
of time. (See [COE01] for a general definition of the time-reversal operator and
examples.) To give another example, in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics the
time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
i~∂tψ(t) = H(t)ψ(t) (2.1.1)
is equivalent to its time reversed and complex conjugated form
i~∂tψ(−t) = H+(−t)ψ(−t) . (2.1.2)
If H(t) = H+(−t), ψ(t) in (2.1.1) and ψ(−t) in (2.1.2) evolve according to the
same dynamical law. The time reversal operator can then be defined in the
position representation as Wigner’s anti-unitary operator
K : ψ(x, t) 7→ ψ(x,−t) .
Then ψ and Kψ have the same expectation values for position operators, while
the expectations for momentum operators differ by a sign3. The ambiguity of mo-
mentum is no problem, because position and momentum are not simultaneously
3If we assume that position eigenstates |q〉 remain unchanged upon complex conjugation,
the latter can also be seen from a complex conjugation of
|p〉 =
∫
dq eipq |q〉 ,
which gives |−p〉.
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dispersion-free. Note that the state vector ψ is a dynamical condition, since the
equation of motion is of first order in time.4
Another example is Hamiltonian mechanics, which treats position and momentum
on an equal footing (in a“symplectic”way) and therefore – contrary to Newtonian
mechanics – is not strictly time-reversal invariant. In order to restore partial
time-reversal invariance the sign of all momenta has to be inverted.
For certain decay processes of elementary particles (e.g. Kaons), which violate
the combined charge-parity (CP ) symmetry, partial time-reversal invariance is
expected to be violated, as a consequence of CPT conservation.
Summarizing, we have the following definition:
Definition 2.1.1. A given dynamical law based on the standard notion of time
(with parameter t) /1.1/ is strictly time-reversal invariant, if it is invariant under
the transformation I : t 7→ −t, i.e. if for each solution f : R → Γ, t 7→ f(t),
where Γ is the set of dynamical conditions, f ◦ I : R → Γ, t 7→ f(−t) is also a
solution. In other words, the set S of solutions of the theory fulfils S = S ◦ I.
The dynamical law is partially time-reversal invariant, if
(i) there is an operator J : Γ → Γ, which maps dynamical conditions into dy-
namical conditions such that the instantaneous state (instantaneously mea-
surable configuration) remains invariant, i.e. P ◦ J = P , where P : Γ → X
maps a dynamical condition to the corresponding instantaneous state.
(ii) for each solution f , J ◦ f ◦ I is also a solution, i.e. S = J ◦ S ◦ I.
The map K : S→ S, f 7→ J ◦ f ◦ I is then called time-reversal operator.
Remark 2.1.2. In phenomenological thermodynamics a solution f ∈ S is given
by the time dependence of the state functions, among them the entropy S, which
according to the second law does not decrease, dS(t)
dt
≥ 0. Thermodynamics is
not strictly time-reversal invariant, since the time-reversed solution f ◦ I has the
entropy S ′(t) = S(−t), which contradicts the second law (except if S is constant):
dS′(t)
dt
= dS(−t)
dt
= −dS(t′)
dt′ ≤ 0
To restore partial time-reversal invariance one has to change the sign of S,
KS(t) = −S(−t). On the other hand entropy is related to heat transfer δQ
and absolute temperature T via dS = δQ
T
; if δQ does not change its sign, then
KT (t) = −T (−t) must hold. If the time-reversal operator is appropriately defined
for all other thermodynamical quantities, this non-standard usage of negative ab-
solute temperatures has been shown to be consistent (see [Kro85, p. 128]).
In the abstract relational approach developed in /1.3.3/ each observation is in
one and only one equivalence class of the simultaneity relation and therefore is by
assumption instantaneous. (Quantities such as momenta in mechanics require two
observations at different instants.) Let a description (O,A, r,∼S) of a physical
4According to [Alb00, p. 132] a time-reversal and time-translation invariant theory, whose
instantaneous states are also complete dynamical conditions, cannot describe change with its
dynamics.
46 The arrow of time
system be given. (This is an abstraction of a solution, albeit reduced to actual
observations.) Let furthermore T be a time observable for O with a time order
<. We can then reverse the time order without affecting physics; this means
that there is a physically equivalent time reversed description of the system:
the relational formulation is automatically time-reversal invariant. The reason is
that we have no external time against which a time-reversal would be physically
meaningful.5
2.1.2 Irreversibility
As mentioned in the introduction to the previous chapter, the problem of linearity
versus cyclicity of time has long been disputed in human history [F9¨9], often
under the terms infinity and finiteness [Obe00]. Modern science is built on the
assumption of linear time as represented by the standard notion /1.1/. If – as
in the relational approach – time is physically observable within a system, then
cyclicity or linearity must be properties of the solutions of the equations of motion
of the system:
Definition 2.1.3. A solution of an equation of motion is reversible if it is a fixed
point or a closed curve in phase space; otherwise it is called irreversible.
The problem of irreversibility consists in showing that a time-reversal invariant
equation of motion (definition 2.1.1) admits an irreversible solution.
Irreversibility is desirable, because a reversible solution does not allow to define
a nontrivial time order on all instants. (Note that irreversibility is independent
of the time order. It has however often been mixed up [CL03] with the arrow of
time /2.1.3,2.1.4/.)
Irreversibility is a problem, because of Poincare´’s recurrence theorem6, which
states that in an isolated, finite mechanical system, any state will be revisited to
arbitrary closeness an infinite number of times during the course of time evolution.
For a quantum version of Poincare´’s theorem cf. [Sch78, Duv02]. In a coarse-
grained theory which takes into account our limited precision of measurements,
we will therefore always detect recurrence, though possibly after an enormously
long duration.
There are several ways to circumvent recurrence:
• Infinite systems can have an irreversible solutions, e.g. in scattering of two
classical particles. Quantum field theory also allows for irreversible motions
[Vit01a]. A well known example are scattering processes, which require a
5One can however ask, whether a reversal of the internal time (relative to other observa-
tions) leads to another description, which is admissible in the dynamical theory. Of course, this
depends on the choice of time observable. If, e.g., the time observable T is given by observations
of the position of a free particle, then nature proves to be T -reversal invariant.
6The so called reversibility objections (recurrence and microreversibility) against an arrow of
time historically appeared for the first time in the discussion of Boltzmann’s H-theorem [Dav74,
ch. 3].
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change of the unitary equivalence class of representations of the underlying
field algebra.
• Open systems allow for irreversible solutions. An environment can e.g. effect
damping of the system. In classical mechanics an external influence can cause
a chaotic dynamics, whereby the system loses its memory; in the quantum
domain this can be achieved through decoherence.
• An interesting approach [Vit01b,Vit01a] to simulate an “effective” environ-
ment of a quantum system doubles the degrees of freedom of the system in
order to compensate e.g. the energy flux to/from the hypothetical environ-
ment. Thereby a dissipative system can be quantised, while its copy has the
time-reversed dynamics.
• Another possibility, which formally works for isolated, finite systems, is to
modify the dynamical theory in such a way that it becomes irreversible, using
dynamical semigroups [Ali02, Lin76]. The dynamics is chosen such that it
mimics the influence of an environment.
• A similar, but different method in the quantum realm, which also modifies
the dynamics is known as the rigged Hilbert space approach [Boh99, B7¨8].
Here the usual Schro¨dinger equation is considered with asymmetric boundary
conditions. Two Gelfand triplets are used, one for the prepared state (“in
state”) and one for the detected state (“out state”). Time evolution then splits
into two semigroups (towards past and future, respectively). In particular,
decay processes can be described within this theory. An arrow of time (see
below) must however be postulated [Bos00].
• Another modification of quantum dynamics, which introduces a probabilistic
element through a random local collapse of the wave function, is known as
spontaneous collapse [GRW86].
• Of the several other approaches to embody irreversibility in the quantum do-
main we just mention one, which relies on K-flows, i.e. on a certain shrinking
of the algebra of observables in time. See [Pri97,LM85] for details.
The approaches with a modified dynamics are called intrinsic, while those relying
on openness are called extrinsic. Extrinsic irreversibility usually involves ontic as
well as epistemic state concepts (see [ABA00], where some of the above enlisted
approaches are discussed and compared).
From the relational point of view /1.3/ open system approaches are ruled out.
On the other hand the intrinsic approaches do not allow to determine the time
of a state from within the system, which is however required in the relational
approach. We are then led to the consideration of infinite systems.
In the abstract relational approach /1.3.3/ a description of a physical system with
time observable T is irreversible, if the observed T -values can be equipped with
a nontrivial time order, which does distinguish different instants.
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2.1.3 The arrow of time in classical physics
As pointed out in [CLL03b], in order to explain the apparent passage of time,
i.e. why certain processes (like breaking glasses) are observed and their time-
reversed images are not, one has to solve the problem of irreversibility /2.1.2/,
but this is not enough: One also needs the existence of an arrow or direction of
time, which allows to distinguish the two possible time orderings. – Let us make
this more precise.
Known dynamical theories only relate observations to conventional time order,
but each time order has an “opposite” one: From a notion of time with a (partial)
time order ≤ one can always define a 4 b :⇔ b ≤ a and show that 4 is a (partial)
time order, too. A time order is just a conventional description, in analogy to
choosing coordinates on a manifold. In order to select one of the two orderings
on a physical basis, i.e. in order to define a physical direction of time, one needs a
physically substantial argument telling which one of two arbitrary instants a and
b is the past/future one.
Definition 2.1.4. Let a physical theory with the standard notion of time be
given. Let T be the set of instants and M ⊂ T × T a time order, denoted by ≤.
Let S be the set of solutions
f : T → Γ
of the equations of motion of the theory, where Γ is the set of dynamical conditions
(phase space in classical mechanics), and let
P : Γ→ X
map each dynamical condition to the instantaneous state (instantaneously ob-
servable configuration), which it represents. Here X is the set of instantaneous
states.
We say that the theory has an arrow of time (or equivalently, a direction of time),
if there is a (nonlocal in time) observable (correlation)
A : X ×X → {+1,−1} ,
which for all ta, tb ∈ T , ta 6= tb and all f ∈ S fulfils:
A (P ◦ f(ta), P ◦ f(tb)) =
{
+1 if ta ≤ tb
−1 if tb ≤ ta
If A (P ◦ f(ta), P ◦ f(tb)) = +1, we denote the arrow of time as ta
A½ tb.
If A (P ◦ f(ta), P ◦ f(tb)) = −1, we denote the arrow of time as tb
A½ ta.
If ta
A½ tb, we say that ta lies in the (substantial) past of tb, or that tb lies in the
(substantial) future of ta.
Remark 2.1.5. Clearly, the arrow of time can be used to select one time order
on a physical basis. The value of A does only depend on a pair of instants, and not
on the choice of solution f . This is a desired property, since for single solutions
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(or special classes of solutions) an arrow of time could often be defined trivially
(see the following example).
Apart from the arrow of time itself only instantaneously observable quantities do
enter into our definition.
Example 2.1.6. Consider classical mechanics of a free particle in one dimension
and superficially restrict the set of solutions to just those with positive veloc-
ity v: The solutions read x(t) = vt + x0, and the dynamical conditions are
f(t) = (x(t), v). Since position x is an observable, we can immediately define an
arrow of time A (P ◦ f(ta), P ◦ f(tb)) = A (x(ta), x(tb)) := sign (x(tb)− x(ta)) =
sign (tb − ta), which is independent of the chosen solution. (If we allow for solu-
tions with negative velocities, we cannot define an arrow of time, see below.)
A more realistic case is phenomenological thermodynamics, where an arrow of
time can be defined from the observable entropy S, which due to the Second law
increases along one time order ≤ only:
S(t1) ≤ S(t2) ⇔ t1 ≤ t2 (2.1.3)
Correspondingly, one speaks of the thermodynamical arrow of time. If one con-
siders thermodynamics as based on the statistics of a microscopic theory, then
one has to decide whether the statistics is the appropriate description of reality,
or the microstate. In the latter case there is no arrow of time, since the funda-
mental theories are partially time-reversal invariant. In the former case there is
also no arrow of time, since probabilities are invariant under time reversal and
an entropy defined from statistics increases towards the future as it does towards
the past.
Remark 2.1.7. If a theory based on the standard notion of time has an observ-
able S : X → R, whose values increase strictly monotonously along one time
order for all solutions f : T → X, see (2.1.3), then this theory has an arrow of
time defined by
A(ta, tb) := sign (S(f(tb))− S(f(ta))) .
Observations, which are genuinely nonlocal in time [Atm97,AA98], do not exist
in known fundamental theories. The above arrow of time A combines two in-
stantaneous observations of the observable S. It is a common strategy to obtain
such an S (whose monotonicity behaviour is isomorphic to a time order) by re-
stricting the set S of solutions. In particular one imposes boundary conditions
guaranteeing the monotonicity.
A well known example is classical electrodynamics, where advanced solutions
are discarded. The waves are assumed to propagate from macroscopic coherent
sources in the past to the future, and the macroscopic sources in the future
are assumed to be incoherent [Pri96, ch. 3]. (This applies to wave theories in
general, and is called the radiation arrow of time.) – To justify this asymmetry
it has been argued that due to the expansion of the universe radiation carries
away coherence beyond the event horizon of an observer, so that the increase in
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(observable) entropy parallels the expansion of the universe [Obe00]. The loss
of coherence is based on the assumption that the outgoing (beyond the event
horizon) radiation is coherent, while the incoming is not.
Another example is the decay of an unstable state: Essentially a two-level system
is interacting with an environment and one assumes the state with an excited
two-level system and no excitation in the environment to be the “initial” state,
while the state where the excitation has been transferred to the environment is
considered to be the “final” one. The time asymmetry is obviously introduced by
hand through the choice of asymmetric boundary conditions. With suitable other
boundary conditions nothing would prevent a particle from becoming excited in
the future. – The same argument applies to the process of decoherence, where
a state with localised coherence is considered to be “initial”, while a unitarily
evolved state with delocalized coherence is dubbed “final”.
Lemma 2.1.8. Let a theory have an arrow of time A. Then all solutions of the
equations of motion of this theory are irreversible.
Proof. Assume there is a fixed point solution f0 ∈ S. Then A(ta, tb) =
A(tb, ta) and A cannot be an arrow of time. Assume next that there is a closed
solution f1 ∈ S. Then there are instants ta 6= tb with f1(ta) = f1(tb), and again
A(ta, tb) = A(tb, ta). Hence all solutions must be be irreversible. ¤
The problem of the arrow of time consists in deciding whether an arrow of time
does exist in fundamental physics. The crucial point in the definition is that the
time order must be observable. The main obstacle is time reversal invariance:
Proposition 2.1.9. If a theory based on the standard notion of time has a
partially time-reversal invariant dynamical law, then it does not possess an arrow
of time.
Proof. By assumption for every solution f : T → Γ also fK = J ◦f ◦I is a solu-
tion. We choose an instant t ∈ T with t > 0, and as conventional time order the
order of the real numbers (such that −t ≤ t) and assume that there is an arrow of
time A. Then we have A (P ◦ f(−t), P ◦ f(t)) = +1, since−t 6= t and−t ≤ t, and
on the other hand A (P ◦ f(−t), P ◦ f(t)) = A (P ◦ J ◦ f(−t), P ◦ J ◦ f(t)) =
A (P ◦ fK(t), P ◦ fK(−t)) = −1, hence a contradiction. This result does not de-
pend on the choice of conventional time order. (In the case of classical mechanics
a similar proposition can be found in [AM78, prop. 4.3.14].)
As in the abstract relational approach /1.3.3/ a theory is automatically time-
reversal invariant, it does not possess an arrow of time. (With the relational
approach we are therefore making a strong commitment with regard to one of
the most fundamental open problems.)
In order to circumvent proposition 2.1.9 one argues that the fundamental physical
theories are only idealized theories in that they describe closed systems while all
systems (except for the universe) are open. In this line of reasoning it suffices
to justify an “arrow of time for the universe”. The (classical) evolution of the
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universe however is governed by the time-reversal invariant Einstein’s equations.
There are essentially two ways out: The one appeals to a statistics of universes in
the tradition of Boltzmann, while the other contents itself with a single solution
of Einstein’s equations, namely that in which we live.
The first approach was initiated by Gold [Gol62] and is discussed in an illumi-
nating way in [Pri96, ch. 4]. The idea is to relate the entropy of the universe
with its expansion. Although it is not yet clear how to define entropy includ-
ing gravitational interaction, it seems that this is not sufficient to explain the
very low entropy of the big bang7 [Pri96]. Nevertheless, one could introduce
the low entropy of the big bang as a postulate, i.e. a restriction to solutions
with special boundary conditions. (In the case of a symmetric universe an anal-
ogous postulate would be required for the big crunch.) For an extended dis-
cussion of the alternatives see the cited literature as well as a number of other
books [Dav74,Zeh99,Sch97,Sav95,Ste00,AR97,Pri96,Pri79]. (These also discuss
the other arrows of time at length.) Altogether the entropic (or traditional global)
approach relies on the questionable statistics of universes.
The second approach [CLL03b, CLL03a] provides a global and local arrow of
time in a non-entropic way: It postulates as an additional law that there be only
a single solution of Einstein’s equation, namely that which we observe as our
universe. Together with the input of an asymmetric universe (being currently
favoured) the expansion of the universe in cosmic time8 is a global observable.
If the dominant energy condition [CLL03b] is fulfilled, the global arrow of time
becomes manifest locally in the timelike local energy flux. This provides a local
arrow of time and is possible because just one (asymmetric) solution of Einstein’s
equations is allowed.
Another way to circumvent proposition 2.1.9 is the assumption that the funda-
mental dynamical laws of nature are not partially time-reversal invariant.
The case of weak interactions is not clear. (It has been argued that the Kaon
decay experiments have not actually been performed in a time-reversed manner,
or that the weak interactions might be too weak in order to observe a macroscopic
arrow of time [CLL03b, footnote in part V. C.]; apart from short remarks this
topic is however not treated in the literature.) Due to lack of new insights we
have to follow bad custom and leave weak interactions out of consideration.
If there were an arrow of time, how could it explain our everyday experiences?
If we could distinguish past and future instants on a physical basis, why would a
glass always be intact in the past and broken in the future, and not vice versa?
One strategy is to weaken this question, and to ask why most glasses would do so.
That is, one can reduce the question to statistics and try to deduce an increase
in entropy towards the future. This is not a trivial task, especially when taking
into account all fundamental interactions.
Another twist is added to the problem of the arrow of time by quantum mechanics:
7According to Penrose’s estimate only 1 in 1010
123
universes will have a big bang compatible
with our observations.
8The existence of a cosmic time is a precondition for a global arrow of time.
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2.1.4 The arrow of time in quantum physics
According to quantummechanics there are two incompatible time evolutions (”dy-
namical dualism”[Zeh03]): The unitary evolution, which is partially time-reversal
invariant and hence does not allow for an arrow of time /2.1.3/; and the collapse
dynamics, or (wave packet) reduction, which is nonunitary and nondeterministic
and describes von Neumann measurements.
In order to deal with the latter dynamics we first clarify the notions of determin-
ism and causality9:
Definition 2.1.11. A system with time order ≤ is said to be deterministic in the
time forward (backward) direction, if any copy of this system containing exactly
the same observations at instant t does so for any t′ ≥ t (t′ ≤ t).
Of course, no experimenter can produce a copy of the universe, so determinism
can be tested only locally in space and time by providing the same boundary
conditions locally at a later time, or somewhere else in space.
If there is no arrow of time, then forward and backward determinism have to be
equivalent, i.e. if any two copies contain the same observations at an instant, then
they do so at any other instant.
Definition 2.1.12. A system with time order < is said to be causal in the time
forward (backward) direction, if any two copies of this system containing different
observations at an instant t do so at any instant t′ < t (t′ > t).
If there is no arrow of time, then forward and backward causality have to be
equivalent, i.e. if any two copies contain different observations at an instant, then
they do so at any other instant. Thus causality does not require an arrow of time.
From our definitions it is obvious that determinism in the time forward (back-
ward) direction is equivalent to causality in the time forward (backward) direc-
tion. The time-symmetric versions are identical, too.
From the definitions we can distinguish four kinds of (in)determinism [DEH01]
(compare fig. 2.1.2):
(a) The system is forward deterministic and backward deterministic.
(b) The system is forward deterministic and not backward deterministic.
(c) The system is not forward deterministic and backward deterministic.
(d) The system is not forward deterministic and not backward deterministic.
ad (a):
This case includes classical (non-statistical) theories and unitary quantum dy-
namics: Determinism does not mean predictability; the former refers to ontic
descriptions of systems, the latter to epistemic ones [Pri02,Bis03]. For instance,
9Here we are concerned with the question of fundamental indeterminacy (or uncertainty),
which cannot be blamed to the observer’s limited accuracy.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)Time
Figure 2.1.2. Four types of (in)determinism [DEH01]. (a) One
cause has one effect and vice versa. (b) One effect has more than
one cause, but these causes have always the same effect. (c) One
cause has more than one effect, but these effects have always the
same cause. (d) Every effect has more than one cause and each of
these causes has more than one effect.
there might be a hidden variable theory according to which the evolution is deter-
ministic, but as long as the hidden variables are not observable the theory lacks
predictability.
Clearly, the time symmetry of this kind of determinism by itself does not imply
the impossibility of an arrow of time. Furthermore, if two systems are in an
entangled state, then they have the same arrow of time [Pri02].
ad (b), (c):
This asymmetric kind of determinism relies on the assumption that the theory is
intrinsically indeterministic. For if hidden variables were able to restore a forward
as well as backward deterministic evolution, it would have to be explained why
always the same type of determinism (forward, resp. backward) is concealed by
the unobservability of hidden variables.
Given an intrinsic indeterminism of type (b) or (c) one can experimentally deter-
mine an arrow of time in the following way: One prepares several copies of the
system at one instant t1 of time, where approximately all possible states of the
system appear approximately infinitely often. Then one measures the states of
all these copies at another instant t2. If there are copies with the same state at t2
(t1), but different states at t1 (t2), then the system is not backward (forward) de-
terministic between t1 and t2, otherwise it is. If the same type of (in)determinism
holds for all pairs of different instants with the same time order (as between t1
and t2), then in cases (b) and (c) one can observe the time order and has an
arrow of time.
We thus define a quantum arrow of time to be a classical arrow belonging to the
classical motion of expectation values of the quantum system, where expectation
values are operationally defined as averages over many systems. If there is only
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one copy of the system (as in the case of the universe), the definition becomes
meaningless.
ad (d):
However, as argued in [DEH01], indeterminism in quantum physics with collapse
always comes as in (d): Consider e.g. an electron source emitting particles in an
x-spin up (x+) state and let them pass through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, which
measures their z-spin, the result being indeterminate (with probabilities 1
2
for z+
and 1
2
for z−). The same result would be obtained upon usage of x− states. There
is thus more than one cause having the same effects. This kind of indeterminism
appearing in von Neumann collapse is symmetric in both directions of time.
Time symmetry of the standard formalism of quantum mechanics with collapse
was revealed already in 1964 in the famous paper by Aharonov, Bergman and
Lebowitz (ABL) [ABL64]10. They formulated quantum mechanics including mea-
surement collapse in a time-symmetric way by considering preparation as well as
detection. Textbooks usually limit consideration to ensembles constructed in the
following way:
Put all joint events with fixed initial state ψ
(i)
k0
and one of the
possible final states ψ
(f)
l (l = 1, 2, . . .) into the same ensemble
El, and discard all other initial states.
Clearly, this introduces a time asymmetry; time-symmetric ensembles can be
constructed in the following way:
Put all joint events with one of the possible “initial” states ψ
(i)
k
(k = 1, 2, . . .) and one of the possible “final” states ψ
(f)
l (l =
1, 2, . . .) into the same ensemble Ek,l.
The probability interpretation of quantum mechanics ascribes an approximate
relative frequency distribution to the population of the ensembles El and Ek,l
(provided they contain sufficiently enough events). The time-symmetric case is
therefore included in the standard interpretation; this remains true for histories,
i.e. sequences of measurements.
The reverse does not hold: Given probabilities for ensembles with time-symmetric
double-selection one cannot deduce probabilities for ensembles in which the se-
lection is based only on initial (or only on final) observations. As shown by
ABL [ABL64], this deduction requires the following additional postulate: En-
sembles chosen on the basis of an initial measurement alone possess unambiguous
and reproducible probability characteristics.
Adopting the time-symmetric description without this postulate, a system at a
time between two noncommuting measurements can be described either by the
state after the “initial” observation (for predictive purposes), or by the the state
before the “final” observation (for retrodictive purposes).
10Note that while their conclusions are correct there is a mistake in the derivation, which
cancels itself [Kir02].
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One may ask which state between preparation and detection is the correct one
in the time-symmetric formalism: the state predicted from preparation, or the
state retrodicted from detection? Since however by assumption there is no
measurement-like interaction between preparation and measurement, this ques-
tion is operationally meaningless. (This “inaccessible past” [Pri96] is the charac-
teristic difference with classical mechanics, where any quantity is measurable at
any time.)
In [AV91] the concept of a general state was introduced, which comprises all
information about a system at a time, including both past and future measure-
ments. The predictive formalism of quantum mechanics, which together with
Bayes’ theorem allows to calculate retrodictive probabilities, was reformulated
in a such a way that it treats both preparation and detection in a symmetric
fashion. Recently in [PBJ02] a generalization to biased (preparation as well as)
detection procedures was given. (A simpler formalism for retrodiction is desirable
in quantum communication and quantum cryptography, for the recipient wants
to retrodict the state prepared by the sender.)
Prediction and retrodiction still assume the system to be causal in the time for-
ward direction, and thereby assume the existence of one and only one direction
of time, with respect to which inferences can be drawn. If there is no arrow
of time, then time forward and backward causal descriptions must be equiva-
lent. The main argument against backward causation is the so-called bilking
argument [Fay01,Wha98]: Assume that a cause A is later than the effect B.
Then appealing to free will one argues that one could intervene after B has oc-
curred (and before A has occurred) in such a way that instead of A a different
and to some degree arbitrary cause A’ would take place. Now B would have to
be caused by A and arbitrary causes A’, which cannot be true in general and
therefore backward causation is impossible. – While this is true in classical me-
chanics, an arbitrary intervention without changing A is impossible in quantum
mechanics, as pointed out above. Quantum mechanics hence allows for backward
causation and in fact some features of quantum mechanics can be interpreted in
a new way. E.g. the nonlocal Bell correlations can be reinterpreted in the fol-
lowing way [Wha98,Pri94a,Pri96]: Bell’s theorem assumes that the past values
of hidden variables cannot be influenced by future measurements. With back-
ward causation this is possible, and measurements on both spatially separated
subsystems cause the earlier state of the compound system. Hence there is a lo-
cal propagation of causal effects and the local realistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics as desired by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen can be reestablished. –
Of course, such an approach conflicts with common intuition, but there is noth-
ing in quantum mechanics which forbids this interpretation. Also, due to the
stochastic nature of quantum mechanics superluminal signalling is impossible in
this approach although causal influences are instantaneous.
In [EDZ02] (see also [ED02]) an experiment has been proposed, which suggests
backward causation. It consists of the time-reversed generation of an EPR pair.
Consider first the time-forward (V-shaped) version of the experiment: A single
photon passes through a beam splitter and each of its two “halves” subsequently
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interacts with a single atom in a cavity along its path. In this way the states
of the atoms become entangled (w.r.t. ground and excited states of both). After
passing the cavities the photons are not detected. – Now consider the time-
backward (Λ-shaped) version of this experiment (called “RPE”): One arranges
two distant, independent sources so that they emit a single photon (during a cer-
tain time interval) on average. The beams of both sources are directed towards
a beam splitter, so that the interference of this single photon with itself can be
detected with photon counters behind the beam splitter. (The interference of
light coming from uncorrelated sources was discovered by Hanbury-Brown and
Twiss; see [Pau86] for a review. It has been experimentally demonstrated at the
single photon level.) To complete the time-backward analogue one now puts two
cavities, each with a single atom, into the beams. The time-reversed experiment
thus works in the following way: A single photon is emitted from two independent
sources, its two “halves” pass through the cavities, thereby possibly exciting the
atoms inside, and finally are brought to interference at a beam splitter, behind
which the single photon is detected. Through the use of the beam splitter the
two photon paths become indistinguishable, which entails that the atoms are in
an entangled state. On the other hand, if one pulls out the beam splitter and
gains knowledge on the photon path, one atom will be excited, and the other
not. The astounding fact now is that the experimenter can choose to pull out or
not to pull out the beam splitter only after the interaction with the atoms has
taken place. Thereby the wave function of the atoms (which is experimentally
verifiable!) can be chosen ex post! If one claims reality of the wave function at
any instant of time, then one has to admit backward causation.
We return to physics without backward causation and consider a modification
of quantum mechanics, which explicitly rules out symmetric determinism (a) in
favor of symmetric indeterminism (d): In the spontaneous collapse model of Ghi-
rardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) [GRW86] a local collapse of the wave function
in the position basis on certain time and distance scales is postulated, thereby
slightly modifying the collapse-free unitary dynamics. The probability of sponta-
neous collapse is taken to be so small that no contradiction with observed mea-
surement results arises. In [DEH01] it is argued, that this kind of indeterminism
may be macroscopically time asymmetric: Consider a sufficiently big number of
molecules in a box so that collapses happen at almost every instant of time, and
assume furthermore that the dynamics without collapse evolves the wave func-
tion into a sufficiently delocalized superposition of localised molecule states, so
that the collapse dynamics will perform a substantial relocalization. While the
delocalization happens in both directions of time, this spontaneous localization is
postulated to occur only in one direction of time (towards the “future”). Clearly,
this assumption explicitly breaks time-reversal invariance. Nevertheless the inde-
terminism is symmetric of type (d): Let |x〉 and |y〉 be localized states. Then we
have an arrow of time intrinsic to the dynamics, where e.g. the following collapse
happens:
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1√
2
(|x〉+ |y〉)
or
1√
2
(|x〉 − |y〉)
 ½¾/
 |x〉or|y〉
The problem then is to justify that the future direction ½ is the same as that
observed in thermodynamics. Indeed, under the stated assumptions an entropy
increase of a nonequilibrium state of the molecules in the container towards the
future is very likely; an anti-thermodynamic (entropy decreasing) behaviour is not
excluded. The probability of an entropy increase can in principle be calculated
from a solution of the equations of motion, which may however turn out to be
intractable. The hypothesis of a low entropy of the initial states is not needed
here; the increase of entropy is rooted in the intrinsic time asymmetry of an
indeterministic dynamics.11
Conversely, it has also been argued that a fundamental indeterminism is a nec-
essary condition for the existence of an arrow of time [DEH01,ED99]. As in the
GRW case, this condition is however not sufficient; existence of an arrow of time
depends on the details of dynamics.
In [ED99] it was argued that in the case of black holes the (indeterministic) evap-
oration at the event horizon is a sufficient condition for an intrinsic arrow of time,
because the increase in entropy due to quantum fluctuations at the event horizon
seems to be unrelated to the content of of the black hole; the increase of entropy
outside is not connected with an equal decrease inside the event horizon, so that
the entropy production (information annihilation) is absolute and defines an ar-
row of time. – This argument remains however speculative as long as it is not
supported by an established theory of quantum gravity. Penrose [HP96] expects
that a theory of quantum gravity will reveal an arrow of time in the basic laws
of physics. Hawking point of view [HP96] is however not tenable: He argues that
causation is time-symmetric, and the arrow of time arises from intrinsic indeter-
minism (information annihilation) together with some unique initial conditions of
the universe’s evolution. However, as shown in [ED99], time-symmetric causation
is incompatible with intrinsic indeterminism.
The open question therefore is whether a proper theory of quantum gravity does
provide an intrinsic indeterminism (which goes beyond indeterminism in non-
gravitational quantum physics).
We come to the conclusion that a fundamental indeterminism as in the GRW
theory or in black hole evaporation has not been established. Hence quantum
physics does not require a fundamental arrow of time, not does it unambiguously
provide one. The relational concept of time based on a mere simultaneity relation
without an arrow of time is therefore adequate for the description of fundamental
physics.
11It has been criticised however, that the usage of nonequilibrium states remains unex-
plained [Cal01].
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Let us finally mention a new idea for defining an arrow of time in local quantum
field theory: Buchholz considers a class of states of quantum field, which are
locally (but not necessarily globally) close to thermal equilibrium. The largest
space-time regions in which these “local equilibrium states” can exist, are shown
[Buc03] to be timelike cones in a simple model. The singular events at the apices
of these cones can be interpreted as “hot bangs” (singularities in temperature);
by assuming that they always lie in the past of the temporally subsequent local
equilibrium they give rise to a local direction of time for the chosen state of
the quantum field without requiring dissipative effects. The model shows how
macroscopic time-reversal symmetry is reflected in the microscopic setting.
In the absence of a fundamental arrow of time our impression (or “illusion” 12)
of the flow of time might be explained by a new physics of consciousness, which
seems to depend on the possibility of memory. There is some hope that this can be
achieved with a proper understanding of quantum mechanics. (See e.g. [Pen89,
Pen95, AB02, AAMH99, Vit01b] and [Atm03] for thoughts in this direction, to
which the author is inclined. They go beyond the scope of this thesis, however.)
2.2 Time measurement
In this section we assume the existence of an absolute time and investigate how
it can be measured with clocks built from classical or quantum free harmonic
oscillators. Before we do this, we give a short review of the problem of finding a
quantum time observable.
2.2.1 Quantum time observables
In classical mechanics as well as in quantum mechanics there are systems with an
oscillatory motion, i.e. whose solutions of the equations of motion are not irre-
versible /2.1.2/, which do not allow to determine absolute duration by measuring
the state of the system. They have no internal time, but may possess a phase
operator /2.2.3/. On the other hand, systems with irreversible motion (e.g. free
particles) do exist in classical mechanics. In quantum mechanics a footnote in
Pauli’s famous 1926 Handbuch article [Pau26, p. 60] opened a long discussion
on whether a time observable can exist for a quantum system at all. For several
decades it was believed that this is not the case; more precisely, Pauli’s theorem
asserts that there is no self-adjoint operator canonically conjugate to a semi-
bounded Hamiltonian. The time operator T should be canonically conjugated
to the Hamiltonian H, because [T,H] = dT
dt
!
= 1. This is however a too strong
statement [Bos01]: 1. T cannot always be defined on the entire phase space.
2. [T,H] = 1 needs only be fulfilled on actual trajectories. Moreover, the value of
T in a state depends on a reference state (initial conditions), so there is a family
12“For us convinced physicists the distinction between past, present and future is an illusion,
although a persistent one.” (A. Einstein)
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of time observables. – But even if one takes the canonically quantized time op-
erator T and the semi-bounded Hamiltonian H to be densely defined, then due
to Pauli’s theorem [T,H] = i~ 13 cannot be true. However, after more than seven
decades and after this statement had entered into numerous textbooks, Pauli’s
theorem was recognised [Gal02a] to rely on contradictory implicit assumptions. A
careful discussion (with regard to the domains of definition of the operators) has
shown that for certain semi-bounded Hamiltonians canonically conjugate time
operators do exist [Gal02b]. The interpretation as quantised time is however not
clear so far. (For instance, there should be a certain probability for time to run
backward.)
The hypothetical time observable in Pauli’s theorem is assumed to be a selfad-
joint operator, or equivalently, due to the spectral theorem, a projection valued
(PV) measure14. It has however become clear during the last decades that the
common textbook wisdom identifying observables with selfadjoint operators is
too restricted. More generally, observables have to be represented by positive
operator valued (POV) measures15, which are well established16 by now [BGL95].
The assumptions of Pauli’s theorem are therefore not only self-contradictory, but
also too strong. And indeed, POV measures with the meaning of a time observ-
able can be found [BGL94]. E.g., the POV measure for a free particle is explicitly
constructed in [Gia97,Bos01]. The idea is to find a POV measure whose expec-
tations coincide with those of the time operator17 T = (2p)−1 q + q (2p)−1 (q and
p being position and momentum operators of the particle), and which is also
covariant under time translations (rather than a system of imprimitivity as in
Pauli’s theorem). This POV measure can be evaluated in any state and yields
the duration t between the current state and the initially prepared state at t = 0.
– A general procedure for constructing a POV time observable is still missing.
The time observables discussed so far are clock time observables used to measure
the intrinsic time of a system. Such measurements can take place at any instant.
A different question is at which time a measurement event does occur [BF01,
Rov98, ORU98, Per86]. An often discussed situation is that of arrival time or
time of flight of a particle (see e.g. [ML00,ORU99] and some of the contributions
in [MME02]), where the detection of a particle takes place at a single instant
13Using T = t and H = i~ ∂∂t one obtains [T,H] = −i. The ambiguity of the sign is not
understood, but indicates problems with quantum time.
14Such observables have been called decision observables, ordinary observables, or sharp
observables.
15These measures were also called POM (probability operator measures), and the cor-
responding observables appear also under the names generalized observables, or unsharp
observables.
16There is however still progress: Recently it has been shown [DHLP02], that there are self-
adjoint operators, which have a unique PV measure due to the spectral theorem, and at the
same time have a unique POV measure due to certain requirements (such as covariance) with
a statistics different from that of the PV measure. If one wants to interpret these operators
as observables, then one has to make a choice between the PV measure and POV measure
formalisms.
17In the PV formalism this operator has been often discussed, see e.g. [Per80,GYS81].
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according to von Neumann’s measurement collapse. – We point out that in a
genuinely quantum description without collapse and without absolute time there
is no need that the becoming definite of some observable must happen instan-
taneously; instantaneity means that a time observable becomes definite simul-
taneously, which is not necessary in a relational setting.18 – Von Neumann’s
measurement theory however assumes instantaneous collapse and thus the ques-
tion when a measurement event takes place is perfectly justified. There is a
certain probability distribution for the occurrence of the event over time, and one
wants to find a time observable, which has exactly this distribution for result-
ing time values. Such observables have been called event time observables (see
e.g. [Bus02]).
A general procedure for constructing a POV event time observable measuring
the time of occurrence of an effect (more precisely, the duration between the
instant of occurrence and the preparation instant) has been given in [BF01]. Let
us briefly sketch the idea: Let A > 0 be a bounded operator on a Hilbert space
H. A is the effect whose occurrence time shall be measured. E.g., A might be a
projection operator for a spatial region, in which a particle detector is sensitive.
In the Heisenberg picture the expectation 〈A(t)〉ψ of A(t) in a state ψ varies over
time. This probability distribution may be such that
0 <
∫
R
〈A(t)〉ψ dt <∞ ,
if the particle does enter the detector at all and does not spend an infinitely long
time there. For this case it is shown in [BF01], that the total duration between
t = 0 and the occurrence of the effect, namely
B =
∫
R
A(t) dt ,
is a positive selfadjoint operator; moreover the POV measure
P (I) = B−
1
2
∫
I
A(t) dt B−
1
2
(where I is an interval of the real line) transforms covariantly under time trans-
lations,
(P (I)) (t) = P (I + t) ,
where (P (I)) (t) is the time evolution of P (I). An event time operator can then
be defined as the first moment of this POV measure:
TA =
∫
R
tP (dt)
This procedure can be used for the construction of event time operators for several
characteristic times, e.g. the time delay in scattering theory [CN02], the dwell time
in tunnelling [CN02], or the lifetime of an unstable state.
18In [Rov98] (which was also criticized in [ORU98]) it is argued that one could attach a
second apparatus in order to detect whether the first apparatus has performed a measurement
or not; but here again the instantaneity (w.r.t. absolute time) of the second measurement is an
assumption, if the overall system is genuinely quantum.
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Intimately connected with the search for time observables is the question on the
existence and meaning of time-energy uncertainty relations. We do not review
this endless debate here, but instead refer to the introductory section of [KAN94];
see [BF02] for a recent rigorous derivation of this uncertainty relation.
2.2.2 Classical oscillator clocks
In /1.2.2/ we used a free classical body as a clock, whose time can be read off
(up to linear transformations) by measuring position. The quantum POV time
observable for the free particle mentioned in the previous subsection /2.2.1/ has
the disadvantage that the measured time value is not classically definite, but
probabilistic, so that the clock time sometimes might go backward. To obtain a
classical clock time one could use an infinite number of free particles and take the
average, or one could take an infinitely massive particle. Both options are not
convincing for real clocks; real clocks do usually tick, i.e. they have an oscillation
mechanism. Oscillator clocks are no better than free particles regarding quantum
stochasticity. They even have the further disadvantage that their motion is not
irreversible and thus they only allow to measure a cyclic time. Bosonic quantum
fields do however provide an infinite number of oscillators with arbitrary long
oscillation periods. They can thus be used to measure a linear time, and we will
explore below /4.1/ how a classical notion of time can be obtained from them.
In this subsection we study in detail how classical clocks can be constructed from
one, two, or infinitely many free oscillators.
One oscillator
The motion of a free harmonic oscillator in one dimension is known to be
q(t) = A cos (ωt+ φ) ,
where q ∈ R is the position, A ∈ R+0 the amplitude, φ ∈ [0; 2pi[ a phase, ω ∈ R+
the frequency and t ∈ R a time parameter. The latter coincides with absolute
time, since by assumption the oscillator is free. Knowing this motion we can 1)
determine A by measuring q at all instants and taking the supremum, and 2)
measure q at a single instant and obtain information about t,
t =
1
ω
(
2pi
(
n+
1
2
)
− φ± χ
)
, (2.2.1)
where χ = pi−arccos ( q
A
)
and the equation holds for some n ∈ Z. From q alone we
can determine neither n, nor the correct one of the two branches. The positions
qi = q(ti) (i = 1, 2) are insufficient for measuring the duration d(t1, t2) between
two instants t1, t2 ∈ R:
d(t1, t2) := |t2 − t1| = 1
ω
|2pi (n2 − n1)± χ2 ∓ χ1| ,
where χi := pi− arccos
(
qi
A
)
and we have to require A > 0. While φ drops out, we
can neither infer the branches uniquely, nor n2−n1. The latter would amount to
knowing duration in advance, though on a larger scale; if we had an irreversible
mechanism at hand, we could use it as an event counter and “outsource” the
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counting of clock cycles to it, but we do not assume so. Hence we can only
measure a cyclic time.
In the limit ω → 0 the oscillator approximates a free particle, and we have ni = 0
(for finite ti), but the sign ambiguity remains.
With an irreversible mechanism we would be able to distinguish between forward
and backward motion, i.e. between positive and negative values of velocity q˙ =
−Aω sin (ωt+ φ) – independent of the metric of time. This would render the
choice of branches unambiguous for the single oscillator clock.
Moreover, two interactionless single oscillator clocks, which in particular do not
share their irreversible mechanisms, do not necessarily assign the same time order
to a series of instants, if there is no arrow of time /2.1.3/.
Two oscillators
Consider an additional oscillator
q′(t) = A′ cos (ω′t+ φ′) .
We assume that we are able to perform simultaneous measurements of q and q′.
For the second oscillator we obtain an equation analogous to (2.2.1),
t =
1
ω′
(
2pi
(
n′ +
1
2
)
− φ′ ± χ′
)
, (2.2.2)
where χ′ = pi − arccos
(
q′
A′
)
and n′ ∈ Z. Equating (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) leads to
ω′n− ωn′ = ∆±,±(ω, ω′) (2.2.3)
with ∆±,±(ω, ω′) ∈ R, the first ± indicating the two branches of (2.2.1) and the
second those in (2.2.2). When is a solution (n, n′) of this equation unique?
Lemma 2.2.1. A solution of (2.2.3) is unique, iff ω′ω−1 is irrational.
Proof. Let (n, n′) and (n˜, n˜′) be solutions to (2.2.3). Thenω′n − ωn′ =
ω′n˜ − ωn˜′, whence ω′ω−1 (n− n˜) = n′ − n˜′. If ω′ω−1 is irrational, we must have
n = n˜ and n′ = n˜′. Otherwise we have r ∈ Z, s ∈ N with ω′ω−1 = r
s
and can
choose n˜ := n+ s, n˜′ := n′ + r, which is a solution different from (n, n′). ¤
Hence for irrational ω′ω−1 (ω and ω′ being incommensurable) position measure-
ments on both oscillators determine time uniquely, up to a possible choice of
4 branches. However, a limited accuracy of position measurements renders the
resulting time values non-unique.
Again, if we consider durations (corresponding to 4 measured positions q1,q2,q
′
1,q
′
2),
the phases φ and φ′ drop out. And in the limit ω, ω′ → 0 we also have n = n′ = 0.
Free field
Next consider the time evolution of a free Klein-Gordon field Φ in one dimension
with coordinate x, i.e. a solution of the Klein-Gordon equation
∂2
∂t2
Φ(x, t)− ∂
2
∂x2
Φ(t, x) +m2Φ(x, t) = 0 ,
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with massm ≥ 0. We assume Φ ∈ C∞(R2,R) and Φ(t, ·) =: Φt ∈ S(R,R) (t ∈ R),
where S(R,R) is the space of real-valued Schwartz functions on R. Denoting the
Fourier transformation w.r.t. x by ·ˆ, we get
∂2
∂t2
Φˆt(k) + ω(k)
2Φˆt(k) = 0 (k ∈ R) ,
where ω(k) :=
√
k2 +m2 ∈ R+0 . The solution reads
Φˆt(k) = Φˆ0(k) cos (ω(k)t+ φ(k)) ,
where φ(k) ∈ C∞(R,R) is an initial phase. Let us fix a k and measure Φˆt(k) for
some k at two different instants t = t1, t2. Since every nontrivial neighborhood of
k contains a k′ for which ω(k′) is an irrational multiple of ω(k), we can use the
oscillators at k and k′ as a clock. According to classical theory this is possible in
principle. In order to know the exact values of the Fourier transformed fields, we
must know Φ(x, t) for all x ∈ R.
An alternative method to measure time makes use of a convergent sequence of
field modes (kn)n∈N. Let k
∗ := limn→∞ kn. From a measurement of Φˆt(k∗) and
Φˆt(kn) for some n one can infer the value of
(ω(k∗)− ω(kn)) t
modulo some recurrence time. In the limit n→∞ this recurrence time becomes
infinite. (Intuitively, this sequence corresponds to a (cascaded) hierarchy of hands
of a clock counting seconds, minutes, hours, etc..) In order to resolve k∗ and kn it
is however necessary to measure the field at sharply localized values of k, which
means that nonlocal observables are unavoidable. Furthermore, this method does
work only, if in each neighborhood of k∗ there is at least one kn with Φˆ0(kn) 6= 0.
If the field is translation invariant, then the choice of k∗ is arbitrary. If translation
invariance is broken, then the value k∗ = 0 is of special interest (cmp. /4/ below);
then one can find k1, k2, . . . such that mω(km) = m |km| = const. (m ∈ N). The
greater m, the longer the period of the km-oscillator, and the more instants can
be distinguished by this oscillator. Not only do the nkagain disappear, but also
the sign ambiguity: Since |χk,1 − χk,2| becomes arbitrarily small for k → 0 the
duration between two configurations of the field is defined unambiguously. This
fact makes the field into a clock.
2.2.3 Quantum phase observables
While the measurement of the phase of a single oscillator is classically unprob-
lematic, the existence of a phase observable for a quantum oscillator is one of the
oldest and still debated problems of quantum mechanics [Lyn95]. It is similar to
the problem of finding a quantum time observable /2.2.1/.
One wants to have a phase operator Φ in the traditional Hilbert space setting,
i.e. an observable which can be measured on an individual system in any state,
and that has eigenstates which have a definite phase in [0; 2pi[ in the classical
limit.
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The first to define an assumed phase operator was Dirac in 1927. He proposed a
polar decomposition [RS80] of the annihilation operator, a = eiφR, where φ and
R are selfadjoint. Then a∗ = Re−iφ, n := a∗a = R2, eiφ = an
1
2 , and finally one
calculates
[
eiφ, n
]
= eiφ, which can be expanded as a power series in φ, whence
by comparison of the lowest-order terms one obtains the canonical commutation
relation between number and phase, [n, φ] = i. However, this relation leads to an
obvious contradiction already for number states (l,m ∈ N0):
iδlm = i 〈l|m〉 = 〈l |nφ− φn|m〉 = (l −m) 〈l |φ|m〉
Closer inspection shows that eiφ is not unitary and thus φ is no selfadjoint opera-
tor. The problems in finding a phase observable canonically conjugate to number
can be traced back to two reasons: 1. The number operator is bounded from be-
low. (This reason is similar to the problem of finding a time observable.) 2. The
phase shall be 2pi-periodic.
Later Susskind and Glogower defined analogues of e±iφ, namely
E = (n+ 1)
1
2 a =
∞∑
n=0
|n 〉〈n+ 1| ,
E∗ = a∗ (n+ 1)−
1
2 =
∞∑
n=0
|n+ 1 〉〈n| .
However, E is not unitary again, only an isometry: EE∗ = 1, E∗E = 1− |0 〉〈 0|
(These operators have the advantage that they are approximately unitary for
number states |n〉with large n.
Most other approaches suffer from similar problems. In fact it has been proved in
general, that a Hermitian phase operator cannot be consistently defined within
the traditional Hilbert space formalism [Fuj95].
Pegg and Barnett [PB89] were able to recover self-adjoint phase operators by
slightly modifying the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. They
defined for θ ∈ R phase states by
|θ〉 = lim
s→∞
(
s+
1
2
)− 1
2
s∑
n=0
einθ |n〉 .
Here |n〉 (n = 0, . . . , n) are number states spanning a finite, s + 1-dimensional
subspace Ψs of the infinite dimensional Hilbert space of the harmonic oscillator.
Note that only the finite dimensional approximations to |θ〉 live in the Hilbert
space, but |θ〉 itself contains infinitely many excitations.
Time evolution takes a phase state |θ〉 into another phase state |θ − ωt〉.
The basic idea of the formalism is to first calculate all expectations using the
finite subspaces Ψs, and only then to take the limit s→∞. On each Ψs (s ∈ N0)
one can define a Hermitian phase operator by
Φs :=
s∑
m=0
θm |θm〉 〈θm| .
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Here θm :=
2pim
s+1
∈ [0; 2pi[ so that Φs has the correct spectrum. Although Φs fails
to be Hermitian in the limit s → ∞, its expectations do converge in this limit
and the Pegg-Barnett approach asserts that these limit values are observable.
This means that one has a phase observable which can be repeatedly measured
on phase states without affecting time evolution and at the same time measuring
duration (up to multivaluedness).
The Pegg-Barnett formalism has been criticised (see e.g. [VR99b,VPB99,VR99a,
Kak02]) and its relevance is still unclear, since no experiments are known, which
would allow to discriminate between the traditional and the modified Hilbert
space formalism.
A second approach to the phase operator problem argues that the requirement of
hermiticity is too restrictive; instead one should identify observables with POV
measures. Along these lines of thought covariant phase observables have been
extensively studied [LP99,LP00,LP01,Pel01a,Pel01b]. Dropping hermiticity one
can find infinitely many phase operators [Roy96].
A third class of approaches to the phase operator problem rests upon a change
of quantization. We follow this route with the relational quantization scheme
below /3.2/. This quantization does actually involve only phase difference ob-
servables19, which is also desirable, since phase measurements are always based
on interference.
2.2.4 Quantum oscillator clocks
After having seen how to use classical oscillators as clocks and how to measure
the phase of a quantum oscillator, we now want to use a quantum oscillator as a
clock.
Consider a single quantum oscillator in the traditional Hilbert space setting. First
of all it is necessary to note that not all states are apt for building a clock: The
time evolution of number states consists merely in a change of complex phase and
therefore does not change expectation values (denoted by 〈·〉). It is only when a
nontrivial superposition of number states is involved, that expectations become
time dependent.20
Because of their classical limits the coherent states |z〉 (z ∈ C) are an important
special case of such superpositions. They are defined by
|z〉 = eza+−z¯a |0〉 = e− |z|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
zn√
n!
|n〉 ,
19By this we mean an observable, which corresponds to phase differences in the classical
limit. Another definition of phase difference observable has been given in [HLP02] in the POVM
formalism. There it was shown that one can find phase difference observables, which are not a
difference of phase observables.
20Actually, for any system with two energy eigenstates |ψ1,2〉 with energies E1 6= E2,
the observable |ψ1〉 〈ψ2| − |ψ2〉 〈ψ1| has a time dependent expectation value in a nontrivial
superposition of |ψ2〉 and |ψ2〉. See also [Sto03].
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where |n〉 (n ∈ N0) are the number states and a+ and a are creation and annihi-
lation operators. They are related to position q and momentum p through
a+ =
λq − iλ−1p√
2~
and a =
λq + iλ−1p√
2~
, (2.2.4)
where λ =
√
mω. Under time evolution with the free HamiltonianH = ~ω(N+1
2
),
N = a+a, coherent states remain coherent states:
e−
i
~Ht |z〉 = e− 12 iωt ∣∣e−iωtz〉 =: e− 12 iωt |z(t)〉 (2.2.5)
While |z(t)| =√〈N〉 remains constant, the complex phase of z(t) oscillates and
so does the expectation of the position operator q, just as in the classical case:
〈q〉 = 〈z(t) |q| z(t)〉 =
√
2~
λ
〈
z(t)
∣∣a+ a+∣∣ z(t)〉 = √8~ 〈N〉
λ
cos (ωt+ φ)
Here we have used z = |z| e−iφ. The uncertainty is calculated as
(∆q)2 =
2~
λ2
.
With increasing amplitude |z| → ∞, i.e. in the classical limit of an infinite number
〈N〉, the relative measurement error ∆q〈q〉 becomes negligible for almost all times.
In order to infer information about time from measurements of position we can
simultaneously prepare at an initial instant t = 0 an ensemble of oscillators in the
states |z〉, i.e. with particle number 〈N〉 and initial phase φ, and then choose an
instant at which we simultaneously measure q among all oscillators. The duration
t between both instants is again given by (2.2.1), where now
χ = pi − arccos λ 〈q〉√
8~ 〈N〉 .
The problems with the multivaluedness are the same as in the classical case and
we must require 〈N〉 > 0.
If instead of measuring q on all oscillators at a single instant, we measure q on
a single oscillator at different instants, the time resulting from a substitution of
〈q〉 with the measured values of q may occasionally run backwards, compared to
the classical time.
A phase operator apt for coherent states would e.g. be
Φ :=
∫
R2
d2z (ln z − ln z¯) |z〉 〈z| ,
or (in order to avoid problems with the multivaluedness of the ln-terms)
Φ :=
∫
R2
d2z
z
|z| |z〉 〈z| ,
which corresponds to e−iφ in the classical limit. This approach to the phase
operator problem is known as Paul formalism. A problem with Paul’s Φ is – as
with most phase operators in the traditional Hilbert space setting – its lack of
unitarity.
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If we want to have a phase operator which can be used in any state of the
oscillator system, then as explained above /2.2.3/ we have to leave traditional
quantum mechanics.
2.3 Quantum gravity
A quantum theory of gravity is still missing [Rov00], there are two main can-
didates21: loop quantum gravity (LQG) and string theory. Smolin [Smo00]
believes, that both could be correct and complementary, describing nature on
different length scales. LQG is assumed to be valid below the Planck length
(∼ 10−35m) and string theory at intermediate scales, between the Planck length
and the smallest length scales of particle physics. The main conceptual dif-
ference between both theories is that string theory assumes a spacetime with
a fixed background metric (sometimes called a ’stage’ on which strings act),
while LQG tries to take diffeomorphism invariance of general relativity seriously.
LQG [Rov87,Thi01,GR99,Thi02] is in the tradition of canonical quantum gravity
(CQG), to which we restrict the following considerations. It is the more funda-
mental of both approaches, and it requires a new understanding of space and
time.
In CQG classical general relativity is formulated as a Hamiltonian field theory
with fields gµν and canonically conjugate momenta piµν . Spacetime is foliated
into a 1-parameter family of 3-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces with constant
time coordinate, and the Hamiltonian effects the evolution within this family of
hypersurfaces along coordinate time. Classical general relativity is a gauge theory
with the group of active diffeomorphisms of spacetime as gauge group /1.2.4/. In
particular it is invariant under reparametrizations of (coordinate) time22. This
implies that the Hamiltonian H is a Hamiltonian constraint.
The second step in CQG is a canonical quantization of the Hamiltonian theory.
One has two options [BI99]: 1) Solve the constraint classically and quantize the
reduced theory, or 2) quantize the gauge theory and solve the quantum constraint.
Choosing option 1 requires to find some internal time (i.e. an observable corre-
sponding basically to one of the degrees of freedom of the theory, to which the
motion of the other degrees of freedom can then be related; e.g. local proper time
of some observer, or cosmic time of a simple cosmological model) w.r.t. which evo-
lution becomes physically meaningful. This has not been achieved over decades
and constitutes a first aspect of the problem of time in CQG.
21Cf. [Rov03, appendix B] for an extended discussion of the history (see also [Pul02])
and [Smo03] for a recent review.
22As a generalization of Hamiltonian systems the notion of a reparametrization invari-
ant system has been introduced [H9´7]; each Hamiltonian system then corresponds to a
reparametrization invariant system with a particular choice of auxiliary rest frame.
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Choosing option 2 leads to four equations constraining the quantum state ψ in
a suitable Hilbert space: three momentum constraints which ensure diffeomor-
phism invariance within a spacelike hypersurface, and one Hamiltonian constraint
(Wheeler-DeWitt equation)
Hˆψ = 0 , (2.3.1)
where Hˆ and ψ depend on the metric of the hypersurface only. This equation
differs from the Schro¨dinger equation in that no ∂ψ
∂t
term is present, which makes
it difficult to interpret it as an equation describing time evolution: in quantum
theory a time parameter is required for evolution.23 It is a second aspect of the
problem of time in CQG that no time has been found at the quantum level,
which would allow to understand the Wheeler-DeWitt equation as an evolution
equation.
Even if an internal time could be found, there would be several problems [Kuc99,
Kuc92,Kuc91,Ish92,Hea02] (problem of global time, problem of spacetime fitting,
multiple-choice problem, problem of many-fingered time-evolution).
These problems gave rise to the hypothesis that CQG has no time at all. Of
course, in an appropriate semiclassical approximation a classical notion of time
must reemerge, see e.g. [Kie94]. – LQG uses loop variables for the description
of the gravitational field and thereby simplifies the treatment of diffeomorphism
invariance; it allows for a canonical quantization of general relativity, but it suffers
from the same problems with time.
A more radical hypothesis states that there is no time in quantum mechanics
either. On the one hand this would diminish the conflict with diffeomorphism
invariance of gravity, but if there is no fundamental time, at a first glance our ex-
perience of change would be an illusion. The idea of quantum mechanics without
time is the subject of the next chapter.
23There are more arguments for the incompatibility of diffeomorphism invariance and quan-
tum mechanics:
Diffeomorphisms may change the causal structure, a timelike curve may become spacelike.
But the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics requires an observer who performs
measurements, and the simplest model for an observer is a timelike curve. Hence the observer
ceases to exist after the diffeomorphic transformation. – Above /1.3.2.2/ we mentioned already
the long debate on observability even in classical general relativity.
As our discussion in /1.2.4/ has shown, infinitesimal adjacency is a primitive concept in
general relativity. Quantum mechanics renders exactly this notion meaningless due to local-
ization problems. Consequently, there are problems of defining a reference frame in quantum
gravity.
CHAPTER 3
Relational field quantization
In this chapter we introduce a new quantization of the free massless scalar
field, by generalizing a model of Rovelli, which is based on the relational
concept of time.
At a fundamental level, we should,
simply, forget time.
Carlo Rovelli [Rov01c]
This chapter studies the mechanics of simple systems, basically free harmonic
oscillators, whose role as clocks was discussed already in /2.2/; by contrast, here
we use the relational concept of time introduced in /1.3/. In the first section
/3.1/ we review the classical part of a model of Rovelli and generalize it to a
massless Klein-Gordon field in one dimension. In a second step /3.2/ we explain
Rovelli’s quantization method (roughly outlined already in /1.3/) and generalize
it to the free massless scalar quantum field in one dimension.
3.1 Relational classical mechanics
This section introduces and discusses the classical part of Rovelli’s model [Rov90],
which is based on the relational concept of time /1.3/. Next we generalize this
model to a field in one dimension. We stress once more that there is no need
for an elimination of time in classical mechanics; this analysis merely serves as a
preparation for quantization, leading to a quantum theory that does not suffer
from an unphysical notion of (parameter) time in section /3.2/.
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3.1.1 Two oscillators
Rovelli’s model is concerned with one of the simplest systems having more than
one degree of freedom: two noninteracting harmonic oscillators (double pendu-
lum) in one dimension. After introducing the notation of the traditional treat-
ment of this system in classical mechanics /3.1.1.1,3.1.1.2/ we switch to the
presymplectic formulation without external time due to Rovelli /3.1.1.3/. Next we
exhibit the physical algebra of this reparametrization invariant system /3.1.1.4/
and derive relations between partial observables /3.1.1.5/. We discuss the limi-
tations of the model /3.1.1.6/ and finally sketch the general theory of evolving
constants of motion /3.1.1.7/.
3.1.1.1 Hamiltonian formulation
Let two noninteracting harmonic oscillators with canonical coordinates qi (i =
1, 2), conjugate momenta pi (i = 1, 2) and with equal masses m1 = m2 = 1 and
frequencies ωi > 0 be given. The free Hamiltonian reads
H =
1
2
(
p21 + ω
2
1q
2
1 + p
2
2 + ω
2
2q
2
2
)
.
The solutions of the Hamiltonian equations of motion are (i = 1, 2)
qi = ai sin (ωit+ φi) ,
pi = aiωi cos (ωit+ φi) ,
where a1, a2 ≥ 0 are amplitudes and φi ∈ [0; 2pi[ are initial phases, with “initial”
meaning the point t = 0 on the trajectories, t being the observable time param-
eter of classical mechanics. In geometric language, on the 4-dimensional phase
space Γ (which is the cotangent bundle, Γ = T ∗Q, of the two dimensional config-
uration space Q = R×R) the symplectic form σ = dq1 ∧ dp1 + dq2 ∧ dp2 (which
is the exterior derivative of the canonical 1-form on Γ) together with the Hamil-
tonian function H determine the Hamiltonian vector field XH via iXHσ = dH.
Moreover, XH = ∂t is complete, i.e. its flow exists for all values (’times’) of the
flow parameter t ∈ R.
For the time evolution of both oscillators to be comparable we require
ω1 = ω2 =: ω .
(The Hamiltonian could also contain an interaction term proportional to q1q2,
provided that after diagonalisation the frequencies of both oscillators were equal.)
Following Rovelli [Rov90], we write the solutions as
q1(τ) =
√
2A sin τ
q2(τ) =
√
2E − 2A sin(τ + φ) (3.1.1)
where φ = φ2 − φ1 is the relative phase, A = 12a21ω2 is the energy of the first
oscillator, E = 1
2
ω2(a21 + a
2
2) is the total energy and τ = ωt + φ1 is a rescaled
and shifted time parameter. In traditional classical mechanics /1.2.1/ both the
elongations q1, q2, and differences in the time parameter τ are observable, hence
the dependencies qi(τ) can be verified experimentally, except for shifts in τ .
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3.1.1.2 Constants of motion
Before we impose an energy constraint we define the algebra of observables of
classical mechanics, which is a Poisson algebra [Lan98]:
Definition 3.1.1. A real vector space V equipped with two bilinear maps,
◦ : V × V → V (anticommutator, Jordan product)
[·, ·] : V × V → V (commutator)
is called a Jordan-Lie algebra, if
(i) [·, ·] is a Lie bracket, i.e. antisymmetric and fulfilling the Jacobi identity
[[f, g] , h] + [[h, f ] , g] + [[g, h] , f ] = 0
(Hence, (V , [·, ·]) is a Lie algebra.)
(ii) ◦ is symmetric and respects the associator identity
(f ◦ g) ◦ h− f ◦ (g ◦ h) = k [[f, h] , g]
with some k ∈ R,
(iii) both together fulfil the Leibniz property
[f, g ◦ h] = [f, g] ◦ h+ g ◦ [f, h] .
If there is an element 1 ∈ V with f ◦ 1 = f (f ∈ V), it is called identity.
If ◦ is associative (i.e. k = 0), V is a Poisson algebra.
An immediate consequence of the Leibniz property is [f, 1] = 0 for all f ∈ V .
The algebra of observables of classical mechanics is the Poisson algebra of real
(measurable) functions on a symplectic manifold (Γ, σ). Often one chooses V =
C∞(Γ,R), V = C0(Γ,R), V = Cb(Γ,R), V = L∞(Γ,R), or especially for Γ = R2n
V = P (2n), the Poisson algebra of all polynomials of the Cartesian coordinate
functions qi and pi. Since the energy is an observable, one requires H ∈ V .
The anticommutator is defined as pointwise multiplication, f ◦ g = fg, and the
commutator is the Poisson bracket1, [f, g] = {f, g}.
Definition 3.1.2. An observable A ∈ V , which has a vanishing commutator with
the Hamiltonian H ∈ V , i.e. [A,H] = 0, is called a constant of motion.
Lemma 3.1.3. In classical mechanics the constants of motion form a Poisson
subalgebra C of the algebra of observables V .
Proof. Given f, g,H ∈ V with [H, f ] = 0 and [H, g] = 0, the anticommuta-
tor f ◦ g is also a constant of motion, since from the Leibniz property
[H, f ◦ g] = [H, f ] ◦ g + f ◦ [H, g] = 0 .
Because of Jacobi’s identity
[H, [f, g]] = − [g, [H, f ]]− [f, [g,H]] = 0 .
1In geometric terms the Poisson bracket of two functions f and g on the symplectic manifold
is defined as {f, g} := σ(Xf , Xg), where Xf and Xg are defined by iXfσ = df and iXgσ = dg.
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also the commutator is in Vc. ¤
3.1.1.3 Presymplectic formulation
Arbitrary time reparametrizations are not allowed in classical mechanics: Time
has to be identical with the unique absolute time up to a linear transformation.
As we have seen in /1.2.2/, classical mechanics can however be formulated in
such a way that the evolution parameter is separated from the time coordinate.
This allows for a reparametrization invariant evolution, and a measurement of
time still requires an extension of the system.
We now drop the assumption of extensibility /1.3.2/, i.e. we switch to an endo-
physical description and assume that there is nothing beyond the two-oscillator
system. In particular, the evolution parameter τ in (3.1.1) does no more need
to be linearly related to absolute time t. The value of τ (more precisely, dif-
ferences in τ) ceases to be observable; we have no notion of duration for the
endosystem comprising both oscillators. The dependencies qi(τ) now cannot be
verified experimentally according to this description, which for this reason is also
called timeless. (To counter the obvious objection that in order to have physi-
cally meaningful properties a physical system must not be strictly closed we refer
to [Pri94c].)
To avoid confusion we warn the reader that in the remaining part of this chapter
we will frequently have to switch between the exophysical description (with time)
and the endophysical description (without time) to illuminate the difference.
Let us explore the endophysical description of the two-oscillator system corre-
sponding to the exophysical one introduced above /3.1.1.1/: We assume that the
energy E ∈ R is strictly conserved2,
C := H − E = 0 . (3.1.2)
This constraint3,4 defines a 3-dimensional compact hypersurface Σ ⊂ Γ. This
is the starting point of Rovelli’s pioneering work [Rov90, Rov91c, H9´1, Rov91a];
it was motivated by the analogy of (3.1.2) with the Hamiltonian constraint in
canonical quantum gravity.
In the theory of constrained systems one calls the phase space Γ of the original
system the extended phase space and the hypersurface Σ the constraint surface.
The constraints (which in the general case could be more than one) generate a
gauge group via the Poisson brackets (infinitesimally, F 7→ F + ε {F,C}, with
infinitesimal ε; the orbits of the gauge group in phase space are obtained by choos-
ing F = q, p). Ha´j´ıc˘ek [H9´5] pointed out that there are two types of constrained
systems, which are quite different with respect to time evolution: Gauge systems
and parametrized systems. In the former, the solution curves (of the equations
2For closed systems the boundedness from below of the Hamiltonian is not necessary; it is
required for open systems in order to ensure the existence of stable states.
3In Dirac’s formalism for quantization with constraints [Dir64] one writes H−E ∼ 0, where
∼ means “weakly vanishing”.
4Strictly speaking, the function C : Γ→ R, x 7→ C(x) is the constraint function, and C = 0
is the constraint condition.
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of motion) in phase space are transversal to the orbits of the gauge group, while
in the latter each solution curve lies within a gauge orbit. The latter is trivially
the case for the constrained two-oscillator system, since (the generators of) time
evolution and gauge are the same, {H, ·} = {H − E, ·} = {C, ·}. (In the ter-
minology of Dirac [Dir64], C is a first-class primary constraint, and no further
constraints (secondary, or second-class) are required.) Since dH = dC = 0, this
system is reparametrization invariant /1.2.2/.5
In /1.2.2/ we parametrized a system and found that a subsequent restriction to
the hypersurface H + p0 = 0 together with the requirement q0 = t is equivalent
to the original system. Here we consider the two-oscillator system as already
parametrized and proceed in the opposite direction: we render q0 = t endophys-
ically meaningless (since there is not absolute time), and we reduce the phase
space. The two-oscillator system does however not arise from a symplectic sys-
tem through parametrization: Assume that a symplectic system (with 4− 2 = 2-
dimensional phase space) has the coordinates q′ and p′ and HamiltonianH ′(q′, p′),
and is extended by the canonical variable q0 = t and its conjugate momentum
p0 as in /1.2.2/, so that the resulting system is the two-oscillator system. The
restriction H ′(q′, p′) + p0 = 0 yields a 3-dimensional manifold, but since q0 is
unbounded, this cannot be topologically equivalent to the compact constraint
surface Σ. We thus have a genuine presymplectic system (Σ, σ¯) with manifold Σ,
where the presymplectic form σ¯ is defined as the pull-back of σ to Σ.
Since we can change the parametrization of any trajectory diffeomorphically (τ 7→
τ ′) without altering physics, the mathematical concept representing a physical
solution is a 1-dimensional manifold with a differentiable structure, but without
a fixed parametrization. We allow also τ 7→ −τ , since we have no preferred
direction of time. Hence, here we use time structure (D), see /1.1/.
The reduced phase space Γphys := Σ/ ∼ is a partition of the constraint manifold
Σ into gauge equivalence classes, where x ∼ x′ means that x and x′ are related
by a gauge transformation. Since in our case gauge transformations are time
evolutions, Γphys consists of the solutions of the system, where by a solution we
mean a solution curve modulo parametrization. The points in Γphys are in 1-
1 correspondence with the initial conditions at some arbitrary, but fixed initial
instant. For the two-oscillator system the points in Γphys are coordinatized by the
parameters A and φ. Γphys is a 2-dimensional manifold and it can be easily seen to
have the topology of a 2-sphere S2: The ranges of the parameters are 0 ≤ A ≤ E
and 0 ≤ φ < 2pi. For A = 0 and A = E, respectively, there is a unique physical
solution, irrespective of φ, corresponding to the poles of the sphere.
3.1.1.4 Complete observables
The physical observables in a theory with constraints are the elements of the
Poisson algebra, which commute with the constraints. In our case they have to
commute with H − E; hence the physical observables are just the constants of
5Confer [H9´7] for a general definition of a reparametrization invariant system in geometrical
terms.
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motion. In contradistinction with the partial observables to be introduced in the
/3.1.1.5/ we call them complete observables.
Expressing both A and φ as phase space functions,
4A = 2E + ω−2
(
p21 − p22
)
+ q21 − q22 ,
tanφ =
p1q2 − p2q1
ω−1p1p2 + ωq2q1
,
we find that they have vanishing Poisson brackets with H 6:
{A,H} = 0 ,
{φ,H} = 0
We choose as Poisson algebra V = V2 the algebra of all polynomials in qi, pi
(i = 1, 2) including the identity 1 : Γ→ R, (q, p) 7→ 1. This ensures H ∈ V2 and
A ∈ V2, but we have tanφ /∈ V2. The following functions are however in V2:
Lx =
√
A (E − A) cosφ= 1
2
(
ω−1p1p2 + ωq2q1
)
Ly =
√
A (E − A) sinφ = 1
2
(p2q1 − p1q2)
Lz = A− E
2
=
1
4
(
ω−1p21 − ω−1p22 + ωq21 − ωq22
)
It can be easily seen that they generate a Poisson subalgebra
C2 := gen ({Lx, Ly, Lz, 1})
of V2 and {H, C2} = 0. We call C2 the algebra of constants of motion or algebra
of complete observables of the two-oscillator system.
From {qi, pj} = δij one moreover calculates
{Lx, Ly} = Lz ,
{Ly, Lz} = Lx ,
{Lz, Lx} = Ly .
A simple calculation also yields
4ω2L2 := 4ω2
(
L2x + L
2
y + L
2
z
)
= H2 = (C + E)2 , (3.1.3)
so that (C + E)2 ∈ C2. For quantization it is desirable that the constraint C is
in C2, which is not the case here, but for H ≥ 0 and E > 0 the constraint C is
equivalent to C (H + E) = C (C + 2E) = (C + E)2 − E2, which lies in C2.
6Since A and φ are two functionally independent constants of motion and our system has
two degrees of freedom, we have here a maximally superintegrable system [TTW01].
75
3.1.1.5 Partial observables
In /1.3.2.1/ we have mentioned the example of a harmonic oscillator and dis-
tinguished complete observables (motion) and partial observables (position and
time). In the endophysical approach to the two-oscillator system time is not
observable, hence not even a partial observable. We assume that the positions
of both oscillators are partial observables. This requires that a primitive notion
of instantaneity is empirically meaningful, so that we can make instantaneous
observations of q1 and q2. Moreover, Rovelli’s approach to complete and partial
observables takes – without mentioning it explicitly – an empirically meaningful
notion of simultaneity ∼ (cf. our discussion in /1.3.3/) to be given.
The combination of simultaneous observations of the partial observables gives
a complete observable. While in classical nonrelativistic theories the absolute
Newtonian time is always an independent partial observable, and all other partial
observables are time dependent, there is no distinguished independent observable
in the timeless two-oscillator model. All we can do is: relate simultaneous obser-
vations of the partial observables7 q1 and q2 and infer the values of one of them,
e.g. q1, from the values obtained when measuring another one, e.g. q2, simultane-
ously. Given the values of the constants of motion A and φ we can eliminate the
unphysical parameter τ and obtain from (3.1.1) the complete observable
q2(q1) =
√
E
A
− 1
(
q1 cosφ±
√
2A− q21 sinφ
)
.
This is to be interpreted as follows: Upon a measurement of q1 leading to a
value q1 ∈ R a prediction of the outcome of a measurement of q2 is possible: Its
value will be one of the two values q2(q1). Thus q1 is an oscillator clock time as
discussed in /2.2.2/ and its value plays the role of an (internal) time parameter for
oscillator 2. Moreover, q1 is not a time observable /1.3.3/ for the two-oscillator
system, because due to the sign ambiguity the value of q1 does not uniquely
determine the value of q2.
The complete observable q2(q1) is built from constants of motion,
q2(t) =
(
Lz +
E
2
)−1 (
Lyt± Lx
√
2Lz + E − t2
)
(t ∈ [−
√
2A,
√
2A]) .
(3.1.4)
When seen as a Taylor series in t all coefficients of this expression can be approx-
imated by elements of C2.
Using a complete observable it is thus possible to describe change without absolute
time.
7Obviously, without time one oscillator would have only one instantaneously measurable
partial observable, namely position; to make meaningful statements about a relation between
partial observables one needs at least two degrees of freedom.
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3.1.1.6 Limitations of the model
Let us now examine in what respect the two-oscillator model is too restrictive
and can be generalized:
1. Its dynamics is solvable analytically, so that the algebra of constants of motion
is known explicitly. This is required for quantization, but in general an excep-
tionally rare case. In particular for realistic models with interaction no general
method is known to overcome this limitation.
2. The model has only two degrees of freedom. In /3.1.2/ we generalize to a field,
albeit without interaction.
3. The kinematical group of the model is the Galilei group. If instead we use the
Poincare´ group and consider a Lorentz boost with velocity v parallel to the line
connecting the two oscillators, then the time is dilated by a factor
√
1− (v
c
)2
in
the moving frame. If the oscillation does not happen in the spatial domain (e.g.,
in electric field strength), or perpendicular to the boost, then the elongations of
the oscillators are unaffected by the boost. If in (3.1.1) the phase difference φ
were also dilated by
√
1− (v
c
)2
, we would obtain exactly the same motion in the
moving frame and in the rest frame. This means that absolute time does not
show up, just a transformation of constants of motion is required to realize a
Lorentz boost.
Consider now the general case (where a Lorentz boost may also affect the elonga-
tions) of a system with a Lorentz covariant equation of motion: A solution of the
equation of motion in the rest frame can be Lorentz transformed and becomes a
solution of the equation of motion in a moving frame. Since a choice of solution
corresponds to a choice of the constants of motion, this induces a transformation
of the constants of motion, disregarding absolute time.
4. Even in the case of free oscillators the equality of their frequencies is a main
limitation. In /2.2.2/ we have discussed broadly if and how one can infer the
position of one oscillator from that of the other in the general case.
3.1.1.7 Evolving constants of motion
In a theory which deals with solutions of the equations of motion, disregarding
the global time parameter, the question naturally arises how evolution is possible
at all, if only constants of motion are physical. In the case of the two-oscillator
system we have already answered this question in that the family of observables
(3.1.4) represents evolution w.r.t. the internal time t = q1. The general case of
a dynamical system with N degrees of freedom has been investigated by Rovelli
[Rov91c]. Here we sketch the classical part of this theory.
Let H be a Hamiltonian constraint on a presymplectic space with coordinates
qn, pn (n = 1, . . . , N). Let us choose t := q1 to be the clock time. Then for
i = 2, . . . , N t-dependent families of observables Qi(t) = Qi(t; qn, pn) are wanted,
77
which measure the value of the coordinate qi at the time t = q1. On the one hand
due to reparametrization invariance w.r.t. absolute time they have to fulfil
{Qi(t; qn, pn), H(qn, pn)} = 0 (t ∈ Ran(q1)) .
On the other hand the requirement of constancy along each trajectory does not
fix the constant value of the observable; this is done by the equation
Qi(t; t, q2, . . . pn) = qi (t ∈ Ran(q1)) ,
which forces the single, instantaneous observable Qi(t) (t fixed!) to have the
desired value qi at that instant t, which fulfils t = q1. In other words, the value
of the observable is determined by the value of the variable qi at that point along
the trajectory, where the trajectory intersects the simultaneity surface q1 = t.
The t-dependent families Qi(t) are called evolving constants of motion. E.g., in
the two-oscillator system the family (3.1.4) of complete observables is an evolving
constant of motion.
The two conditions defining an evolving constant of motion can be generalized to
the case where the internal time is not given directly as a phase space coordinate,
but where it is an arbitrary function on phase space, qT = qT (qn, pn). Moreover,
an observable does not need to be restricted to yield one of the phase space
coordinates; instead any phase space function q = q(qn, pn) defines an evolving
constant of motion Q: The two conditions then become
{Q(T ), H} = 0 (T ∈ Ran(qT )) ,
Q(qT ) = q .
We finally mention a method to propagate Q(T ) in T [Rov91c,H9´1,Rov91a], at
least at the points where T = qT :
∂Q(T )
∂T
∣∣∣∣
T=qT
{qT , H} = ∂Q(T )
∂T
∣∣∣∣
T=qT
dqT
dt
=
dQ(qT )
dt
=
dq
dt
= {q,H}
Here the parameter t can be chosen arbitrarily. The Poisson brackets on the left
and right hand can be calculated and thus one obtains ∂Q(T )
∂T
∣∣∣
T=qT
.
3.1.2 Free field
We now generalize the foregoing results to a scalar field in one dimension, pro-
ceeding similarly: After introducing the Hamiltonian formulation (with absolute
time) /3.1.2.1/ we exhibit the algebra of constants of motion /3.1.2.2/. In order
to obtain them explicitly we have to confine ourselves to the noninteracting case;
for the same reason we also specialize to a massless field and to one dimension
only. The basic idea is that we can identify simple constants of motion involving
triples of field modes, two of whose frequencies add up to the third one. Af-
ter switching to the presymplectic formulation /3.1.2.3/ we discuss the meaning
of the constants of motion /3.1.2.4/ and consider particular partial observables
/3.1.1.5/.
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3.1.2.1 Hamiltonian formulation
We consider a free Klein-Gordon field ξ with mass m in one dimension. (Later on
we will specialize to m = 0.) The phase space is Γ = S (R,R)× S (R,R), where
(ξ, η) ∈ Γ consists of the initial field ξ(x) and its initial momentum η(x).
On Schwartz space S (R,R) we have a scalar product 〈f, g〉 := ∫R f(x)g(x)dx,
which allows us to write the Hamiltonian as a spatial integral:
H (ξ, η) =
1
2
〈η, η〉+ 1
2
〈(
m2 − ∂
2
∂x2
)
ξ, ξ
〉
Performing a Fourier transform (symbolized by ·ˆ) we have
H(ξˆ, ηˆ) =
1
2
〈ηˆ, ηˆ〉+ 1
2
〈
ω2ξˆ, ξˆ
〉
=
∫
R
H(k)dk ,
where ω(k) =
√
k2 +m2, and ξˆ, ηˆ ∈ S (R,R) are the Fourier transforms of ξ, η,
and
H(k) =
1
2
ηˆ(k)2 +
1
2
ω(k)2ξˆ(k)2
is the Hamiltonian density.
Canonically, one has position observables q(f) =
〈
ξˆ, f
〉
and momentum observ-
ables p(f) = 〈ηˆ, f〉, which are continuous linear functionals of ξˆ and ηˆ, respec-
tively. Here f ∈ S (R,R) is a test function. – Instead of smearing out the fields,
we can also use point limits and define a continuous family of observables by
qk0 :=
〈
ξˆ(k), δ(k − k0)
〉
= ξˆ(k0) and pk0 := 〈ηˆ(k), δ(k − k0)〉 = ηˆ(k0).
Since qk and pk are continuous in k and the rational numbers are dense in the
reals, one can restrict to observables with rational values of k. One assumes that
these, in turn, are approximated in the limit L → ∞ by the Fourier transforms
qkn , pkn of position and momentum observables in a box of length L with periodic
boundary conditions. Here we have kn = nk
(L), n ∈ Z\ {0} and k(L) = 2pi
L
. We
exclude n = 0, because we will consider the the infrared singularity in the massless
case later on.
To simplify notation we write just n instead of the discretized index kn, e.g. qn
instead of qkn . It is assumed that in the limit L→∞ the Hamiltonian H can be
approximated by “box” Hamiltonians
H(L) =
∑
n∈Z\{0}
Hn ,
where
Hn =
1
2
(
p2n + ω
2
nq
2
n
)
.
(We omit the superscript (L) for notational convenience.)
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The symplectic form reads
σ =
∑
n∈Z\{0}
dqn ∧ dpn ,
and the basic Poisson brackets are
{qn, pm} = δnm .
The equations of motion are those of independent harmonic oscillators with the
well known solutions:
qn(t) = An sin (ωnt+ φn) , (3.1.5)
pn(t) = Anωn cos (ωnt+ φn) , (3.1.6)
where An ∈ R+0 are amplitudes and φn ∈ [0; 2pi[ initial phases.
We take the Poisson algebra generated by the qn and pn with the pointwise
product as commutator and the Poisson bracket as anti-commutator to be the
algebra of observables V(L)∞ of the free field. (Again, we may omit the superscript
(L) and write V∞.) As already seen in lemma 3.1.3 the algebra of constants of
motion of the free field, which we denote by C∞, is a Poisson subalgebra of the
algebra of observables.
3.1.2.2 Constants of motion
In order to study the explicit form of the constants of motion we introduce com-
plexified observables
zn =
√
ωn
2
qn +
i√
2ωn
pn ,
with the inverse relations
qn =
zn + zn√
2ωn
, (3.1.7)
pn =
√
ωn
zn − zn
i
√
2
. (3.1.8)
From {qn, pm} = δnm we have {zn, zm} = iδnm and in the following calculations
z and z behave similarly to creation and annihilation operators, disregarding of
course operator ordering. Furthermore, Hn = ωnznzn, {H, zm} = {Hn, zm} =
iωnznδnm and {H, zm} = {Hn, zm} = −iωnznδnm. From these equations one
easily shows:
Lemma 3.1.4. Let f =
∏M
i=1 zmi
∏N
j=1 znj with mi, nj ∈ N and M,N ∈ N0.
Then
{H, f} = −i
(
M∑
i=1
ωmi −
N∑
j=1
ωnj
)
f .
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In the case of a massless field (with dispersion relation ω(k) = |k|) f is a constant
of motion, iff
M∑
i=i
|mi| −
N∑
j=1
|nj| = 0 . (3.1.9)
From now on we consider a massless field.
Proposition 3.1.5. The only polynomials up to second order in z and z, which
are constants of motion, are linear combinations of
h±n := znz±n
(n ∈ Z\ {0}) and a multiple of 1.
The only polynomials of third order in z, z, which are constants of motion, are
linear combinations of (m,n ∈ Z\ {0})
a±mn := zmznz±(|m|+|n|)
and
b±mn := zmznz±(|m|+|n|) .
Proof. From (3.1.9) it is clear that there must be both a z- and a z-term
and only the asserted combinations of indices are possible. ¤
The following relations are obvious8:
h±n = h
±
±n
b±mn = a±mn
a±mn = a
±
nm
b±mn = b
±
nm
For later use we define
C∞,g :=
{
h±n , a
±
mn, b
±
mn : m,n ∈ Z\ {0}
} ∪ {1} .
One can also easily calculate the following commutators, which we will frequently
use below. We distinguish the two independent sign alternatives by a prime and
abbreviate with ± · ±′ the sign of (±1) · (±′1):{
h±n , h
±′
m
}
= −iδ±n,mh±·±′n + iδn,±′mh±·±
′
m{
a±ij, h
±′
n
}
= −iδina±j,±′i − iδjna±i,±′j + iδ±(|i|+|j|),±′na±·±
′
ij{
b±ij, h
±′
n
}
= +iδi,±′nb±ij + iδj,±′nb
±
ij − iδ±(|i|+|j|),nb±·±
′
ij
8Setting formally zn = z¯n = 1 one could furthermore extend the allowed range of the indices
of a±mn and b±mn to m,n ∈ Z (including 0) and regard h±n as a special third order constant of
motion: h±n = b
±
n,0 = a
sign(n)
±n,0 .
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{
a±ij, a
±′
mn
}
= −iδi,±′(|m|+|n|)zmznzjz±(|m|+|n|+|j|)
− iδj,±′(|m|+|n|)zmznziz±(|m|+|n|+|i|)
+ iδn,±(|i|+|j|)zmzizjz±′(|m|+|j|+|j|)
+ iδm,±(|i|+|j|)znzizjz±′(|n|+|j|+|j|){
b±ij, b
±′
mn
}
= +iδi,±′(|m|+|n|)zmznzjz±(|m|+|n|+|j|)
+ iδj,±′(|m|+|n|)zmznziz±(|m|+|n|+|i|)
− iδn,±(|i|+|j|)zmzizjz±′(|m|+|j|+|j|)
− iδm,±(|i|+|j|)znzizjz±′(|n|+|j|+|j|){
a±ij, b
±′
mn
}
= −iδimzjz±(|i|+|j|)znz±′(|m|+|n|)
− iδinzjz±(|i|+|j|)zmz±′(|m|+|n|) (3.1.10)
− iδjmziz±(|i|+|j|)znz±′(|m|+|n|)
− iδjnziz±(|i|+|j|)zmz±′(|m|+|n|)
+ iδ±(|i|+|j|),±′(|m|+|n|)zizjzmzn
While taking the commutator with h±n leaves span(C∞,g) invariant, the other
commutators may lead to higher order polynomials. In general, taking the com-
mutator of two polynomials f, g in z.,z. gives a polynomial {f, g}, which is (at
least) two degrees smaller than their product, and in which each z. term (each
z. term) in f has canceled a z. term (a z. term) in g. Taking the commutator
of a polynomial f with a·., which has the structure zzz (second degree in z, first
degree in z), increases the degree of f in z by one. Analogously, the commutator
with b·. increases the degree in z by one.
Theorem 3.1.6. The Poisson algebra C∞ of constants of motion polynomial in
qn and pn of the free massless scalar field in 1+1 dimensions is generated by C∞,g,
gen (C∞,g) = C∞ .
Proof. The inclusion gen(C∞,g) ⊂ C∞ is obvious. In order to prove the
converse inclusion let f ∈ C∞. Using (3.1.7,3.1.8) we rewrite f as a polynomial
in z and z. For {H, f} to vanish all summands of f must vanish due to linear
independence; up to a scalar multiple they are of the form considered in lemma
3.1.4. It suffices to show that each such term can be obtained from C∞,g by taking
commutators and anti-commutators: Let f be as in lemma 3.1.4. We proceed
by complete induction over the degree of f . If M + N ≤ 3, then according to
proposition 3.1.5 we immediately have f ∈ C∞,g (up to a scalar multiple).
Now for the case of a constant of motion f of degree M +N > 3. Our induction
hypothesis states that all constants of motion up to degree M + N − 1 are in
gen(C∞,g). We show that f can be obtained from such polynomials. We first
exclude a simple case: If there are i0, j0 (1 ≤ i0 ≤ M , 1 ≤ j0 ≤ N) with
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mi0 = ±nj0 , then
f =
(
M∏
i=1,i6=i0
zmi
N∏
j=1,j 6=j0
znj
)
h±mi0 ,
where the expression in the parentheses is a constant of motion, since
M∑
i=1,i 6=i0
|mi| −
N∑
j=1,j 6=j0
|nj| = 0 .
Moreover it is of degree M + N − 2 and therefore by hypothesis in gen(C∞,g).
Since also h±mi0 ∈C∞,g, we have f ∈ gen(C∞,g).
Because ofM+N > 3 we have eitherM ≥ 2, or N ≥ 2. In caseM ≥ 2 we define
R =
M∏
i=3
zmi
N∏
j=1
znj
so that f = Rzm1zm2 . The expression Rz|m1|+|m2| is a constant of motion of degree
M + N − 1 and therefore in gen(C∞,g). We decompose R = R′zl|m1|+|m2|, where
R′ does not contain the factor z|m1|+|m2| and 0 ≤ l < M + N − 2. Finally we
calculate the commutator of R with b+m1m2 ∈ C0:{
Rz|m1|+|m2|, b
+
m1m2
}
=
{
Rz|m1|+|m2|, zm1zm2z|m1|+|m2|
}
= iRzm1zm2 + z|m1|+|m2|
{
R, zm1zm2z|m1|+|m2|
}
= iRzm1zm2 + ilR
′zm1zm2z
l
|m1|+|m2|
= i (l + 1) f
The second last equation holds, because above we excluded the possibility that
f (and thus R) contains zm1 or zm2 , so that zm1 and zm2 commute with R. We
conclude that f is the commutator of constants of motion of degree lower than
M +N . The second case (N ≥ 2) can be treated analogously, if one interchanges
the roles of z and z and takes the commutator with a+.. instead of b
+
.. . ¤
3.1.2.3 Presymplectic formulation
As in /3.1.1.3/ we switch to an endophysical description. We drop the assumption
of extensibility and employ the constraint
C := H − E =
∑
n∈Z\{0}
Hn − E = 0
with E ∈ R. For the solutions (3.1.5), (3.1.6) it takes the form∑
n∈Z\{0}
A2nω
2
n = E .
The topology is nontrivial, since the field is an infinite dimensional Hamiltonian
system [CM74]. But even if one imposes a cutoff confining to N field modes,
it remains nontrivial: The ranges of the parameters are 0 ≤ A2nω2n ≤ E and
0 ≤ φn < 2pi. The An alone form an N -sphere SN , while the φn form an N -torus
TN . The whole structure is however not simply the direct product, since as in
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the case of two oscillators at points where An = 0 for some n different values of
φn are indistinguishable.
3.1.2.4 Complete observables
To unravel the physical meaning of the elements of C∞,g we express them through
qn and pn, and via (3.1.5) and (3.1.6) also through An and φn:
h+n =
1
2ωn
p2n +
ωn
2
q2n = ω
−1
n Hn = A
2
nωn
h−n + h−n =
1
ωn
pnp−n + ωnqnq−n = ωnAnA−n cos (φn − φ−n)
h−n − h−n = i (qnp−n − q−npn) = ωnAnA−n sin (φn − φ−n)
In the following expressions the same choice is made on both sign alternatives:
a±mn + b
±
mn =
1√
2ωmωnω±(|m|+|n|)
(ωmωnω|m|+|n|qmqnq±(|m|+|n|)
+ ωmqmpnp±(|m|+|n|)
+ ωnpmqnp±(|m|+|n|)
− ω|m|+|n|pmpnq±(|m|+|n|))
=
√
ωmωnω|m|+|n|
2
AmAnA±(|m|+|n|) sin(φm + φn − φ±(|m|+|n|))
In the last equation we have made use of ω|m|+|n| = ωm+ωn, whereby t-dependent
terms cancel. A similar calculation gives
(−i) (a±mn − b±mn) = 1√2ωmωnω±(|m|+|n|) (pmpnp±(|m|+|n|)
+ ωmω|m|+|n|qmpnq±(|m|+|n|)
+ ωnω|m|+|n|pmqnq±(|m|+|n|)
− ωmωnqmqnp±(|m|+|n|))
=
√
ωmωnω|m|+|n|
2
AmAnA±(|m|+|n|) cos(φm + φn − φ±(|m|+|n|))
Combining the last two equations leads to:
2ib±mn =
√
ωmωnω|m|+|n|
2
AmAnA±(|m|+|n|)ei(φm+φn−φ±(|m|+|n|)) (3.1.11)
The (in)dependence of observables can be analyzed when considering only finitely
many field modes n = −N, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , N (N ∈ N being an ultraviolet cutoff):
• The 2N amplitudes An are determined by h+n .
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• Given the amplitudes, N further relations between the initial phases are given
by h−n :
tan (φn − φ−n) = h
−
n − h−n
h−n + h−n
(n = 1, . . . , N) (3.1.12)
• Given the amplitudes, the expressions a±mn and b±mn together determine the
expressions φm+φn−φ±(|m|+|n|) involving three initial phases up to a multiple
of 2pi. (The frequencies of two of these initial phases add up to the frequency of
the third one.) Taking into account h−n one can constrict to positive m, n and
+ (|m|+ |n|), and one sees that there are only N−1 linearly independent ones
among the expressions φm+φn−φm+n, since with m = 1 for n = 1, . . . , N−1
the initial phase φn+1 can be obtained from φ1+φn−φn+1 and φ1 recursively;
φ1 itself cannot be determined, since this would amount to measuring an
absolute phase.
• Altogether there are 2N + N + N − 1 = 4N − 1 independent constants of
motion, just one less than in the exophysical situation with the 4N param-
eters An and φn. The Hamiltonian constraint finally reduces the number of
independent variables to 4N − 2. (Compare the two-oscillator case, where
N = 1.)
In the limit where L,N → ∞ such that Nk(L) = Nk1 = const., the field modes
become dense, and because of the continuity9 of φk in k the choice of one branch
of arctan (φ1 + φki − φki+k1) for some i determines the branches for all i; the
2pi-ambiguity thus disappears.
We have thus shown that in this limit already the constants of motion
h+n : n = −N, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , N ,
h−n : n = 1, . . . , N ,
a+1,n, b
+
1,n : n = 1, . . . , N − 1 ,
which are in C∞,g, uniquely determine a solution (a point in reduced phase space).
3.1.2.5 Partial observables
The elements of gen(C∞,g) are complete observables, since their values – once they
are known at one instant – can be predicted (and retrodicted): they are constant.
The qn and pn are partial observables, since their values cannot predicted without
resorting to results of related simultaneous measurements. One can use e.g. a±mn+
b±mn to relate the partial observables qn, qm and q±(|m|+|n|), where the momenta pl
(l = m,n,± (|m|+ |n|)) can be obtained from ql and h+l :
pl = ±
√
2ωlh
+
l − ω2l q2l
Predictions of one partial observable (e.g. q±(|m|+|n|)) in general require two other
partial observables (e.g. qn and qm). (An exception is e.g. the case m = n.) This
9This derives via (3.1.5) and (3.1.6) from the continuity of qk and pk, which in turn stems
from the fact that ξˆ, ηˆ ∈ S (R,R).
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prediction is in general not unique, since an instantaneous configuration of the q·
contains no information about the sign of the p· (cf. /2.1/).
We are interested in relating qn (n > 1) with q1, since in the limit L → ∞ the
oscillation period of the q1-oscillator becomes infinitely long, effectively approx-
imating a free particle, and thus providing an internal clock time with range R.
We have from (3.1.7) and (3.1.8)
qn(q1) = An sin
(
n arcsin
q1
A1
+ φn − nφ1
)
= AnTs cos (φn − nφ1) + AnTc sin (φn − nφ1) ,
(3.1.13)
where Ts = sin
(
n arcsin q1
A1
)
and Tc = cos
(
n arcsin q1
A1
)
are expressions in-
volving powers of q1
A1
and arcsin has 2 branches. While A1 = ω
− 1
2
1 (h
+
1 )
1
2 and
An = ω
− 1
2
n (h+n )
1
2 are constants of motion, q1 is a partial observable; the terms
cos (φn − nφ1) and sin (φn − nφ1) are constants of motion, since they can be ob-
tained as the real and imaginary part, respectively, of
ei(φn−nφ1) = ei(φn−φn−1−φ1)ei(φn−1−φn−2−φ1) · · · ei(φ2−φ1−φ1)
=
n−1∏
ν=1
2ib+ν,1
(√
ωνω1ων+1
2
AνA1Aν+1
)−1
(3.1.14)
=
n−1∏
ν=1
2
√
2ib+ν,1
(
h+ν h
+
1 h
+
ν+1
)− 1
2 ,
where we have used equation (3.1.11). Strictly speaking, (h+ν )
−1
/∈ C∞, but
it can be approximated through constants of motion using the formula x−1 =∑∞
ν=0(1− x)ν (x 6= 0). Equation (3.1.13) thus relates the partial observables qn
and q1 via constants of motion.
A similar relation between qn and q−1 holds in the case n < −1. The initial
phases φ1 and φ−1 are also connected via a constant of motion, see (3.1.12) for
n = 1, so that all qn with n ∈ Z\ {0} can be related via constants of motion to
q1.
In the limit of infinite box length (L, n → ∞ such that kn = nk1 = nk(L) =
n2pi
L
= const.) the relation qkn(qk1) can be interpreted as a time dependence qk(t),
where the time parameter t depends on the infrared behaviour of the state of the
field and allows to predict qk up to a twofold ambiguity.
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3.2 Relational quantization
In this section we discuss the quantization of the algebra of constants of motion.
After introducing canonical quantization and quantization in general /3.2.1/ we
describe Rovelli’s [Rov90] quantization of the two-oscillator system /3.2.2/. In
/3.2.3/ we treat the free field.
3.2.1 On quantization
Quantization is a procedure for obtaining a quantum theory whose classical limit
coincides with a given classical theory and whose prediction in the quantum do-
main cannot be falsified. Although there are numerous quantization methods
(main classes are Hilbert space based methods, algebraic methods and path inte-
gral methods) and plenty of literature, no unique method of quantization could
be singled out as the physically correct one; after all there may be inequivalent
quantum theories having the same classical limit and different but untested, or
untestable predictions.
The best known quantization method is traditional canonical quantization. It
starts from the Poisson algebra V /3.1.1.2/ of observables of a classical mechanical
system with n degrees of freedom and the goal is to translate the observables into
symmetric operators on the Hilbert space H = L2(Rn). A well known theorem
due to Groenewold and van Hove (see [Giu03] for a review and references and also
an introduction to canonical quantization) states that a full quantization of the
Poisson algebra V = Vpoly := P (2n) of all polynomials of canonical positions qi
and momenta pi (i = 1, . . . , n) does not exist. The best one can do is to quantize
a Lie subalgebra Vquant of Vpoly (i.e., a subalgebra w.r.t. the Poisson brackets
only), e.g. the algebra of polynomials of at most first order,
Vquant = Vpoly,1 := span ({qi, pi : i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {1}) .
(Here 1 is the observable which maps all of phase space to the value 1 ∈ R.) Vpoly,1
is a Lie subalgebra, because {qi, pj} = δij · 1 ∈ Vpoly,1 and {qi, qj} = {pi, pj} =
0 ∈ Vpoly,1.
Le us make these statements more precise. In general there are two rules how
to choose a pair of subalgebras (Virr,Vquant) of Vpoly for quantization, compare
[Giu03]:
Canonical quantization rules:
(a) Virr ⊂ Vpoly must contain ’basic observables’: With the help of these basic
observables one must be able to coordinatize phase space. Virr shall be
minimal in this respect.
Clearly, for Virr = Vpoly,1 the basic observables {qi, pi : i = 1, . . . , n} provide
such a coordinatization and there is no proper Lie subalgebra of Vpoly,1 with
this property.
(b) Vquant shall be the maximal Lie subalgebra of Vpoly containing Virr, for which
a Lie homomorphism (quantization map)
Q : Vquant → SYM(H), f 7→ Q(f)
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(where SYM(H) is the set of symmetric operators10 on H) can be found,
i.e. a linear map which intertwines the Lie structures11 {·, ·} and 1
i~ [·, ·] onVpoly and SYM(H), respectively,
Q ({f, g}) = 1
i~
[Q(f), Q(g)] (f, g ∈ Vquant) , (3.2.1)
so that Q(Virr) acts almost irreducibly, i.e. up to finite multiplicity on H.
For Virr = Vpoly,1 = Vquant the canonical quantization map
Qcan,1 : Vpoly,1 → SYM(H),
1 7→ 1 ,
qi 7→ Q(qi) ,
pi 7→ Q(pi) ,
where Q(qi)ψ(q) = qiψ(q) and Q(pi)ψ(q) = −i~∂qiψ(q) are defined on the com-
mon invariant dense domain D = S (Rn,C), fulfils both quantization rules, except
for maximality of Vquant:
As an extension of Qcan,1 one can consider
Vquant = Vpoly,2 := span
({
qi, pi, q
2
i , p
2
i , qipi : i = 1, . . . , n
} ∪ {1})
and one finds that
Qcan,2 : Vpoly,2 → SYM(H),
1 7→ 1 ,
qi 7→ Q(qi) ,
pi 7→ Q(pi) ,
q2i 7→ (Q(qi))2 ;
p2i 7→ (Q(pi))2 ,
qipi 7→ 1
2
(Q(qi)Q(pi) +Q(pi)Q(qi)) .
fulfils both quantization rules [Giu03].
Note that Qcan,2 maps products of classical observables, i.e. more of the associa-
tive structure than Qcan,1, into quantum operators. If one wants to carry over
more of the associative structure of the Poisson algebra into the quantum realm
(e.g. finding quantum operators for q3i and p
3
i ) then contradictions will arise. The
statement of maximality is a consequence of a theorem of Groenewold and van
Hove (see also [Got98a, Got98b], where also classical phase spaces with other
topologies are discussed).
10Since already the canonical operators Q(qi) and Q(pi) are not defined everywhere on
H = L2(Rn), a more precise notation is SYM(H,D), where D is a common invariant domain
on which all operators in SYM(H,D) are defined and symmetric, and which lies dense in H; D
could for instance be the space of Schwartz functions on which both position and momentum
operators are usually defined.
11There is no rule saying how the associative structure of the Poisson algebra has to be
mapped; the so-called ’symmetrization rule’ can be implemented only partially, see below.
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Moreover it can be proved that Vpoly,2 and Vpoly(∞,1) (the set of polynomials of
at most first order in the p. whose coefficients are polynomials of arbitrary order
in the q.) are the only subalgebras of Vpoly containing Virr = Vpoly,1, which fulfil
both quantization rules.
Besides these rules there is no known algorithm for choosing the pair (Virr,Vquant).
– This way one may obtain empirically inequivalent quantum theories [Wal01],
the correct one of which can be determined only by experiments; in particular
it has to reproduce classical mechanics in the classical limit. There are however
several ways to obtain a classical limit [Wer95]. One frequently considers a family
of quantum theories with different values of ~ in the limit ~ → 0. The canoni-
cal quantization procedure emphasizes the Lie algebraic structure: In the limit
~ → 0 the commutator of the classical limits of quantum observables equals the
Poisson bracket (Dirac’s condition). – There are other quantization procedures
emphasizing different aspects, e.g. the connection between products of classical
observables and the quantum anti-commutator [Lan98, ch. II]. Another often
employed criterion for the correct classical limit states that in the spectrum of a
quantum observable must coincide with the values that the corresponding classi-
cal observable may take (correspondence limit).
For constrained classical systems there is another possibility of quantization: In-
stead of applying the constraint on the classical level and quantizing then, one
can also quantize the classical system on the unconstrained phase space and apply
the constraint on the quantum level. An main advantage of the second possibil-
ity is that one does not have to solve the constraint explicitly. In the relational
approach this is however necessary and the first alternative is chosen.
3.2.2 Two oscillators
We now explain and discuss Rovelli’s (relational) quantization [Rov90] of the two
oscillator system /3.1.1/, which can be based either on the angular momentum
algebra, or equivalently on oscillator algebras.
3.2.2.1 Quantization based on the angular momentum algebra
In /3.1.1.4/ the algebra C2 of constants of motion of the two-oscillator system
was seen to be the angular momentum algebra. Its quantization with Virr =
Vquant = C2 is straightforward, and the constraint can be easily realized, because
the eigenvalue of Lˆ2 = Lˆ2x + Lˆ
2
y + Lˆ
2
z is a good quantum number and C = 0
(compare (3.1.3)) becomes after quantization equivalent to
Lˆ2x + Lˆ
2
y + Lˆ
2
z =
E2
4ω2
.
The quantum operators Lˆi = Q(Li) and Lˆ
2
i = Q(L
2
i ) (i = x, y, z)
12 are defined
on the Hilbert space H of spherical harmonics ψ`m = |`,m〉 in the usual way
(compare any textbook on quantum mechanics) such that ψ`m are joint eigen-
states of Lˆ2 and Lˆz with the respective eigenvalues ~2`(`+1) (` being integer, or
12More precisely one should write L̂2i , but one has Q(L
2
i ) = Q(Li)Q(Li).
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half-integer) and m~ (m = −`, . . . , `). The constraint confines the allowed states
to a subspace of fixed angular momentum `:
~2`(`+ 1) =
E2
4ω2
(3.2.2)
Upon quantization the complete observable (3.1.4) becomes a parametrized family
of self-adjoint operators on H built from constants of motion:
qˆ2(t) = f(Lˆz)
(
Lˆyt± g(Lˆz, t)Lˆxg(Lˆz, t)
)
f(Lˆz)
Here the classical expression was symmetrized, and the functions f and g are (for
self-adjoint arguments) defined by
f(x) =
(
x+
E
2
)− 1
2
,
g(x, t) =
(
2x+ E − t2) 14 .
Classically, the allowed range of the parameter t is given by the condition
|t| ≤
√
2A =
√
2Lz + E .
Put differently, for a given value of t, the complete observable q2(t) is defined
only on that region Γ(t) of phase space, where
Lz ≥ 1
2
(
t2 − E) .
Outside this region g becomes imaginary.
Ha´jic˘ek [H9´1] has shown that q2(t) is not normal (i.e., not diagonalizable) by
evaluating transition matrix elements of [q2(t), (q2(t))
+] between two particular
states with real and imaginary g, respectively. Rovelli replied [Rov91a] that it
is not q2(t) which has to be quantized; instead one has to multiply q2(t) with a
projection
P (t) = θ
(
1
2
(E − t2) + Lz
)
,
obtaining the classical observable
q˜2(t) = q2(t)P (t) =
{
q2(t) on Γ(t) ,
0 otherwise .
Quantum mechanically, this leads to the symmetric operator
ˆ˜q2(t) = Pˆ (t)qˆ2(t)Pˆ (t) .
Here Pˆ (t) is not the straightforward quantization of P (t), since this would not
remedy the problems with normality at the boundary of Γ(t). Rovelli’s solution
uses a slightly modified projection, which includes an additional ~-term (vanishing
in the classical limit):
Pˆ (t) := θ
(
1
2
(E − t2) + Lˆz − ~
)
=
∑
m> t
2−E
2~ +1
|`,m〉 〈`,m|
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With this definition ˆ˜q2(t) can be shown to be normal.
3.2.2.2 Quantization based on oscillator algebras
An alternative way of quantization is obtained by using (2.2.4) to express the
components of angular momentum through annihilation and creation operators
for both oscillators i = 1, 2, with
[
ai, a
+
i
]
= 1. The quantization map then
becomes
Q(Lx) =
~
2
(
a+1 a2 + a1a
+
2
)
,
Q(Ly) =
i~
2
(
a+1 a2 − a1a+2
)
,
Q(Lz) =
~
2
(
a+2 a2 − a+1 a1
)
,
Q(1) = 1 .
One easily verifies:
Q ({Li, Lj}) = 1
i~
[Q(Li), Q(Lj)] (i, j = x, y, z)
(And since gen ({Lx, Ly, Lz, 1}) = span (Lx, Ly, Lz, 1), the quantum algebra also
is finite dimensional.)
The constraint C = 0 takes the form
Q(Lx)
2 +Q(Ly)
2 +Q(Lz)
2 = ~2
(
N1 +N2
2
)2
+ ~2
N1 +N2
2
=
E2
4ω2
,
where Ni = a
+
i ai (i = 1, 2). The constraint can be solved explicitly in a basis of
number states |n,m〉 for both oscillators with the ansatz
(N1 +N2) |n,m〉 = 2j |n,m〉 (3.2.3)
and takes the form
j(j + 1) =
E2
4~2ω2
. (3.2.4)
The ansatz requires n+m = 2j. Thus all states
|m〉〉 := |j −m, j +m〉 (m = −j, . . . , j)
fulfil the constraint independently.
This quantization is equivalent to the one based on the angular momentum alge-
bra /3.2.2.1/.
3.2.2.3 Discussion
The quantized constraint condition (3.2.2) or (3.2.4) of Rovelli arises from a
quantization of the squared Hamiltonian H2 = 4ω2L2 and the requirement that
this observable must take the value E2. Alternatively, in the quantization scheme
based on oscillator algebras /3.2.2.2/, one can directly quantize the constraint
H − E = 0 (being linear in H), which leads to
Q(H) = ~ω (N1 +N2 + 1) = E
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when taking the zero point energy of both oscillators into account. The quantum
states fulfilling this condition are the same as above (direct product of number
states with constant total occupation number), but the subspace spanned by
these states has a different dependence on E, namely using (3.2.3)
2j + 1 = n+m+ 1 =
E
~ω
instead of (3.2.4). (The difference corresponds to a shift ~2ω2 in E2.)
This discrepancy between both quantizations of the constraint is however irrel-
evant, since in our endophysical description the numerical value of E cannot be
compared to that of another system: E depends on the unit of time which is
meaningless for the endosystem. (This does not preclude the possibility of com-
paring the energy of one subsystem to the energy of another subsystem.) In order
to avoid a contradiction it is therefore sufficient that both quantizations have the
same state spaces after imposition of the constraint, regardless with which value
of E they are labeled.
The quantization of H requires that H ∈ C2, which is not the case with the above
definition of C2; there is however no problem with choosing instead
C2 = genLie ({Lx, Ly, Lz, 1, H}) = span (Lx, Ly, Lz, 1, H)
and extending the quantization map with Q(H) = ~ω (N1 +N2 + 1). In the next
subsection we also have the constraint among the complete observables.
3.2.2.4 Directions of research
The idea of relational time and quantization was picked up by many authors since
1990. We give a short chronological list of the directions of research based on, or
similar to Rovelli’s two-oscillator model:
• A number of similar models with constraints was discussed in [Tat92] using
algebraic quantization.
• In [LE96] a reparametrization invariant system consisting of an oscillator and
a free particle serving as a clock was considered.
• In [Ash98b, Ash98a] the coherent state quantization of Rovelli’s model was
introduced and an explicit form for coherent states on reduced phase space
was given and discussed.
• In [Mon01] the relational evolution of generally covariant systems with vanish-
ing Hamiltonian and finitely many degrees of freedom was studied in general
and for two concrete systems.
• In [GP01] four models of relational time evolution in generally covariant quan-
tum systems were studied. In particular, the choice of admissible clock vari-
ables was shown to be not completely arbitrary.
• In [Ohk00] a two-oscillator system with a constraint consisting of the differ-
ence (rather than the sum) of the energies of the oscillators was discussed.
• In [ES02,Elz03a,Elz03b] a model with two compactified extra-dimensions is
studied, in which a discrete cyclic time is accessible only ’stroboscopically’
through quasi-local measurements.
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The concept of evolving constants of motion was discussed in [And95]. There is
a number of other publications aimed mainly at understanding the problem of
time in quantum gravity; we only give the most recent reference: [GPP04]
3.2.3 Free field
In this subsection we generalize the quantization of the two-oscillator system
to infinitely many oscillators, i.e. to a free scalar field in one dimension, whose
Poisson algebra C∞ of constants of motion was examined in /3.1.2/.
3.2.3.1 Quantization map
The idea of our quantization is similar to canonical quantization: We map zn 7→
an and z¯n 7→ a+n , where an and a+n are annihilation and creation operators on the
Hilbert space of oscillator n. We are thus interested in a quantization map Q,
which takes (complex) observables into quantum operators:
Q(1) = 1
Q(h+n ) = a
+
n an
Q(h−n ) = a
+
n a−n (3.2.5)
Q(a±mn) = amana
+
±(|m|+|n|)
Q(b±mn) = a
+
ma
+
n a±(|m|+|n|)
One easily sees that Q maps the real observables 1
2
(h−n + h
−
−n),
1
2i
(h−n − h−−n),
1
2
(a±mn + b
±−
mn) and
1
2i
(a±mn − b±−mn) into symmetric operators. Because of m 6=
± (|m|+ |n|) 6= n (m,n ∈ Z\ {0}) the operator ordering is no issue, except for
Q(h+n ), whose ordering is as in the canonical case.
If we consider only the two field modes n and −n, then identifying n with 1 and
−n with 2 we re-obtain the algebra of the two-oscillator system from h±′±n:
Q(Lx) =
~
2
(
a+1 a2 + a1a
+
2
) ' ~
2
Q(h−n + h
−
−n) ,
Q(Ly) =
i~
2
(
a+1 a2 − a1a+2
) ' ~
2
Q(h−n − h−−n) ,
Q(Lz) =
~
2
(
a+2 a2 − a+1 a1
) ' ~
2
Q(h+−n − h+n ) ,
Q(1) = 1 ' Q(1)
This identification rest on the fact that ωn = ω−n.
So far we have defined only the quantum image of the generating set C∞,g. The
observables in C∞,g provide a coordinatization of the classical phase space: Each
solution curve of the underlying Hamiltonian system is fixed by the values of all
constants of motion, and because of C∞ = gen(C∞,g) these are in turn fixed by
the values of the generating observables C∞,g. We thus choose
Virr = C∞,g
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for our canonical quantization of the field and furthermore
Vquant = genLie(C∞,g) ,
the Lie algebra generated by C∞,g, which is a Lie subalgebra of C∞ and trivially
contains Virr = C∞,g as required. Note that nothing of the associative structure
of C∞ is contained in Vquant. (We will prove a Groenewold-van Hove-like theorem
below in the contrary case.) One can also see, that even when considering the
bare sets, one has Vquant 6= C∞: E.g. z¯2nz2n = h+n · h+n ∈ C∞, but z¯2nz2n cannot
be obtained by taking Poisson brackets of elements of C∞,g: Only the bracket
(3.1.10) leads to expressions of second order in z¯. and second order in z., but no
combination of the indices yields z¯2nz
2
n.
In the canonical cases Qcan,1 and Qcan,2 the sets generating Vquant do even lin-
early span the classical algebra Vquant, which is then quantized. Here we have
gen(C∞,g) = Vquant, but Vquant 6= span(C∞,g), because Poisson brackets of a±.. and
b±.. lead to polynomials of arbitrary high order in z. and z¯.. It is thus not sufficient
to define the image of C∞,g under Q; we have to map all of Vquant.
A naive rule for mapping all of Vquant would state: Given any polynomial f ∈
Vquant, replace each z¯n by a+n and each zn by an. This rule does however not
work, because of operator ordering: For any polynomial containing z¯n and zn one
could order z¯n and zn arbitrarily, but the quantum image would in depend on the
ordering.
A proper definition of the quantization map Q certainly has to fulfil (3.2.1). This
way we can define the quantum image of {f, g}, i.e. for polynomials of arbi-
trary order, but uniqueness of this definition is not assured: There could possibly
be f ′ 6= f and g′ 6= g with {f, g} = {f ′, g′} classically, but [Q(f), Q(g)] 6=
[Q(f ′), Q(g′)] due to operator ordering. – Using the computer algebra system
maple we have calculated Poisson brackets and commutators of several low or-
der constants of motion, and we always found equation (3.2.1) to not lead to
contradictions. We were however not able to prove the following
Conjecture 3.2.1. The map Q : C∞,g → SYM(H) given by (3.2.5) can be
uniquely extended to Vquant using rule (3.2.1).
Let us sketch the difficulties in proving the above conjecture. The lowest order
polynomials containing a zlz¯l-term (for which operator ordering becomes relevant
after quantization) are the 4th order expressions (m,n ∈ Z\ {0})
{
a±mn, b
±′
mn
}
=
{
zmznz¯±(|m|+|n|), z¯mz¯nz±′(|m|+|n|)
}
= (z¯nzn + zmz¯m) z±′(|m|+|n|)z¯±(|m|+|n|) =: P4 ,
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where the ordering of the factors in both summands of P4 is arbitrary. The
quantization of P4 is given by rule (3.2.1):
Q(P4) =
1
i~
[
Q(a±mn), Q(b
±′
mn)
]
=
1
i~
[
amana
+
±(|m|+|n|), a
+
ma
+
n a±′(|m|+|n|)
]
=
1
i~
(
a+n an + ama
+
m
)
a±′(|m|+|n|)a+±(|m|+|n|)
Hence an operator ordering is defined through (3.2.1); it is also unique for P4,
since there is no other way for obtaining the 4th order expression P4 from (a
linear combination of) Poisson brackets other than from a Poisson bracket of two
third oder polynomials, which are easily seen to be fixed uniquely. Note also that
– as required by the symmetry of a±mn as well as b
±′
mn – Q(P4) is symmetric in m
and n, since
a+n an + ama
+
m = a
+
n an + 1 + a
+
mam = a
+
mam + ana
+
n .
In our view the main idea for a proof of the above conjecture is complete induc-
tion over the degree of the polynomials: Assuming that the quantization of all
polynomials up to order n (obtained from building linear combinations of Poisson
brackets of elements of C∞,g) is unique, one would have to show that the quanti-
zation of all polynomials of order n + 1 is unique (regarding operator ordering),
too. We did not succeed in proving this. We considered a polynomial Pn+1 with
n + 1 factors (z. or z¯.), which does emerge as a Poisson bracket {Pn−ν , Pν+3}
(ν = 0, . . . , n − 3) from polynomials with n − ν and ν + 3 factors (since always
two factors cancel out when evaluating the Poisson bracket). Using this mecha-
nism of emergence also for lower order polynomials, it can be shown that Pn+1 is
a linear combination of ’telescopic Poisson brackets’
{{· · · {{∗, ∗} , ∗} · · · } , ∗}
involving only a±ij and b
±
ij-terms (abbreviated with ∗); the number of ∗-term is
N − 1. The proof is based essentially on the Jacobi identity. (Poisson brackets
with h±n can be neglected, since {∗, h±n } = ∗ up to a scalar, which allows to
recursively eliminate h±n using the Jacobi identity.)
This decomposition of Pn+1 into a linear combination of ’telescopic Poisson brack-
ets’ is however not unique, e.g.
iz1z2z5z¯8 = {z1z2z¯3, z3z5z¯8} =
{
a+1,2, a
+
3,5
}
= {z1z5z¯6, z6z2z¯8} =
{
a+1,5, a
+
6,2
}
.
Although the constant of motion z1z2z5z¯8 arises as Poisson bracket of different
expressions, it has a unique quantization, since it does not contain a factor zlz¯l
and thus operator ordering is arbitrary. (It can be easily seen that operator
ordering can become relevant only if the telescopic Poisson bracket expression
contains both a a±ij and a b
±′
i′j′-term.) The appearance of a factor zlz¯l is always
accompanied by the presence of another summand, identical except for possibly
the coefficient and the replacement of zlz¯l with zkz¯k for some k 6= l. This possible
appearance of several summands in a telescopic Poisson bracket expression makes
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the situation complicated; we could not prove that if a telescopic Poisson bracket
expression can be written as a linear combination of other such expressions, then
the quantization of both must be the same. This would prove the conjecture.
3.2.3.2 Groenewold-van Hove theorem
We have already seen that (h+n )
2 /∈ Vquant. What happens, if we add h+mh+n
(m,n ∈ Z\{0}) to the generating set and try to find a quantization map? – We
will show that such a quantization does not exist.
Let now Vquant be arbitrary, but contain genLie(C∞,g ∪ {h+mh+n : m,n ∈ Z\ {0}}).
We assume that a quantization map Q fulfilling (3.2.5) does exist. We do not
need to make any assumption on the image of h+mh
+
n under Q, but we assume
that h+mh
+
n is in the domain of Q. This will suffice to prove a contradiction. (The
proof of Groenewold and van Hove, which assumes that for instance q3 is in the
domain of the quantization map, is similar in that respect.) In the following we
use ~ = 1.
Lemma 3.2.2. For ν ∈ N, if Q((h−n )ν) is defined, then
Q((h−n )
ν) = αν + γν
(
Q(h−n )
)ν
with some constants αν , γν ∈ C.
Proof. We consider Q((h−n )
ν) as a polynomial in a+n , an, a
+
−n, a−n. From
{h+n , (h−n )ν} = −2i(h−n )ν (cf. /3.1.2.2/) it follows that[
Q(h+n ), Q((h
−
n )
ν)
]
= iQ
({
h+n , (h
−
n )
ν
})
= iQ
(−νi(h−n )ν) = νQ((h−n )ν) .
Since Q(h+n ) is the number operator for mode n, Q((h
−
n )
ν) can contain only terms
of ν-th power in a+n or an. Analogously,
{
h+−n, (h
−
n )
ν
}
= νi(h−n )
ν and[
Q(h+−n), Q((h
−
n )
ν)
]
= iQ
({
h+−n, (h
−
n )
ν
})
= iQ
(
2i(h−n )
ν
)
= −νQ((h−n )ν) ,
so that Q((h−n )
ν) can contain only terms of ν-th power in a+−n or a−n. Apart
from a constant term Q((h−n )
ν) is thus a linear combination of terms of the form(
a#n
)ν (
a#−n
)ν
, where a# means a or a+. Since on the other hand[
Q(h−n ), Q((h
−
n )
ν)
]
= iQ
({
h−n , (h
−
n )
ν
})
= iQ (0) = 0 ,
the possibilities (a+n )
ν (
a+−n
)ν
, (an)
ν (a−n)
ν and (an)
ν (a+−n)ν are ruled out, as
a simple calculation of commutators shows. We thus have Q((h−n )
ν) = αν +
γν (a
+
n )
ν
(a−n)
ν = αν + γν (Q(h
−
n ))
ν
, where of course the operator ordering is
arbitrary.
As for the coefficient γν , it can be shown that it is a scalar multiple of 1: Assume
that after writing γν as a sum of normal ordered terms it contains a term (a
+
m)
µaλm
(with m 6= n) and either µ > 0 or λ > 0. Then in case µ 6= λ we arrive at the
contradiction:
Q(
{
h+m, (h
−
n )
ν
}
) =
1
i
[
Q(h+m), Q((h
−
n )
ν)
]
=
1
i
[
a+mam, γν
] (
a+n
)ν
(a−n)
ν 6= 0
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In the case µ = λ > 0 we write γ = (a+m)
µaµmγ˜ (with γ˜ 6= 0 containing neither a+m
nor am) and also obtain a contradiction:
Q(
{
h−m, (h
−
n )
ν
}
) =
1
i
[
a+m, (a
+
m)
µaµm
]
a−mγ˜
(
a+n
)ν
(a−n)
ν 6= 0
¤
Now we use this lemma in the case ν = 2; the following proof shows that Q((h−n )
2)
is defined:
Lemma 3.2.3. Q((h+n )
2) is at most of second order in an and at most of second
order in a+n .
Proof. We write Q((h+n )
2) as a polynomial in a+n and an with normal ordered
summands. We consider a summand proportional to (a+n )
µaνn. Then we have
[[(a+n )
µaνn, Q(h
−
n )] , Q(h
−
n )] = [[(a
+
n )
µaνn, a
+
n ] , a
+
n ] a
2
−n = ν(ν − 1)(a+n )µaν−2n a2−n. On
the other hand, the classical brackets are {{(h+n )2, h−n } , h−n } = −2(h−n )2, implying[[
Q((h+n )
2), Q(h−n )
]
, Q(h−n )
]
= Q
(
2(h−n )
2
)
= 2α2 + 2γ2
(
a+n
)2
(a−n)
2 ,
where the last equation is due to the preceding lemma. We conclude that
Q((h+n )
2) can contain only terms (a+n )
µaνn with either ν = 2 and µ = 2, or with
ν < 2 and arbitrary µ. By analogously taking the commutators with Q(h−−n) and
Poisson brackets with h−−n we can also show µ ≤ 2. ¤
A generalization of this result is also possible:
Lemma 3.2.4. Q((h+n )
λ) is at most of λ-th order in an and most of λ-th order
in a+n .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the preceding lemma, but one has to take
the λ-fold commutator with Q(h−n ). ¤
We are now able to constrain the explicit form of Q((h+n )
2):
Lemma 3.2.5. Q((h+n )
2) = ϑn + ζna
+
n an + γn(a
+
n )
2a2n with ϑn, ζn, γn ∈ C for all
n ∈ Z\ {0}.
Proof. From the classical bracket {(h+n )2, h+n } = 0 we have the commutator
[Q((h+n )
2), a+n an] = 0, which can be easily seen to imply that Q((h
+
n )
2) can contain
only terms proportional to (a+n )
µaνn with µ = ν. Q((h
+
n )
2) thus has the asserted
form, and, since all three contributions to Q((h+n )
2) are linearly independent,
a reasoning similar to that of lemma 3.2.2 can be applied for the coefficients
ϑn, ζn, γn separately, implying ϑn, ζn, γn ∈ C. ¤
A generalization, which is not needed in the sequel, can be proved similarly:
Lemma 3.2.6. Q
(
(h+n )
λ
)
is a polynomial in Q(h+n ) of at most λ-th degree.
Now we can prove the explicit form of Q((h+n )
2):
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Proposition 3.2.7. For n ∈ Z\ {0} we have γn = 1 and ζn = 2, or equivalently
Q((h+n )
2) = ϑn + a
+
n anana
+
n .
Proof. A straightforward calculation shows (for i, j ∈ Z\ {0}){{
a+ij, b
+
ij
}
, a+i,|i|+|j|
}
=
(
h+i + h
+
|i|+|j|
)
a+i,|i|+|j| . (3.2.6)
The quantum version of this equation reads
Q
({{
a+ij, b
+
ij
}
, a+i,|i|+|j|
})
= Q
(
h+i a
+
i,|i|+|j|
)
+Q
(
h+|i|+|j|a
+
i,|i|+|j|
)
.
The left hand side evaluates to:
Q
({{
a+ij, b
+
ij
}
, a+i,|i|+|j|
})
=
1
i
[
1
i
[
Q
(
a+ij
)
, Q
(
b+ij
)]
, Q
(
a+i,|i|+|j|
)]
=
(
a+i ai + 2 + a
+
|i|+|j|a|i|+|j|
)
a+2|i|+|j|a|i|+|j|ai
And the right hand side is connected with Q((h+n )
2):
Q
(
h+i a
+
i,|i|+|j|
)
= Q
(
1
2i
{
(h+i )
2, a+i,|i|+|j|
})
= −1
2
[
Q
(
(h+i )
2
)
, Q
(
a+i,|i|+|j|
)]
= −1
2
[
ϑi + ζia
+
i ai + γi(a
+
i )
2a2i , a
+
2|i|+|j|aia|i|+|j|
]
=
(
1
2
ζi + γia
+
i ai
)
a+2|i|+|j|aia|i|+|j| ,
and analogously
Q
(
h+|i|+|j|a
+
i,|i|+|j|
)
=
(
1
2
ζ|i|+|j| + γ|i|+|j|a+|i|+|j|a|i|+|j|
)
a+2|i|+|j|aia|i|+|j| .
Comparing the left and right hand sides we obtain γi = 1, γ|i|+|j| = 1 and ζi +
ζ|i|+|j| = 4. Especially we have ζ1+ζ3 = 4, ζ1+ζ4 = 4, ζ3+ζ4 = 4, whence 2ζ1 = 4
and ζ1 = 2. For j = 1, 2, . . . we obtain from ζ1+ζ1+|j| = 4 also ζj = 2. This result
implies ζi = 2 also for i < 0, since (setting j = 1) ζi + ζ|i|+1 = ζi + 2 = 4. ¤
Clearly, as far as only commutators are evaluated the value of ϑn is unimportant.
Moreover, one easily sees that Q((h+n )
2) is symmetric.
Lemma 3.2.8. Q(h+i h
+
j ) is a polynomial of at most first degree in Q(h
+
i ) and
Q(h+j ).
Proof. We can assume Q(h+i h
+
j ) to be normal ordered. From
{
h+i h
+
j , h
+
i
}
=
0 we have
[
Q(h+i h
+
j ), a
+
i ai
]
= 0, hence as above we conclude that Q(h+i h
+
j ) must
be a polynomial in Q(h+i ) = a
+
i ai. The reasoning for Q(h
+
j ) is analogous.
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To prove that Q(h+i h
+
j ) is at most of first oder in Q(h
+
i ) one writes Q(h
+
i h
+
j ) as
a polynomial in Q(h+i ) and considers a summand of order ν ≥ 2:[[(
Q(h+i )
)ν
, Q(h−i )
]
, Q(h−i )
]
=
[[
(a+i ai)
ν , a+i
]
, a+i
]
a2−i
= ν(ν − 1)(a+i ai)ν−2a2−i 6= 0
On the other hand we have
{{
h+i h
+
j , h
−
i
}
, h−i
}
= −i{h−i h+j , h−i } = 0, so that[[
Q(h+i h
+
j ), Q(h
−
i )
]
, Q(h−i )
]
= 0. Again, the reasoning for Q(h+j ) is analogous.
¤
Proposition 3.2.9. Q(h+i h
+
j ) cannot be consistently defined.
Proof. Using (3.2.6) a simple calculation yields{{
a+ij, b
+
ij
}
,
{{
a+ij, b
+
ij
}
, a+i,|i|+|j|
}}
=
(
h+i + h
+
|i|+|j|
)2
a+i,|i|+|j| . (3.2.7)
On the other hand we have:{
h+i h
+
|i|+|j|,−
1
2i
{
a+i,|i|+|j|, (h
+
i )
2 + (h+|i|+|j|)
2
}}
= (3.2.8){
h+i h
+
|i|+|j|,
(
h+i + h
+
|i|+|j|
)
a+i,|i|+|j|
}
=
(
h+i + h
+
|i|+|j|
)2
a+i,|i|+|j|
A straightforward calculation (using computer algebra) yields for the quantized
left hand side of (3.2.7):
2a+i a
2
i a
+
|i|+|j|a
2
|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ ai(a
+
|i|+|j|)
2a3|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ 5aia
+
|i|+|j|a
2
|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ 5a+i a
2
i a|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ (a+i )
2a3i a|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ 4aia|i|+|j|a+2|i|+|j|
For the evaluation of the left hand side of (3.2.8) we use due to the preceding
lemma
Q(h+i h
+
|i|+|j|) = α3a
+
i aia
+
|i|+|j|a|i|+|j| + α2a
+
i ai + α1a
+
|i|+|j|a|i|+|j| + α0
and obtain:
2α3a
+
i a
2
i a
+
|i|+|j|a
2
|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ α3ai(a
+
|i|+|j|)
2a3|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ (3α3 + α2 + α1)aia
+
|i|+|j|a
2
|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ (3α3 + α2 + α1)a
+
i a
2
i a|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ α3(a
+
i )
2a3i a|i|+|j|a
+
2|i|+|j|
+ (α3 + α2 + α1)aia|i|+|j|a+2|i|+|j|
Comparing the coefficients of both expressions we obtain from the first five lines,
respectively, α3 = 1 and α2+α1 = 2. This latter equation cannot satisfy however
99
the remaining equality of the sixth line; there is a discrepancy aia|i|+|j|a+2|i|+|j|,
which stems from operator ordering. (For this discrepancy to show up it we
found it necessary to consider the commutator of two expressions, in both of
which operator ordering is relevant.) ¤
In conclusion, we haven proved the following no-go theorem similar to that of
Groenewold and van Hove:
Theorem 3.2.10. A canonical quantization of the Poisson algebra of constants
of motion of a free massless scalar field in one dimension, based on a Lie algebra
Vquant containing genLie(C∞,g ∪ {h+mh+n : m,n ∈ Z\ {0}}) does not exist.
3.2.3.3 Constraint
The constraint takes the simple form∑
n∈Z\{0}
~ωnh+n = E ,
where we have subtracted the zero point energy. The subspace of states fulfilling
this constraint is spanned by all tensor products ⊗i∈Z\{0} |ni〉 of number states of
single field modes with∑
k∈Z\{0}
|k|nk = E~ω1 .
(Clearly, the constraint entails ultraviolet-finiteness.)
The operators Q(a±mn) = amana
+
±(|m|+|n|) and Q(b
±
mn) = a
+
ma
+
n a±(|m|+|n|) preserve
the constraint by just redistributing the occupation numbers between three field
modes.
3.2.3.4 Complete and partial observables
The quantization of the complete observable qn(q1) (3.1.13) is straightforward; it
requires lots of symmetrization for the products (3.1.14).
In the limit of infinite box length the expression (3.1.14) contains a factor(
a+1√
a+1 a1
)n−1
.
This operator is not defined for n1 = 0, but can – as well as its adjoint operator –
be regularized; see [LE96] for a discussion of the free particle limit in a relational
model of two oscillators.
As already stated above /2.2.4/, n1 = 0 does not allow to use field mode 1 as a
clock; this would allow only for a single instant. In the Fock representation all
but finitely many field modes are in their vacuum state. Understanding time as
infrared behaviour of the field, all Fock states thus have the same time. In the
next chapter we shall argue that a proper understanding of time as a physical
quantity requires inequivalent representations.

CHAPTER 4
Change without time
The classicality of time is discussed and an outlook on general dynamics in
view of quantum measurement is given.
A hard-boiled positivist may have difficulties to
appreciate such a quantum endophysics since it
refers by definition to some kind of Platonic
universe, and not to empirical facts. [...] Ev-
ery operationally meaningful description we can
give is observer-dependent or contextual. That
is, for a hard-boiled positivist, universally valid
natural laws do not exist.
Hans Primas [Pri94c]
4.1 Classicality of time
Since a non-cyclic physical time always requires some infinity, we consider the
possibility that time essentially is the infrared behaviour of a field /4.1.1/. The
main problem with the relational concept of time is rooted in quantum mechanics,
where arbitrary superpositions are possible. As a partial solution to this problem
we propose to understand time as an observable at infinity of a quantum system
with infinitely many degrees of freedom, allowing for instantaneity /4.1.2/.
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4.1.1 Physical time
Taking the endophysical point of view and assuming that time is nothing more
than what is measurable by actual clocks we find that in classical mechanics
there are essentially only two types of clocks: A free particle and systems with an
oscillation mechanism. In order to measure a linear (non-cyclic) time the latter
systems must have oscillators with arbitrary long oscillation periods; in case of
free oscillators the limit of infinite oscillation period corresponds to a free particle,
cf. our discussion in /2.2/. Accelerated particles as well as interacting oscillators
can also be used as clocks, but their duration is not identical with that of an
hypothetical absolute time.
In quantum mechanics single (free) particles are of limited use because of spread-
ing wave packets1; anyway, they require space to be infinitely extended and a
quantum field to exist, because without a quantum field (with infinitely many
degrees of freedom) the (infinity of) positions at which the particle can be local-
ized could not be distinguished endophysically.
We therefore conclude that a non-cyclic physical time always requires infinitely
many degrees of freedom and make the hypothesis that time is given by the in-
frared behaviour of fields, i.e. by the oscillation of field modes with arbitrary long
wavelengths.
If there is more than one field (or a field in more than one dimension), it may
happen that one of them is able to separate instants, which another one cannot
separate /1.3.3/. Consider e.g. a classical charge moving in an electromagnetic
field and some other noninteracting field. Due to the long-range electromagnetic
interaction the position of the charge is correlated with the infrared behaviour of
the state of the electromagnetic field, but uncorrelated with the other field; the
state of the other field does not allow to distinguish between states, i.e. positions,
of the charge. – In finding a time observable /1.3.3/ in general one thus has to take
into account all fields. If there are two fields serving as clocks (i.e., separating all
instants), there is no problem with different durations being measured by them,
since an absolute duration is meaningless from the relational point of view. –
Our hypothesis implicitly assumes that every system with short-rage interactions
is coupled (directly or indirectly) to the infrared modes of a field; otherwise the
system would have no correlation with the clock(s).
4.1.2 Instantaneity
Already the quantized version of Rovelli’s two-oscillator model /3.2.2/ shows
severe problems with a relational interpretation: Arbitrary states in the ten-
sor product of the Hilbert spaces of both oscillators, which fulfil the constraint
condition (3.2.3,3.2.4), are allowed. On the one hand this allows to build quasi-
localized states from the number states of oscillator 1, say, so that its position q1
serves as a time for the motion q2(q1) of oscillator 2; but on the other hand also
1There are models with infinitely massive particles, but this limit is beyond respected
quantum mechanics (being useful for approximations, but of no avail in principle).
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superpositions of different times are allowed, which is hard to interpret within a
classical temporal logics.
In Rovelli’s pioneering article [Rov90] therefore the assumption was made that
the total system is in a semiclassical state in which the position observables of
both oscillators (partial observables) are correlated sufficiently strong. From this
Rovelli could derive an approximately unitary dynamics for the state of oscillator
2 when using the (simultaneous) position of oscillator 1 as clock time. – There is
however no a priori reason to require the allowed states of a quantum endosystem
to be semiclassical, let alone having a correlation between certain degrees of
freedom (in this case q1 and q2). This lack of a fixed quantum evolution is the
main problem with the relational approach and to date unsolved.
Part of the problem is that clock states can be coherently superposed, so that
a clear separation of instants is impossible. For this problem we propose the
following solution: If time is embodied in the infrared behaviour of a field, i.e. as
an observable at infinity, different values of this (’time’) observable at infinity
require inequivalent2 representations of the algebra of observables, and these rep-
resentations correspond to states, which cannot be coherently superposed. (Every
superposition of these states is equivalent to a mixture.) Moreover, observables
at infinity are classical observables, i.e. they commute with all observables, so
that time can always be considered as simultaneously measurable. Understand-
ing time as an observable at infinity therefore reproduces the classical intuition
with a definite value of the time observable.
The formalism in which this classicality can be achieved is algebraic quantum
mechanics [Sau88,Emc72,Lan91,Haa96] of systems with infinitely many degrees
of freedom. The starting point is the C*-algebra of observables with all possible
states, i.e. linear functionals on it ascribing to each observable an expectation
value. Each state induces a representation of the algebra through operators on
a Hilbert space (via the GNS-construction). There is a universal mechanism for
’completion’ of these representations (taking the bicommutant, or the closure
in any of several topologies), which adds representation-dependent observables
and results in a representation-dependent von Neumann-algebra. In particular,
projection operators necessary for a classical interpretation (in terms of yes-no-
alternatives) are in general added to the algebra.
It is a generally accepted interpretation that the choice of representation is ar-
bitrary in principle and depends on the experimental situation to be described,
but is by far not determined through it. There is a necessity to make a choice
for a particular description of the quantum system, which introduces new, con-
textual properties. Since one can never know the whole of an infinite system,
such a choice is unavoidable, if one wants to describe the whole system as an
endosystem [Pri94c,AP02,Pri98,Pri97,Pri94b,Pri87].
For the free field we had identified the behaviour of q1 in the limit of infinite
box length as a clock time in chapter /3/. If we want to describe quantum
2If we do not restrict ourselves to pure states, disjoint representations must be used.
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dynamics with this clock time, then we must choose only representations in which3
Q(q1) =
√
~a1+a
+
1√
2ω1
converges in the limit. A change of representation can then
effect a change of the value of Q(q1), i.e. alter the time of the system. Time
emerges as a contextual property, corresponding to the fact that one can never
know the phase of all oscillators from quasi-local measurements only.
Even if in the limit of infinite box length the observable Q(q1) is a classical
observable and dispersion-free in the chosen state with value t, this does not
impose any constraints on the local observables Q(qn), since their expectation
values can be chosen at will within the equivalence class of the chosen state.
Within this class the coherent superposability4 of local states remains untouched.
On the other hand states from different classes having different values of the time
observable cannot be coherently superposed. (In traditional quantum mechanics
this time superselection rule has to be postulated.)
The above reasoning does not apply directly to relational quantum mechanics,
because a relational algebraic quantum mechanics is still to be developed: One
has to find a relational analogue of the Weyl quantization, and it must be shown
that the algebra of constants of motion thus obtained is a C*-algebra. Choosing a
representation of this C*-algebra then corresponds to a choice of evolution. If one
wants to interpret the evolution in terms of partial observables, one has to embed
this C*-algebra into the ’usual’ C*-algebra of algebraic quantum mechanics, the
algebra of canonical (anti-)commutation relations, which may allow for a partial
’time’ observable in suitable states as discussed above.
4.2 General dynamics and quantum measure-
ment
In traditional dynamics the expectation values of all observables depend con-
tinuously on a time parameter t. Unitary time evolution is a basic symmetry
in quantum theory, derived from an automorphism group of the algebra of ob-
servables [Sim76]. Unitary dynamics cannot account for wavefunction collapse
during measurement (quantum measurement problem). There are three options
w.r.t. the reality of collapse:
(a) One can argue that collapses do never occur and resort to a many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This option does not appreciate the
empirical evidence for collapse.
3Here Q is the quantization map in the canonical quantization of positions and momenta.
4This has been called kinematical superposition principle (stating that the superposition
of two states is a valid state), in distinction from the dynamical superposition principle, which
claims that the result of a time evolution of a superposition of two states is the same as the
superposition of respective results of their time evolutions.
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(b) One can argue that collapses do occur approximately, but never ’exactly’.
In this case it can however be proved that coherence can be re-established
through suitable later interactions/measurements. This would in turn re-
quire to find reasons why such interactions do rarely take place. Explana-
tions in this direction tend to end up with problems similar to von Neu-
mann’s infinite chain of measurements.
(c) One can try to solve the measurement problem and explain collapse. Since
the insolubility under reasonable assumptions in the traditional Hilbert space
setting is well known [BLM96], one must change these assumptions at least
partially.
Within algebraic quantum mechanics an approach of the last kind is possible: The
measurement apparatus is modelled as having infinitely5 many degrees of freedom
and is coupled to an object system having finitely many degrees of freedom.
For suitable interactions definite pointer states can be obtained, but this takes
infinitely long [Hep72], in contrast with empirical facts. For this reason it has
been argued that the traditional automorphic dynamics cannot be correct [Bre98];
the alternative is a non-automorphic dynamics, which means that observable
quantities are mapped into unobservable ones during time evolution.
This latter view finds support from our idea of different time instants as inequiv-
alent representations of the algebra of observables. Choosing a representation
with a given value of a time observable may create new facts, i.e., classical ob-
servables being not defined in ’earlier’ representations may emerge. If there is
a one-parameter family of such representations describing time evolution, the
question naturally arises as to when a new fact does emerge (cmp. /2.2.1/).
The answer depends on the choice of non-automorphic dynamics, but which one
is the correct one? For sufficiently weak short-range interactions it certainly has
to reproduce unitary dynamics locally. This requirement does however not fix
a unique ’dynamics at infinity’. Following the general philosophy we speculate
that such a ’dynamics at infinity’ might be not unique. This would allow for a
non-deterministic ’evolution’ of local states having sufficiently strong long-range
interactions.
If a relational algebraic quantum mechanics can be formulated, a choice of rep-
resentation would fix constants of motion and thus evolution. Since many repre-
sentations are compatible with a given local evolution, the evolution ’at infinity’
could be chosen at will. I.e., the indeterminism is introduced not at the level of
instantaneous states, but on the level of dynamical evolutions. We think that
this idea deserves further study. The technical problem are however enormous,
because the constants of motion of appropriate models would have to be explicitly
known.
Radical relationalism takes quite an opposite point of view: dynamics is a set of
instantaneous descriptions of a system, which contain a time observable /1.3.3/
taking different values for different descriptions. The main question then is:
5Without this infinity coherence could be re-established by a suitable later measurement
[Bel75].
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Which descriptions may be combined into a set to obtain a valid dynamics? –
For conformity with traditional dynamics the set would have to be a continuous
family of descriptions parametrized by the value of the time observable, and the
expectation values of all other observables would have to depend continuously on
this parameter within the family. The concept of evolving constants of motion
adheres to this traditional dynamics. E.g., in the two-oscillator model /3.1.1/
such a family is given by specifying the values of all constants of motion and
choosing q1 as parameter; then e.g. the dependence q2(q1) is continuous.
A purely instantaneous description is however an ambitious project, since it has
to account for our knowledge of the past as a property of the instantaneous state
of the system, i.e. it amounts to a theory of consciousness.
In conclusion, the relational concept of time leads to a proper understanding
of time as a physical quantity. The concept of evolving constants of motion
and relational quantization are worth to be further explored (e.g., a momentum
constraint instead of a Hamiltonian might lead to a relational understanding
of space in the quantum domain), especially in an algebraic framework still to
be created. The possibility to choose time evolutions too some degree at will
might account for the indeterminism of measurement collapse and the ’emergence’
(albeit not within ’time’) of classical observables.
We close with a quote of Einstein:
The hardest thing to understand is why we can understand anything at all.
Summary
The nature of time has long been debated in human history and nowadays is
considered of central importance in understanding quantum gravity. This thesis
focuses on and advocates the relational concept of time, which was put forward
in the 17th century in opposition to Newton’s absolute time, and only in 1990
explored in a quantum mechanical framework by Carlo Rovelli.
After a historical introduction the mathematical models of time are carefully
analyzed in chapter 1, followed by a discussion of the role of time played in fun-
damental theories. Using as an example nonrelativistic mechanics, the process
of parametrization is explained, leading to a separation of a ’canonical time co-
ordinate’ from an arbitrary evolution parameter. The discussion of the role of
time in special and general relativity as well as in quantum mechanics shows
that more fundamental theories use less structure of time. This is followed by an
exposition of the history of the relational concept of time, which negates the ex-
istence of an absolute duration and therefore often is called “timeless”. Next it is
shown how fundamental theories can be formulated and re-interpreted using this
concept. We put emphasis on the hitherto neglected connection between relation-
alism and non-extensibility, while absolute time is shown to be unproblematic in
classical mechanics just because of the possibility to extend the system without
changing its nature. We conclude chapter 1 with a new axiomatic basis for the
construction of time observables based on a simultaneity relation between ’obser-
vations’, which are treated as a primitive concept and intuitively correspond to
measurement events, but without knowing ’when’ these events occur. There is
no fundamental time observable; any observable qualifies as a time observable, if
it allows to separate all instants.
Chapter 2 gives a brief account of three main problems connected with time:
The arrow of time, time measurement and quantum gravity. The problem of the
arrow of time actually has to be disentangled from the problem of irreversibility:
a solution of the latter essentially excludes cyclic motions and is required for a
solution of the former, which consists in showing that a fundamental direction
between any two non-identical instants is physically meaningful. We give a for-
mal definition of the arrow of time. This classical analysis is followed by a review
of the problem of the arrow of time in quantum theory, where the situation be-
comes more complicated because of indeterminism. The discussion shows that
there is no experimental evidence for a fundamental arrow of time, so that no
contradiction with the relational concept of time arises. The second problem,
time measurement, is of particular importance for the relational approach, in
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which time has no reality except if measured by a clock. In quantum theory
time observables have long been considered to be impossible in the traditional
Hilbert space formalism according to a ’theorem’ of Pauli. Notwithstanding a
fault in the proof of Pauli’s ’theorem’, useful time operators seem to be possi-
ble only within the more general formalism of positive operator valued measures
(POVM). Clocks based on an oscillation mechanism do however require phase
measurements; quantum phase operators can be defined as certain positive oper-
ator valued measures. Phase difference operators do also exist in the traditional
Hilbert space formalism, if another quantization is used, as is done with relational
quantization. The third problem with time, quantum gravity, is sketched only
briefly. The diffeomorphism invariance of canonical quantum gravity entails that
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation is devoid of time and cannot be understood as an
evolution equation.
Chapter 3 introduces and discusses a model of Rovelli [Rov90] consisting of two
oscillators with no external time. In this model one oscillator is considered as
a clock and defines a relational time for the other one. In the first section we
introduce this model and generalize it to a free massless scalar field in one di-
mension. We establish the relation between a single field mode and the infrared
behaviour of the field through constants of motion. In the second section after a
short review of canonical quantization we review Rovelli’s quantization and gen-
eralize it to the free field. We could not prove the existence of the quantization
map, but calculations using computer algebra indicate that the quantization does
exist. For an enlarged algebra (containing also the products of the energies of two
field modes) we prove the nonexistence of a quantization map. (For the canonical
quantization of position and momentum a similar theorem has been proved by
Groenewold and van Hove.)
In chapter 4 we observe that a clock time always requires infinitely many de-
grees of freedom and we make the hypothesis that a time observable is given by
the infrared behaviour of quantum fields, leading to a classical notion of time
when using algebraic quantum mechanics. This does however not solve the main
problem of quantum relationalism: Which conditions determine a particular evo-
lution? – In a second section we give an informal discussion of some implications
of a physical time for possible solutions to the quantum measurement problem.
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